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A prediction market is a special type of market which offers trades for se-
curities associated with future states that are observable at a certain time in
the future. Recently, prediction markets have shown the promise of being an
abstract framework for designing distributed, scalable and self-incentivized
machine learning systems which could then apply to large scale problems.
However, existing designs of prediction markets are far from achieving such
machine learning goal, due to (1) the limited belief modelling power and also
(2) an inadequate understanding of the market dynamics. This work is thus
motivated by improving and extending current prediction market design in
both aspects.
This research is focused on potential based prediction markets, that is, predic-
tion markets that are administered by potential (or cost function) based mar-
ket makers (PMM). To improve the market’s modelling power, we first pro-
pose the partially-observable potential based market maker (PoPMM), which
generalizes the standard PMM such that it allows securities to be defined
and evaluated on future states that are only partially-observable, while also
maintaining the key properties of the standard PMM. Next, we complete and
extend the theory of generalized exponential families (GEFs), and use GEFs
to free the belief models encoded in the PMM/PoPMM from always being in
exponential families.
To have a better understanding of the market dynamics and its link to model
learning, we discuss the market equilibrium and convergence in two main set-
tings: convergence driven by traders, and convergence driven by the market
maker. In the former case, we show that a market-wise objective will emerge
from the traders’ personal objectives and will be optimized through traders’
selfish behaviours in trading. We then draw intimate links between the con-
vergence result to popular algorithms in convex optimization and machine
learning. In the latter case, we augment the PMM with an extra belief model
and a bid-ask spread, and model the market dynamics as an optimal control
problem. This convergence result requires no specific models on traders, and
is suitable for understanding the markets involving less controllable traders.
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“It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to foresee
at all.”
— Henri Poincaré in The Foundations of Science
Respecting the stochastic nature of the world, probabilistic predictions have
become, especially in machine learning, a more appropriate way for describ-
ing the future than deterministic approaches. During the construction of
probabilistic predictors, aggregating information from different algorithms
or agents is often preferred or even becomes necessary. This is guided by
the intuition that the collective prediction should act better than any individ-
uals and also by many practical evidences (e.g. Netflix challenge, PASCAL
challenge, Kaggle). Today, in the era of “big data”, this aggregation structure
emerges not merely from the requirement of boosting prediction performance,
but more importantly, from the interests of building distributed, scalable sys-
tems for solving large scaled data-driven or crowdsourcing tasks.
Prediction markets are marketplaces for trading securities whose values de-
pend on some future states, which remain uncertain before being realized at a
certain time in the future (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Arrow et al., 2008). Re-
cently, prediction markets have shown the promise of being an abstract frame-
work for designing probabilistic belief aggregation systems that are favoured
by the big data setting. On the one hand, the association between securities
and future states allows beliefs and predictions to be encoded by the market
quantities (e.g. prices, traded shares); on the other hand, the market structure
1
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Figure 1.1: The structure of prediction market. The market structure is a natural
distributed, large-scale environment where each trader learn their own probabilistic
beliefs about the future state and then aggregate their beliefs to market by trading se-
curities. With values dependent on the future state, securities can encode beliefs into
trades, and also rewarding traders according to the quality of their beliefs assessed
based on the actual observed state.
defines a natural distributed, large-scale environment, and also implements
an information aggregation flow through transactions. In addition, the match
between the trading reward and the performance of prediction can incentivize
agents to submit results of better qualities (Figure 1.1). This environment also
provide a way of measuring their skills, which makes prediction markets very
suitable for crowdsourcing tasks (Abernethy and Frongillo, 2011).
In fact, prediction markets have been widely applied to public prediction
tasks in many fields, such as politics (Iowa Electronic Market, Intrade), sports
(TradeSports, STOCCER) and entertainment (Hollywood Stock Exchange).
They are also used by companies to help improve the internal information
aggression and decision-making process (Cowgill et al., 2009). For example,
to predict the winner of the 2012 US presidential election between Obama
and Romney, the prediction market defines two Arrow-Debreu (or indica-
tor, winner-take-all) securities, one for each candidate, which will pay the
holder $1 if the associated candidate wins and nothing otherwise. Trades in
the market finally lead to two market prices that together give a probabilistic
prediction for the winner of the election (Figure 1.2).
In most applications, prediction markets are set up with simple (e.g. indica-
tor) securities. These have limited power for more general probabilistic belief
aggregation problems. In addition, the instability of the behaviour and per-
formance of prediction markets observed in practice (e.g. Berg et al. (1997);
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Figure 1.2: The prediction market for 2012 US presidential election, run by Intrade
using continuous double auction. Two securities are defined, each pays $1 to the
holder if Obama/Romney wins and nothing otherwise. After adequate amount of
trades, the market prices sum up to one and start to interpret a Bernoulli distribution
after April 2012 (black dotted line).
Luckner et al. (2008); Rieg and Schoder (2010)) is not well explained due to the
lack of understanding of the market dynamics, which will prevent the further
improvement and application of prediction markets as a machine learning
system. These two concerns provide the motivation for our research: to de-
velop prediction markets towards a general probabilistic belief aggregation
system, it is necessary to improve their modelling powers and to better un-
derstand their dynamics.
1.1 Research scope and objectives
The framework of prediction markets still leaves open many design decisions
for basic market structures. The focus in this thesis is on the potential based
prediction markets, that is, prediction markets that are run by potential based
market makers (also referred to as cost function based market makers) (Chen
and Pennock, 2007; Abernethy et al., 2011, 2013). Such choice is based on the
following considerations.
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• For technical considerations, a market maker will usually introduce a
simpler dynamics for trading, making the prediction market analysable,
especially when the market is outside of its equilibrium.
• Potential based market makers are of special interest to recent prediction
market research, due to their tight relevance to market scoring rules
(one of the most popular prediction market making mechanism) and
the direct link to machine learning method.
The research goal of the work described in this thesis is to design better po-
tential based prediction markets encoding more powerful probabilistic be-
lief models. These markets should also provide more accurate aggregation
processes, and help pave the way for leveraging potential based prediction
markets in building distributed, scalable, self-incentivized machine learning
systems. To achieve this research goal, two research objectives have been
identified.
1. Improve the modelling power of the potential based prediction market;
and
2. Obtain deeper and more accurate understanding of prediction market
dynamics.
The first objective consists of two aspects. First, the market belief models
need to be powerful enough to be able to capture correlations between states
in complicated spaces (such as combinatorial or continuous state spaces). In
addition, the form of the model should also be flexible enough to express
various types of distributions given the same space. One way to explain such
complex correlations is through the latent variables, which then asks markets
to be able to encode latent variable belief models and to run efficiently on
spaces involving latent variables; while the flexibility of the model forms can
be increased by characterizing more families of distributions that are encod-
able to markets. To achieve the second objective, a more complete discussion
about the market convergence and equilibrium, as well as a revelation of the
related optimization and machine learning topics will be required.
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1.2 Thesis structure
Chapter 2 prepares this research by providing the background information
and reviews the key related work. Chapter 3 and 4 focuses on increasing
the modelling power of the potential based market maker. In particular, in
Chapter 3, the partially-observable potential based market maker is proposed,
which runs a market on a space of partially-observable states, and expresses
the market belief through a probabilistic model containing latent variables.
In Chapter 4, the theory of generalized exponential families is developed and
applied in the mechanism design, providing more models for representing
market beliefs. Chapter 5 analyses the market dynamics in the potential based
prediction markets, and present market convergence and equilibrium results
in different settings. Links between the market dynamics and many optimiza-
tion/machine leaning methods are also given. Finally, conclusion is drawn in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Market Setup
Before our work, a prediction market was associated with a future state ω
whose value remains uncertain in Ω until it is fully revealed at a certain
time in the future. In the prediction market, a security is defined to be a
function of the future state, φ : Ω → R. More specifically, a security is char-
acterized by a payment function φ such that one unit share of the security
will pay φ(ω) to the traders who hold it, when the future state turns out to
be ω. This security is referred to as the complex security (Abernethy et al.,
2011, 2013) and generalizes the Arrow-Debreu or the indicator security. An
indicator security has a payment function φi(ω) = 1Ai(ω), where {Ai} are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsets of Ω. Multiple secu-
rities can be defined, which we index by i = 1, 2, . . . , K and collect into a
vector φ(ω) := (φ1(ω), φ2(ω), . . . , φK(ω))
>. These predefined securities are
the objects traders aim to buy and sell.
Each trader i is characterized by the total amount of shares she holds ϑi ∈
RK, her budget wi ∈ R, and her personal trading preference fi(ϑi, wi), a
function of her holdings and her budget. The preference function measures
the value of holding the share bundle before the realization of the future
state.1 Similarly, each trade made at time t is characterized by the amount of
1Here the “value” of the holdings is not necessarily measured by a monetary value. In
6
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transactions δt and the cost ct(δt). For a rational trader, her decision about a
trade is obtained by maximizing her preference:
δt = arg max
δt
fi(ϑi + δt, wi − ct(δt)), s.t. wi − ct(δt) meets budget constraints.
(2.1)
In the thesis, we consider a number of different trader models in different
contexts. The simplest model for traders is one of risk-neutral myopic traders.
Risk-neutral myopic traders trade in each round to maximize the expected
profit of the holdings w.r.t. her private belief over the future state pi
δt = arg max
δt
δ>t Epi [φ]− ct(δt), s.t. budget constraints (2.2)
Note that all terms that are constants w.r.t. the t-th trade have been ignored.
Risk-neutral myopic traders are the standard trader model for analysing the
potential based market mechanisms (Hanson, 2007; Chen and Pennock, 2007;
Abernethy et al., 2011). They are also involved in building up the convergence
results driven by the market makers. In addition, we will also use risk-averse
traders and niche traders when studying other types of convergence, in Chap-
ter 5. These types of traders are introduced in (Storkey, 2011).
2.2 Prediction markets with market makers
A market maker is a special trader who is always willing to accept a trade of-
fer from any trader as long as the trader agrees to pay according to the market
maker’s pricing. The motivation for using market maker was given in Chap-
ter 1. One rationale is that, with a market maker, the prediction market will
have a simpler dynamics outside of its equilibrium. Here, I will explain from
intuition why a market maker can potentially simplify the trading dynamics.
Suppose a market maker set the price for security k to pk. Let bk be the highest
price per share for buying k that traders can offer, and at the lowest price per
share for selling k. Then it must hold that bk ≤ pk, otherwise the trader
who wants to buy at bk will end up with spending less money if she trades
fact, if the preference function is introduced based on the expected utility theory (EUT), the
value simply measures the degree of satisfaction of holding the corresponding shares. For
detailed discussions see Chapter 5.
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directly with the market maker. Similarly, pk ≤ ak. As the result, the market
maker’s unit price is always lower than lowest selling price among traders
and is also always higher than the highest price, making traders more willing
to interact with the market maker before the other traders. Since every trader
prefers to trade with the market maker, the position of the market maker then
indicates the state of the whole market, and the change of positions via trades
characterizes the market dynamics. The market maker hence provides an easy
interface for describing a prediction market out side of its equilibrium.
Note that the above intuitively discussion holds for transactions with infinites-
imal shares that do not change the price before and after the trade. For dis-
cussion about trading finite shares of securities we refer to Chakraborty et al.
(2015).
2.2.1 Potential based market maker (PMM)
A potential based market maker (PMM), first introduced by Chen and Pen-
nock (2007), is a market maker who has a potential function F, which is a
convex differentiable function whose effective domain Θ ⊆ RK consists of all
possible amount of shares that can be sold to the traders, such that a trade of
δt := θt − θt−1 shares, θt, θt−1 ∈ Θ is priced by the difference of F
ct(δt) := F(θt)− F(θt−1). (2.3)
The cost function is not an inner product of traded shares and the unit prices
of securities, implying that the prices of security is varying during the trade.
However, one can define the (instantaneous unit) price of each security at each









Therefore, the prices of all securities give the gradient of the potential func-
tion. They form a conservative potential field, which guarantees that any
trades that begin with the same pre-trade positions and end with the same
post-trade positions will have the same cost (path-independence). The term
potential results from the fact that F is a potential field on Θ. All prices are
collected into the price vector p := {p1, . . . , pK}>.
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The PMM emerges naturally from an axiomatic approach. In fact, Abernethy
et al. (2011, 2013) show that a PMM is the market maker that meets (1) path-
independence; (2) existence of instantaneous prices (implying differentiable);
(3) information incorporation, that for any θ ∈ Θ and δ such that θ− δ, θ +
δ ∈ Θ, F(θ + δ) − F(θ) ≥ F(θ) − F(θ− δ); (4) no arbitrage, that for any
θ, θ+ δ ∈ Θ and ω ∈ Ω, F(θ+ δ)− F(θ) ≥ δ>φ(ω); and (5) expressiveness,
that for any probability over ω, there exists a θ such that ∇F(θ) = Ep[φ]. All
of these axioms are proposed based on the intuitive requirements for making
a good market maker.
Typically, a PMM will subsidize the market and end up with losing money
(in return for better market prices gathered from traders). Fortunately, the
total amount of money that PMM may lose is proved to be bounded from
above (Chen and Pennock, 2007; Abernethy et al., 2011). The idea that stays
at the centre of the analysis is the so-called Bregman divergence. The Bregman
divergence from u to v w.r.t. a convex differentiable function f ,D f (u, v), is
defined by the value difference at u between f and the tangent line of f at
v (Bregman, 1967; Banerjee et al., 2005)
D f (u, v) := f (u)− f (v)− (u− v)>∇ f (v). (2.5)
The geometric interpretation of the Bregman divergence is shown in Fig-
ure 2.1. For strictly convex f , the induced Bregman divergence D f (u, v) ≥ 0
and the equality holds if and only if u = v. Therefore, a Bregman divergence
can be thought of as some distance measure between its two input arguments,
despite the fact that it is asymmetric D f (u, v) 6= D f (v, u) in general.
The Bregman divergence can be written in a primal-dual form. Denote f ∗ the
convex conjugate of f
f ∗(x∗) := sup
x∈X
〈x∗, x〉 − f (x). (2.6)
Since here f is assumed to be differentiable at x, the supremum of the above
equation is achieved at x∗ = ∇ f (x), and so f ∗(x∗) = x>∇ f (x)− f (x). Substi-
tuting them back to (2.5), one has
D f (u, v) = f (u)− f (v)− (u− v)>∇ f (v)
= f (u) + (v>∇ f (v)− f (v))− u>∇ f (v)
= f (u) + f ∗(v∗)− 〈u, v∗〉. (2.7)
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f (v)
f (u)
(u− v)>t + f (v)
D f (u, v)
uv
t = ∇ f (v)
Figure 2.1: Bergman divergence from u to v w.r.t. f .
From this new form one can easily observe that duality exists between D f (·, ·)
and D f ∗(·, ·). More specifically, applying f ∗∗ = f and x∗∗ = x
D f (u, v) = f (u) + f ∗(v∗)− 〈u, v∗〉
= f ∗(v∗) + f ∗∗(u∗∗)− 〈v∗, u∗∗〉
= D f ∗(v∗, u∗) (2.8)
It turns out that the total loss of the PMM can be written in Bregman diver-
gences. By definition, given observed state ω, the total loss of the PMM is













F∗(φ(ω)) + F(θT)− θ>T φ(ω)
)
= DF∗(φ(ω), p(θ0))− DF∗(φ(ω), p(θT)) ≤ DF∗(φ(ω), p(θ0)). (2.9)
Here F∗ is the convex conjugate of the potential F, p(θ) = ∇F(θ) = θ∗ denotes
the dual of θ, and in the third equation F∗(φ(ω)) is added and subtracted to
construct the two Bregman divergences. From (2.9), if the distance between
the market initial prices p(θ0) and the actual values of the securities φ(ω) is
uniformly bounded, i.e. there exists a M > 0 such that
DF∗(φ(ω), p(θ0)) ≤ M2, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (2.10)
then the market maker’s loss will always be bounded from above. It is worth
noting that this bound will not depend on any intermediate market states or
the particular sequence of trade.
In addition, a PMM is incentive-compatible w.r.t. a risk-neutral myopic trader,
in the sense that the post-trade market prices reflect precisely the expected
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values of the securities w.r.t. the trader’s belief. Given a risk-neutral myopic






t φ(ω)− ct(δt)] = max
θt∈Θ
















where pi := Epi [φ]. Similar to how we derive (2.9), the term F
∗(pi) is added
and then subtracted to construct two Bregman divergences. The last equation
is given by the fact that the minimum is taken w.r.t. θt, and thus not affected
by the first Bregman term which is only involved with θt. Therefore, the
expected profit is maximized at Epi [φ] = ∇F(θt).
2.2.2 Market scoring rules
A scoring rule assesses the quality of probabilistic forecasts by assigning a
numerical score based on the submitted belief and the realized future state.
It was first introduced by Brier (1950) for verifying the quality of probabilis-
tic weather forecasts. Hanson (2007) uses scoring rules to develop a class of
prediction market maker named the market scoring rules (MSRs).
Consider the space of future states Ω and a set of probabilities P on it. A
scoring rule is a function S : Ω × P → R, such that if a probabilistic belief
p ∈ P is submitted, S(ω, p) is the score of p that evaluates the quality of the
belief p. Note that S(ω, p) is uncertain before observing the state. A scoring
rule is said proper if the expected score w.r.t. any distribution of the future




S(ω, p)p∗(ω)dω ≤ S(p∗, p∗), ∀p, p∗ ∈ P . (2.12)
Popular scoring scoring rules/functions include: logarithmic score S(ω) =
log p(ω); quadratic (Brier) score S(ω, p) = 2p(ω) − ‖p(ω)‖22; and spherical
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score S(ω, p) = p(ω)/‖p‖2. Among them, the log scoring rule is most com-
monly used due to its simplicity. First, it is the only local scoring rule whose
score will depend only on the probability of the realized state (Bernardo,
1979). As a comparison, both quadratic and spherical scores involve the norm
of probabilities. In addition, when extending to the continuous space, the
log scoring rule does not suffer from complicated measure issues and still
remains the same form as in the finite discrete space (Gneiting and Raftery,
2007).
Given a proper scoring rule S, and denote pt the market belief over the target
future state, maintained by the market maker. Then a market scoring rule
(MSR) St is defined such that the agent who modifies the market belief from
pt−1 to pt will gain the profit
St(ω, pt) := S(ω, pt)− S(ω, pt−1). (2.13)
That is, the profit is given by the improvement in the score from the previous
submission. Same as a PMM, a MSR will typically subsidize a market but
its loss will be bounded, and a MSR is incentive-compatible w.r.t. risk-neutral
myopic traders. The former follows from the fact that the MSR pays to each
agent based on the relative improvement of the market belief rather than the
absolute quality. As a consequence, the total loss depends only on the initial








S(ω, pt)− S(ω, pt−1) = S(ω, pT)− S(ω, p0). (2.14)
The latter results from the definition of a proper scoring rule (2.12).
The MSR introduces a market belief, and links the profit directly to the qual-
ity of the market belief measured by the scores. At the first glance, the MSR
seems set up a different environment from a prediction market, since no se-
curities are defined and no trades are involved. However, it turns out that a
MSR, in particular a logarithmic MSR (LMSR) can be implemented by a poten-
tial based market maker through the exponential family (Chen and Pennock,
2007; Abernethy et al., 2014). Consider an exponential family PΘ where Θ is
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Then the corresponding LMSR is
St(ω, pt) = log pθt(ω)− log pθt−1(ω) = δ
>
t φ(ω)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)). (2.16)
That is, if we define securities to be the sufficient statistics φ involved in the
exponential family, and set up a PMM with the potential function F(θ) =
log Z(θ), then the profit of the t-th trade will be precisely to the LMSR profit
at time t, and so this PMM is also a LMSR. This connection also explains how
a PMM encodes the market belief into the securities and its potential function.
However, the market belief is restricted to exponential family.
2.2.3 Other designs of market makers
It is worth noting that PMMs and MSRs are not the only designs of predic-
tion market makers. Other methods include dynamic parimutuel mechanisms
(DPMs) of Pennock (2004) and Bayesian market makers (BMMs) of Das and
Magdon-Ismail (2009). A DPM has a continuous cost function like a PMM
and also prices each trade by the difference of the cost function. Different
from a PMM, the final payout of securities is determined by the parimutuel
rule which redistributes the money invested by traders among the winning
shares, rather than the predefined payment functions. Therefore, no subsidy
is required for running a DPM.2 The drawbacks of DPMs are (1) that its the
cost function is more expensive to compute, and (2) it is difficult to extend
a DPM to large state spaces. The BMM is a market maker who mantains a
belief about the true prices of the securities via Bayesian updates, and prices
each security by utilizing this belief. In Chapter 5, we show that BMM can be
thought of as an augmented version of the PMM, although they were viewed
as two different models (Brahma et al., 2012).
2.3 Analysing prediction markets
Apart from market maker design, another central task in prediction markets
is to analyse market dynamics.
2In fact, the dynamic parimutuel mechanism needs extra money to start the market, but
this amount of money can be arbitrarily small.
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Interestingly, compared to work on prediction market maker design which
has started booming just recently, the equilibrium analysis for prediction mar-
kets can be dated back to Eisenberg and Gale (1959), and different discussions
have been done from various aspects by Pennock and Wellman (1996, 1997,
1998); Storkey (2011); Barbu and Lay (2012); Storkey et al. (2012, 2015).3 These
discussions are all based on the generic market setup and do not involve any
specific market mechanisms. The results show that the prediction market at
the equilibrium state can be viewed as a belief aggregation model with dif-
ferent aggregation structures depending on the traders’ behaviours. These
structures include mixture (or average, or linear pooling) and product (or log
pooling). Storkey (2011); Storkey et al. (2012, 2015) finally provide a unified
view of these models. The authors formalize the traders’ behaviours by mod-
elling traders as expected utility maximizers, and derive a spectrum of belief
aggregation model by varying continuously the form of the utility function.
Note that, however, these results focus only on the market equilibrium, and
do not involve the dynamics towards the equilibrium.
The first trial to explicitly link the PMM driven dynamics to machine learning
is given by Chen and Wortman Vaughan (2010). In this work, the authors
equate Arrow-Debreu securities to the experts in the online learning setting,
prices of securities to the weights on the experts, and total sold shares of
each security to the losses in each learning step. They show that the PMM
is equivalent to the Follow the Regularized Leader (FtRL) algorithm. It is also
worth mentioning that the analysis does not make any assumption about the
trader’s behaviour. The result is a bit less intuitive as securities instead of
traders are matched to the learning experts.
Frongillo et al. (2012) shows that adding a PMM will not affect the equilibrium
result based on risk-averse traders. More importantly, the interaction between
a PMM and a set of stochastic risk-averse traders will approximately imple-
ment stochastic mirror descent (SMD). Premachandra and Reid (2013) introduce
a modified PMM which fixed the prices to the pre-trade market prices for each
trade, allowing the match between PMM and SMD to become exact. However,
this modification exposes the PMM to arbitrage opportunities, since for any
3Admittedly, the formal concept of prediction markets does not exist in early work, but is
replaced a similar concept such as a parimutuel betting market.
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(θt − θt−1)>p(θt) ≤
∮
F(θ) = 0. (2.17)
Hence such PMM will not be realistic. A question remains if the PMM dy-
namics with risk-averse traders can match any learning process in an exact
sense.
Another concern for the existing trader driven convergence results is that,
they suggest using expected utility to model traders’ preferences, but due
to high computational complexity, behaviours under expected utilities can-
not be solved or analysed except for simple cases (Sethi and Vaughan, 2013;
Chakraborty and Das, 2015), and will prohibit deriving results in general cir-
cumstances.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, necessary background was provided and related work has
been reviewed. In particular, we reviewed the PMM defined on states that are
fully observable, showing its properties and how it represents a market belief
model by viewing it as an implementation of the LMSR. We found that the
belief represented is currently restricted to the fully-observable state space
and also to the exponential family, which motivates our work in Chapter 3
and 4. The existing market analysis results all imply a connection between
market equilibria and belief aggregation models in probabilistic modelling,
and a connection between market dynamics towards the equilibrium and the
model learning process. However, these discussions are either incomplete or
based on inappropriate approximations of the true potential based mecha-
nism, thus motivating our analysis in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Partially-observable State Spaces
In the conventional design, a prediction market works on a space of possible
future states Ω where the true state ω ∈ Ω can eventually be determined.
The observability of the true future state is fundamental to the conventional
market design, since it guarantees that the values of all securities will finally
become deterministic, and further, that all payouts promised by the purchased
shares can really be executed. This condition provides the basic incentive for
traders: certainly no one is willing to trade securities giving empty promises.
However, such state spaces (i.e. the spaces requiring the observability of the
true future state) are restrictive in representing the unknown future states.
Instead, what we commonly see is that the true state can only be determined
up to a subset A in the space, that is, ω ∈ A ⊆ Ω. This inexact determination
of the true state can be caused by various reasons that often emerge in the
daily life, such as the limit budget of perform the accurate observation or
the stochastic nature of the future state itself. We name a state space that
allows the inexact determination of the true state a partially-observable state
space, since we do get a better idea of the true state than before after we
make the observation. Comparatively, we name a state space that requires the
exact determination of the true state a fully-observable state space. As will be
shown more formally later, a fully-observable state space can be characterized
by a realizable random variable v, while a partially-observable state space
can be characterized by a pair of random variables (v, h) with only v being
16
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realizable.1 In machine learning language, v is called the visible/observable
variable and h is the hidden/latent variable.
To have a concrete example of the partially-observable state space, let’s con-
sider a revised version of the Spot-the-Ball game (Figure 3.1). In a standard
Spot-the-Ball game, people are presented with an image, and asked to place
bet on the position of the football; the true position of the ball is then realized
by the true image at the end of the game and each one is rewarded accord-
ing to the accuracy of her bet. The standard Spot-the-Ball game defines a
fully-observable state space: the true state of the ball is guaranteed to be ex-
actly determined by the rule of the game. In the revised version of the game,
called Who-Touched-the-Ball game, people are presented with the same image,
but instead they are asked to bet on who last touched the ball and where the
ball is given the player who touched it. The Who-Touched-the-Ball defines
a partially-observable state space: each state consists of the player who last
touched the ball and the ball position, and it cannot be determined exactly as
we cannot read the true player directly from the true image. In particular, the
true image only reveals the true position of the ball x. For a Who-Touched-
the-Ball game this could only determine the true state up to the set {(player
Gerrard with ball at x, player Van Persie with ball at x)}.
The partially-observable state spaces are beyond the conventional setting of
the prediction market design. In this chapter, we extend the conventional mar-
ket design to allow prediction markets to work on partially-observable state
spaces. Our solution is based on the potential-based market maker (PMM) but
it is a non-trivial extension. We name our mechanism the partially-observable
potential-based market maker (PoPMM).
3.1 Motivation
Although partially-observable state spaces are more commonly seen than the
fully-observable state spaces and they provide better representations for the
unknown future events, the doubt often comes out that whether the partially-
observable state space is really necessary for prediction market design. Here
1Here the term “random variable” can be a variable or a vector in the normal sense.
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Figure 3.1: A Spot-the-Ball/Who-Touched-the-Ball game (left) and the true answer
(right). In the standard Spot-the-Ball game, only the position of the ball is asked;
in the Who-Touched-the-Ball game, both the player who last touched the ball and
the position of the ball are asked. From the true image we can only read off the
position of the ball. The state space of a Spot-the-Ball game is a fully-observable state
space. Comparatively, the state space of a Who-Touched-the-Ball game is a partially-
observable state space: the true image reveals only the true position of the ball x,
which determines the true state up to the set {(player Gerrard with ball at x, player
Van Persie with ball at x)}. (Figure credits: Spot the ball Round 1 at nytimes.com)
the work on partially-observable state spaces is motivated and justified.
Compared to the fully-observable state space, the partially-observable state
space provides a more interesting setting for running prediction markets.
Benefit comes from the following aspects:
More straightforward and flexible in market design One criticism about
the partially-observable state space is that, given a partially-observable space
one can always introduce a fully-observable space with a redefined meaning
of the future states. For example, consider a partially-observable space Ω
in which we can only tell if the true state is either in the subset A0 or its
complement A1 := Ac after the observation. Then the space I = {0, 1} with
the state redefined to be the index i is a fully-observable state space. The
conventional design of the prediction market can thus be applied on I, which
avoids involving the partially-observable state space.
However, such workaround does not set up prediction markets on the state
space we care about, and cannot necessarily extract the desired information
from the market. In fact, all beliefs extracted from these markets are for
the space I, not for Ω. Comparatively, prediction markets built directly on
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partially-observable spaces lead to a more straightforward design, and also
allow us to obtain the information about the space we care.
In the Who-Touched-the-Ball game example (Figure 3.1), the true state could
only be determined up to the set {(player Gerrard with ball at x, player Van
Persie with ball at x)}. Each set is indexed by the ball position i = x, thus the
index space I, which contains all possible ball positions, is a fully-observable
state space. This space I coincides with the state space of the standard Spot-
the-Ball game. Therefore, when running a prediction market on I we are in
essence running a Spot-the-Ball game, which is only about betting on the ball
position. On the other hand, by running markets on the joint space we could
extract the belief about who touched the ball, in addition to the ball position.
Using a partially-observable space also improves the design flexibility. To
infer beliefs for any variables whose observations are expensive or impossible
to obtain, we can construct a partially-observable space from them and their
relevant variables with cheap observations, and run prediction markets on
that space.
More effective in belief modelling The partially-observable space contains
more correlations between states than the fully-observable space derived from
it. This allows a prediction market to define more interesting belief mod-
els with fewer parameters/securities. Also, complicated correlations in the
marginal fully-observable space I can potentially be replaced by simple cor-
relations in Ω. For example, a prediction market can define a belief model
that is an exponential family on the partially-observable space Ω but has a
non-trivial marginal (such as multi-modal) on the derived fully-observable
space I.
Again consider the Who-Touched-the-Ball game. The ball may end up with
rather different positions conditioned on which player last touched the ball.
It implies that the ball position follows a multi-modal distribution, which is
difficult for the market’s belief model to capture if the market is built on the
derived fully-observable space I. One way to capture the belief is to divide
the whole canvas into many small patches and associated with each patch
an indicator security. Here numerous securities will be needed, but even with
this setup the ball position could only be modelled down to a tiny area instead
Chapter 3. Partially-observable State Spaces 20
Figure 3.2: Effective belief modelling for the Who-Touched-the-Ball game. Left: belief
model built on the derived fully-observable space. In order to capture the potential
multi-modality, the market has to split the canvas into various tiny pieces and as-
sociate each one with an indicator security. Despite the large number of securities,
ball positions are always described by areas instead of exact positions on the can-
vas. Right: belief model built directly on the partially-observable state space that
expresses a mixture of two Gaussians. The model needs only 16 securities and can
output exact ball positions.
of an exact position. If on the other hand the prediction market is built on the
state space Ω, the market can define its belief model using a mixture of two
Gaussians, with no more than fourteen securities: six securities for a Gaussian
component, and two securities for the binary mixing (Figure 3.2).
Obtaining unified framework for free A fully-observable state space can be
understood as a special case of a partially-observable state space whose ob-
served subsets always contain a single state, i.e. A = {ω}. As a consequence,
prediction markets that are originally designed for partially-observable state
spaces can also work on fully-observable spaces. Therefore, by building pre-
diction markets on partially-observable state spaces we will obtain a unified
market framework for free.
Bridging the gap The problem of eliciting beliefs on partially-observable
state spaces sits in between the problem of eliciting beliefs on fully-observable
state spaces, and the problem of eliciting beliefs on spaces with no observa-
tions. The former problem can be achieved by the conventional design of
prediction markets while the latter can be achieved by more game-theoretic
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based methods such as peer prediction (Miller et al., 2005) and Bayesian truth
serum (Prelec, 2004). Previously, prediction markets are thought very differ-
ent from either peer prediction or Bayesian truth serum. However, discussing
the market design in this new setting with partially-observable state space
may shed light on the connections between these methods.
3.2 The setting of partially-observable state space
Consider a state space Ω which contains all possible states of the future we
care about. These states are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive,
that is, each ω ∈ Ω represents a unique state of the future and the true state
must fall in Ω. At a definite future time, an observation will be made that
tries to determine the true state. Then Ω is a partially-observable state space, if
the observation can only determine that the state ω is in one of the mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsets of Ω: A(ω) ∈ {A1, A2, . . . , AI}
where Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, ∀i, j ∈ I, i 6= j and
⋃
i∈I Ai = Ω with I the index set of
these subsets.
Requiring subsets {Ai}i∈I to be collectively exhaustive is to ensure that every
possible state can be observed, while the mutual exclusiveness guarantees
that the true state is determinable up to these subsets. If otherwise two
subsets Ai ∩ Aj 6= ∅ which allows the true state ω to be found in these
two subsets at the same time, we can always split them into three subsets,
Aij := Ai ∩ Aj, A′i = Ai − Aij, A′j = Aj − Aij that are mutually exclusive.
These are the actual subsets up to which the true state can be determined by
the observation.
The property of subsets {Ai}i∈I allow themselves to be represented by a
random variable/vector. This random variable, denote by v, is a function
v : Ω → V such that states in the same subset will be mapped to the same
value, while those in different subsets will be mapped to different values.
More accurately, this random variable v is defined on the probability space
(Ω,A,P) where A is the σ-algebra generated from the subsets {Ai}i∈I , and P
is the unknown distribution of the state in nature. Given a realization v of v,
the true state is then determined up to the set {ω ∈ Ω | v(ω) = v}.
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Denote Bl the set formed by the l-th elements in each Ai, i ∈ I (if Ai has less
than m elements then restart from the first). The subsets {Bl}l∈L have several
properties. First, given an observation that the true state is in Ai, it still re-
mains uncertain which Bl the true state belongs to since by construction each
Bl contains one element from each Ai. Second, if we know the true state is
in both Ai and Bl, then we can determine the state exactly by Ai ∩ Bl. Fi-
nally, similar to {Ai}i∈I subsets {Bl}l∈L are mutual exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. Therefore, they can also be represented by a random variable
h : Ω→ H.
The properties together with the definitions of v and h imply that a partially-
observable state space can be represented by a pair of random variables
(v, h). Each state of the space is uniquely represented by a pair of realiza-
tions (v, h) of (v, h), but only v is realizable by the observation. In machine
learning language, v is called the visible/observable variable and h is called
the hidden/latent variable. This gives an alternative interpretation of the
term “partially-observable”. Compared to subsets {Ai}i∈I , the random vari-
able pair (v, h) gives a simpler representation of the partially-observable state
space. It is also easier for people to understand a partially-observable space,
and constructing an interesting space can also be achieved by simply con-
catenating random variables without working out the underlying subsets (σ-
algebras).
Reduction to the fully-observable state space When every set in {Ai}i∈I
contains a single state, the partially-observable state space reduces to a fully-
observable space. It follows that the subsets {Bl}l∈L has only one set B1 that is
equal to Ω. Then, the random variable h that represents {Bl}l∈L is actually a
constant function, as all possible states belong to B1 and will be mapped to the
same value. Therefore, a fully-observable state space is represented by (v, h)
where h is a constant. Since the constant function provides no information,
we can also ignore h and represent the space using only v.
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3.3 Partially-observable potential-based market
maker (PoPMM)
The partially-observable potential-based market maker (PoPMM) extends the
conventional potential-based market (PMM) to partially-observable spaces. In
the rest of this section, we first review the key structure of the PMM, espe-
cially the PMM that defines its belief model via an exponential family, and
then point out its deficiency on partially-observable spaces. Next, we discuss
the equivalence between the market prices and expected security values, and
introduce the conditional market price. Finally, we propose our mechanism,
PoPMM, which is constructed from the conventional PMM and the condi-
tional market prices.
3.3.1 PMM with exponential family belief model
Let (v, h) be a state space. Define K securities. Each security is a function
φk : V ×H → R and they are collected into a vector φ = (φ1, . . . , φK)>. Here










ν(v, h)dvdh < +∞ (3.1)
for every θ ∈ Θ, an open set in RK, where ν(·) represents a certain base
measure. Then φ and Θ together define an exponential family PΘ in which








ν(v, h), ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.2)
Meanwhile, the log partition function F(θ) := log Z(θ) is convex. Therefore
φ, θ and F together define a PMM who offers securities φ, sets prices based
on the potential F, and has all possible positions (i.e. sold shares) given by Θ.
To show that the exponential family PΘ is the belief model the PMM implic-
itly defines, we rewrite the PMM as a logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR).
An LMSR is a market maker who asks traders to directly submit a probability
distribution and, after the true state is realized, pays each submission a profit
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equal to the increase in the log score of the distribution w.r.t. the previous
one. If all traders’ beliefs are restricted to PΘ, then the profit is given by
mt(v, h) = log pθt(v, h)− log pθt−1(v, h) (3.3)
= (θt − θt−1)>φ(v, h)− (log Z(θt)− log Z(θt−1)), (3.4)
which matches precisely to the profit of the t-th trade in the PMM defined
by F, φ and Θ. Therefore, PΘ is the belief model for the PMM, and each pθ
represents the belief of the market maker when it has the position θ.
3.3.2 Deficiency of the standard PMM
Full observability of the state space is a necessary condition for a PMM to
work. First, it guarantees that some state will be drawn from the true distri-
bution of nature, which is not manipulated by any trading strategies. Then
each trade with the PMM can reflect the trader’s true belief about how the
state is distributed in nature, rather than a belief of strategy such as how the
trader thinks the others will do. In addition, fully observability also guar-
antees that the true values of securities is determinable by the observation
and the payouts of all purchased shares can always be cleared. If other-
wise the space is partially-observable, securities will remain uncertain and
a PMM cannot generate monetary payouts for purchased shares, ending up
with buying and selling empty promises. Therefore, when the state space
becomes partially-observable, the PMM will lose both guarantees, and any
direct implementation of the PMM will not work in the desired way.
3.3.3 Conditional market prices
In order to let a PMM work on partially-observable state spaces, the first key
issue we have to handle is to make the security values determinable by the ob-
servation. In other words, we need to find some deterministic quantities that
can summarize the uncertain security values, taking into account the observed
information. These quantities should be closely related to market prices. This
is because market prices can be thought of as such quantities which summa-
rize the uncertain security values into deterministic values, before the market
observes the future state.
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In fact, in a PMM with an exponential family belief model, such quantities
can be constructed by using an alternative interpretation of the market prices.
We name them conditional market prices or conditional expected security values,
and the reason will be seen shortly.
Equivalence between markets prices and security values Originally the
market prices at market position θ are defined by the gradient of the mar-
ket potential F at θ: p(θ) = ∇F(θ). Under the belief model, the market prices
can also be expressed by the expectation of securities w.r.t. the current market
belief pθ, that is, p(θ) = Epθ[φ]. This new interpretation of market prices
results from an important property of the exponential family: the gradient of
the log partition function of pθ always matches to the expectation of sufficient
statistics w.r.t. pθ.
The alternative interpretation of market prices also gives us a unified view
of market prices and the true security values. When (v, h) is fully-observable
such that h is ignored, the security values φ(v) determined by the realiza-
tion v = v can also be represented as expectations w.r.t. the current market
belief, just like the market prices before observation, but conditioned on the
deterministic observation v = v.
φ(v) = Epθ[φ | v = v]. (3.5)
For fully-observable markets, although being written in the above form, the
security values φ(v) relies only on the observation v and is independent of
the market position θ. This is because the conditional of the market belief pθ
given v = v is a degenerate distribution at v with a Dirac Delta density. Nev-
ertheless, with this new interpretation we can immediately generalize market
prices to situations beyond no and full observation.
Conditional market prices Following the unified view and (3.5), if the PMM
is defined on a partially-observable space (h, v) such that h cannot be ignored,
we construct a deterministic quantity by taking the expectation of φ w.r.t. the
market belief pθ conditioned on the observed v = v
p(θ, v) := Epθ[φ | v = v] =
∫
h∈H
φ(v, h)pθ(h | v)dh. (3.6)
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We name p(θ, v) the conditional market prices or the conditional expected security
values given v = v, as p(θ, v) is computed the same way as p(θ) but is derived
using the conditional form of the market belief pθ. Unlike for φ(v) in (3.5),
p(θ, v) will depend on θ due to the partial observability, despite that they are
defined via the same conditional expectation. This extra dependency on θ
also leaves the question of which θ should be used for the computation.
The conditional market prices can be calculated in two ways. We can explic-
itly write down the market belief pθ and compute (exactly or approximately
if necessary) the conditional expectation. Alternatively, the conditional of pθ
given v = v is also an exponential family distribution with sufficient statis-
tics φ(v, h). Therefore, we can write down the log partition function of the
conditional








Its gradient w.r.t. θ will immediately give the conditional market prices, that
is, p(θ, v) = ∇θF(θ, v) when v = v. We name F(·, v) the conditional potential
given v. Note that F(θ, v) is a function of v. Therefore, it is a random variable
before v is realized.
By definition, given realization v = v and the conditional market price com-
puted at market position θ′, p(θ′, v), the profit of a trade δt = θt − θt−1 is
mt(v) = δ>t p(θ
′, v)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)). (3.8)
3.3.4 PoPMM: the mechanism
A PoPMM is a potential-based market maker who evaluates security pay-
outs using the conditional market prices at the penultimate market position.
In practice, the penultimate position can be easily tracked by maintaining a
record of the pre-trade market position with a K-dimensional vector. When
computing the conditional market prices, the choice of penultimate position
instead of the other positions is critical: it guarantees that the PoPMM will
generate desired incentives for trading. The detailed analysis will be given
later in Section 3.6.
A practical implementation of the PoPMM mechanism is given by Figure 3.3b.
The resulting mechanism is simple. In fact, it is almost the same as a PMM
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Input: φ, F, initial position θ0;
for t = 1 to T do
δt trade costs F(θt)− F(θt−1);
update position θt ← θt−1 + δt;
end
at T observe v = v, close the market;
evaluate securities r = φ(v);
a trader holding δ gets payout δ>r;
(a) PMM for fully-observable space
Input: φ, F, PΘ (or F(·, v)) and θ0;
for t = 1 to T do
record pre-position θpre ← θt−1;
δt trade costs F(θt)− F(θt−1);
update position θt ← θt−1 + δt;
end
at T observe v = v, close the market;
evaluate securities r = p(θpre, v) =
Epθpre [φ | v] = ∇θF(θ
pre, v);
a trader holding δ gets payout δ>r;
(b) PoPMM for partially-observable space
Figure 3.3: PoPMM and its comparison to PMM. Running on a partially-obsrvable
space, a PoPMM is almost the same as a PMM except for two differences (marked
in red): 1. an extra vector θpre is defined, and is then used to record the pre-trade
market position whenever a trade happens; 2. after observing v = v, securities are
evaluated by the conditional market prices at θpre.
running on a fully-observable state space (Figure 3.3a) but differs in two
places, which we highlight:
1. an extra vector θpre is defined, and is then used to record the pre-trade
market position whenever a trade happens;
2. after observing v = v, securities are evaluated by the conditional market
prices at θpre.
3.4 Examples
In this section we give two examples of PoPMM. The first one defines its
belief model by a mixture of exponential family distributions. The second
one offers securities that are actually only dependent on the latent variable;
this PoPMM has a belief model with adjustable marginal p(h) on the latent
variable but a fixed conditional p(v | h).
Chapter 3. Partially-observable State Spaces 28
3.4.1 Defining belief model by a mixture
Consider a partially-observable state space (v, h) where v := x ∈ X ⊆ RD and
h := z ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . , M}. Define M indicator functions onH, ϕ : H → RM,
such that ϕm(z) := 1{m}(z), m ∈ M; also define M sets of statistics on V ,
such that for the m-th set of statistics ψm : V → RKm , an exponential family








ν(x)dx < +∞ (3.9)
for every θm ∈ Θm ⊆ RKm , where ν(·) represents the base measure of the
exponential family.
Then a PoPMM can be defined on this partially-observable space (x, z). In




>, ϕ1(z)ψ1(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ1






where for simplicity each sub-vector in φ(x, z) is indexed by the new notation
underneath. The PoPMM’s potential and the set of all possible positions are
Θ := RM × ∏
m∈M
Θm, (3.11)
F(θ) := log ∑
m∈M
exp (θ0m + log Zm(θm)) . (3.12)
Here θ is the vector of sold shares and is indexed the same way as φ, such
that θi is the shares associated with securities φi. θ0m is the m-th element of
θ0 corresponding to security ϕm. Note that F is a convex function.
Now we show that the belief model this PoPMM defines is a mixture of M
exponential family components. Following the argument in Section 3.3.1, we
assume the space is fully-observable, and write down the profit mt(x, z) of a
trade δt := θt − θt−1, given an observed (x, z)
mt(x, z) = δ>t φ(x, z)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)) (3.13)
= (θ>t φ(x, z)− F(θt))− (θ>t−1φ(x, z)− F(θ)). (3.14)
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It turns out that
θ>φ− F(θ) = θ>0 φ0 + ∑
m
θ>mφm − log ∑
m
exp (θ0m + log Zm(θm)) (3.15)
(let ξm := θ0m + log Zm(θm)) (3.16)
= ∑
m
ξ>m ϕm − log ∑
m
eξm︸ ︷︷ ︸
a categorical dist. over z
+∑
m
(θ>mψm − log Zm(θm)︸ ︷︷ ︸




= log(p(z)p(x | z)). (3.18)
Therefore, mt(x, z) matches to an increase in the log density of a mixture
model p(z)p(x | z) defined over (x, z) with parameter θ. In addition, this
model is parametrized by θ, such that p(z) is a categorical distribution with
natural parameters ξ = {θ0m + log Zm(θm)}m∈M, and p(x | z = m) is an
exponential family distribution with statistics ψm and natural parameters θm.
Therefore, the proposed PoPMM defines a belief model pθ(x, z) = p(z)p(x | z)
with a mixture of M exponential family components.
The price vector is given by the gradient of the corresponding potential, or
equivalently the expectation w.r.t. current market belief. Before observing x,
the prices are p(θ) = (p0(θ0), p1(θ1), . . . , pM(θM))
>. For each m ∈ M
p0m(θ0m) = Epθ[φ0m] =
exp(θ0m + log Zm(θm))
∑m exp(θ0m + log Zm(θm))
(3.19)
pm(θm) = Epθ[φm] = p0m(θ0m)∇ log Zm(θm). (3.20)
The conditional market prices are computed by taking the conditional expec-
tation given x = x. Also, we can first derive the conditional potential and
obtain the conditional market prices from its gradient. Here, the conditional
potential is analytical:









After observing x, the prices change to
p0m(θ0m, x) = Epθ[φ0m | x = x] =
exp(θ0m + θ>mψm(x))
∑m exp(θ0m + θ>mψm(x))
(3.22)
pm(θm, x) = Epθ[φm | x = x] = p0m(θ0m, x)ψm(x). (3.23)
After the observation, prices for φm clamps to the realization of x. Since φ0
are indicators, each price in (3.22) is in essence the conditional probability
p(z = m | x = x).
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A PoPMM representing a mixture model is suitable for solving the Who-
Touched-the-Ball game (Figure 3.1). The latent component indicator naturally
encodes the player, while each component represents the possible ball posi-
tion given that corresponding player last touched the ball. To complete the
design, what remains is to specify the exponential family for each component.
We will return to this market design later in Section 3.7.
3.4.2 Offering securities only for the latent variables
Consider a PoPMM with a mixture belief defined in the previous example,
but now it only offers φ0 for trading. Then only θ0 can be adjusted via trades,
and all the other parameters {θm}m∈M will be fixed at their original values.
Notice that θm is the parameters of the m-th component of the belief mixture.
Therefore, the belief model of this PoPMM has an adjustable marginal p(z)
over the latent indicator z but a fixed conditional p(x | z). Since log Zm(θfixm ) is
fixed, by changing the variable ξm := θ0m + log Zm(θfixm ) and F′(ξ) := F(θ0),
the market prices will be invariant ∇F′(ξ) = ∇F(θ0), so will be a trade δt =
θt,0− θt−1,0 = ξt − ξt−1. In addition, the cost of a trade will also be simplified
F′(ξt)− F′(ξt−1) = log ∑
m
eξt,m − log ∑
m
eξt−1,m . (3.24)
In general, simpler structures can be found in a PoPMM whose belief is only
adjustable on the latent variable. Given a fixed conditional p(v | h), which
determines the meaning of a set of latent variable and its correlation to the
visible variables, a PoPMM can be set up to model p(h) by an exponential









by first defining securities φ matching to the sufficient statistics of the expo-
nential family, and then defining the potential F(θ) := log Z(θ), and finally
setting the parameter set Θ := {θ ∈ RK | F(θ) < +∞}. The profit of a trade
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δt := θt − θt−1, given an observed (v, h), is
mt(v, h) = δ>t φ(v, h)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)) (3.26)
= (θ>t φ(h)− F(θt))− (θ>t−1φ(h)− F(θt−1)) (3.27)
= log pθt(h)− log pθt−1(h) (3.28)
= log(pθt(h)p(v | h))− log(pθt−1(h)p(v | h)), (3.29)
where the last equality is obtained by introducing the fixed term log p(v | h).
Hence pθ(v, h) := pθ(h)p(v | h) is the joint belief of this PoPMM.
From the partition function of p(h | v) the conditional potential v = v can be
derived, which has the form







ν(h)p(v | h)dh. (3.30)
The conditional market prices can be computed by either the conditional ex-
pectation w.r.t. pθ or by the gradient of the conditional potential.
p(θ, v) = ∇θF(θ, v) = Epθ[φ | v = v]. (3.31)
3.5 Bounding monetary losses
To be able to do prediction market making under real world circumstances,
the market maker has to possess two fundamental properties: (1) always hav-
ing bounded monetary losses that do not scale with the number of trades; and
(2) providing incentives for traders such that they are willing to hand in their
true beliefs. The first property allows a market maker to run large markets
with many traders using a limited subsidy. The second property ensures that
the market maker can learn from trades some useful information about the
future state, which the market maker cares about.
In this section, we prove that PoPMM provides bounded monetary losses.
The market incentives will be discussed later in the next section.
Consider a state space (v, h) and a PoPMM with securities φ, potential F and
the set of positions Θ. Denote PΘ the PoPMM’s belief model and pθ ∈ PΘ
the specific distribution at market position θ ∈ Θ.
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Assume that the market lifetime is T and one trade is made at each time
point. Then the t-trade with δt = θt − θt−1 costs F(θt)− F(θt−1). Given the
realization v = v, securities are evaluated by the conditional market prices at
the penultimate market position θT−1, p(θT−1, v), and the payout of the t-th
trade is δ>p(θT−1, v). Therefore, the profit of the t-trade is given by
mt(v) = δ>t p(θT−1, v)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)) (3.32)
Since the profit of the t-trade is the loss of the market maker at time t, then

















= (θT − θ0)>p(θT−1, v)− (F(θT)− F(θ0)), (3.34)
Now we show that under certain conditions, MT(v) is bounded from above.
Lemma 3.1. If p(θT−1, v) ∈ dom(F∗), then
MT(x) ≤ DF∗(p(θT−1, v), p0). (3.35)
Here p0 := p(θ0) is the initial market price, F∗ is the convex conjugate of F with
effective domain dom(F∗) := {p ∈ RK | F∗(p) < +∞}, and D f (·, ·) is the
Bregman divergence generated by a convex function f .
Proof. Denote p := p(θT−1, v). Since p sits in the effective domain of F∗, F∗(p)
is defined. Adding and subtracting F∗(p) we have
MT(v) = (F∗(p) + F(θ0)− θ>0 p)− (F∗(p) + F(θT)− θ>T p) (3.36)
By definition of convex conjugate and Bregman divergence (recall (2.7))
DF∗(p, p0) = F∗(p) + F(θ0)− p>θ0, (3.37)
DF∗(p, pT) = F∗(p) + F(θT)− p>θT. (3.38)
Therefore, MT(v) can be written as a difference between two Bregman diver-
gence
MT(x) = DF∗(p, p(θ0))− DF∗(p, p(θT)). (3.39)
Apply non-negativity of Bregman divergence to complete the proof.
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Similar to a PMM, the monetary loss of a PoPMM is bounded from above by a
Bregman divergence which depends only on the initial market positions, the
penultimate market positions, and the realization of v.
On the one hand, we would desire a uniform bound on MT(v) regardless of
what v = v is observed. On the other hand, we want to make sure the condi-
tion in Lemma 3.1 is mild enough to hold in general situations. It turns out
that a simple and mild condition is sufficient to help achieve both goals. This
condition is essentially the same as the one that guarantees the boundedness
of PMMs in fully-observable settings: it simply requires that a PMM’s loss
is uniformly bounded for any possible complete realization of the state (cf.
(2.10)).
Theorem 3.2. If ∀(v, h) ∈ V ×H we have φ ∈ dom(F∗) and DF∗(φ, p0) ≤ M2
for some M > 0, then
MT(v) ≤ M2, ∀v ∈ V . (3.40)
Proof. When φ ∈ dom(F∗), any conditional expectation of φ is simply a con-
vex combination of φ and must belong to dom(F∗), thus we get the condition
p(θT−1, v) ∈ dom(F∗) for free.
The Bregman divergence is convex in its first argument, as for any u := λu1 +
(1− λ)u2 with u1, u2 in the domain and λ ∈ [0, 1]
D f (u, v) = f (λu1 + (1− λ)u2) + f ∗(v∗)− (λu1 + (1− λ)u2)>v∗
≤ λ( f (u1) + f ∗(v∗)− u>1 v∗) + (1− λ)( f (u2) + f ∗(v∗)− u>2 v∗)
= λD f (u1, v) + (1− λ)D f (u2, v). (3.41)
Therefore, by applying Jensen’s inequality we have
DF∗(p(θT−1, v), p0) ≤ EθT−1 [DF∗(φ, p0) | v = v] ≤ M
2. (3.42)
This completes the proof.
Remark. Although in Lemmar 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 we specify conditional
market prices to be p(θT−1, v), both results will hold for all choices of condi-
tional market prices p(θ′, v) as the proofs does not dependent on particular
conditional market prices.
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3.6 Market incentives
Similar to a PMM, a PoPMM encourages traders to move the market belief
pθ towards their true beliefs. However, different from a PMM which allows
traders’ beliefs to be elicited precisely in a single trade, a PoPMM only guar-
antees that each trade moves the market position in the correct direction, in
the sense that the post-trade market beliefs will always be closer to the traders’
true beliefs than the pre-trade ones. The essential reason is that: a PMM im-
plements an exact logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), while, as we will
see, a PoPMM implements an approximated version.
3.6.1 LMSR and its double-potential form
Let (v, h) be a partially-observable state space and PΘ be an exponential fam-
ily defined on it. We consider a LMSR which pays the t-th trade the following
profit








In other words, the LMSR asks marginal distributions over v to be submitted,
with the set of belief distributions restricted to PΘ.
Substituting in the canonical form of the exponential family, we can rewrite
(3.43) in a different form. Also recall that that the potential of a PoPMM with
a belief model PΘ has its potential defined by F := log Z, and the conditional
potential defined by (3.7).















= (F(θt, v)− F(θt))− (F(θt−1, v)− F(θt−1)) (3.46)
= (F(θt, v)− F(θt−1, v))− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)). (3.47)
The profit of a trade under the LMSR involves simultaneous changes of both
the potential F and the conditional potential F(·, v), w.r.t. the same move in
θ. Therefore, intuitively this LMSR can be understood as a hedge mechanism
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implemented by hedging between two PMMs which offer the same securi-
ties but price them in different ways. Thus a LMSR can be thought of as a
hedge mechanism between two PMMs which offer the same security but have
different potentials.
To be specific, consider two PMMs on (v, h) (Figure 3.4). The first PMM is a
standard PMM with securities φ and potential F. The second PMM offers the
same securities, but its potential is set to be the conditional potential F(·, v).
Traders can only interact with these two PMMs in a restrictive manner: each
trade must trade a share bundle with both PMMs at the same time, such that
whenever a trade purchases δt = θt− θt−1 shares of securities from one PMM,
an inverse purchase −δt = θt−1 − θt from the other is always automatically
attached.
However, such a hedge mechanism is purposed vacuously only for the pur-
pose of analysis, and cannot really be implemented. The problem is that the
second PMM is not a standard PMM. In fact, the potential of the second PMM
F(·, v) is a random variable, thus the cost of a trade with the second PMM is
indeterminable until we observe v.
3.6.2 Weak incentive-compatibility
A well-known result given by Hanson (2007) is that the market scoring rule
(MSR), which includes LMSR as a special case, is an incentive-compatible
mechanism w.r.t. risk-neutral myopic traders. More precisely, given a risk-
neutral myopic trader with her true belief pθ∗ ∈ PΘ, the highest MSR profit
she expect will be obtained when the belief she submits pθt coincides with her
true belief pθ∗
St(pθ∗ , pθ∗)− St(pθ∗ , pθt) ≥ 0, ∀pθt ∈ PΘ. (3.48)
Here St(p, ·) := Ep[St(v, ·)] denotes the expected MSR profit w.r.t. p.
A MSR interprets the incentive-compatibility of a mechanism as the ability to
maximize the expected MSR profit. It allows us to define the conventional
concept of incentive-compatibility through an optimization problem, and fur-
ther introduce a weaker concept of incentive-compatibility.











Figure 3.4: The double-potential form of LMSR. Consider a LMSR that asks traders
to submit a marginal distribution over v. When the belief distributions are restricted
to an exponential family PΘ, the profit given by the LMSR can be rewritten as si-
multaneous changes of both F and the F(·, v) w.r.t. the same move in θ. Therefore,
the LMSR can be thought of as a hedge mechanism: whenever a trade purchases
δt = θt − θt−1 from one PMM, an inverse purchase −δt = θt−1 − θt from the other is
always attached. From this double-potential point of view, the PoPMM approximates
a LMSR by linearizing the change of the conditional potential F(θt, v)− F(θt−1, v) to
the payout θ>t p(θt−1, v) (red), which always bounds the change form below.
Definition 3.3. A mechanism is (St) incentive-compatible (w.r.t. risk-neutral my-
opic traders), if there exists a MSR St such that for any risk-neutral myopic
trader with belief pθ∗ ∈ PΘ, St(pθ∗ , ·) is always maximized at the post-trade
market belief pθt resulting from her optimal trade
St(pθ∗ , pθt)− St(pθ∗ , pθ) ≥ 0, ∀pθ ∈ PΘ. (3.49)
Definition 3.4. A mechanism is said weakly (St) incentive-compatible (w.r.t. risk-
neutral myopic traders), if there exists a MSR St such that for any risk-neutral
myopic trader with belief pθ∗ ∈ PΘ, St(pθ∗ , ·) is always positive at the post-
trade market belief pθt , where pθt results from her maximum expected profit
trade. That is, for all t, St(pθ∗ , pθt) > 0.
A weakly incentive-compatible mechanism can not elicit the traders’ true be-
liefs exactly via its post-trade market beliefs, since there is no guarantee that
the post-trade market beliefs will maximize the expected LMSR profits. How-
ever, the mechanism can guarantee that the market position moves in a cor-
rect direction, such that each post-trade belief is always closer to the current
trader’s true belief than the pre-trade one. Here, the closeness is measured by
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the KL-divergence. In fact, from the definition of weak incentive-compatibility
0 < St(pθ∗ , pθt) = Epθ∗ [log pθt(v)]−Epθ∗ [log pθt−1(v)] (3.50)
= KL(pθ∗ , pθt−1)− KL(pθ∗ , pθt). (3.51)
The link between a PoPMM and the LMSR defined in (3.43) can be established
through the double-potential form in (3.47). Given v = v, the conditional
potential F(·, v) is a convex differentiable function over Θ, as its Hessian
∇2θF(θ, v) = Epθ[(φ−Epθ[φ | v])
2 | v] ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.52)
Applying the convexity to (3.47), we have
St(v, pθt) = (F(θt, v)− F(θt−1, v))− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)) (3.53)
≥ (θt − θt−1)>∇θF(θt−1, v)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)) (3.54)
Recall that the gradient of F(·, v) at θt−1 gives the conditional market prices
p(θt−1, v). Then (3.54) matches precisely to the profit of the most recent trade
made with a PoPMM. In other words, the profit of a trade made with a
PoPMM always bounds the LMSR profit, or equivalently the increase in the
marginal log probability at v = v, from below (Figure 3.4).
Applying the above inequality, we can prove the weak incentive-compatibility
of the PoPMM.
Theorem 3.5. A PoPMM is weakly incentive-compatible.
Proof. Consider a PoPMM which, after t − 1 trades, has a market position
θt−1. Since the t-th trader is risk-neutral and myopic, her trading objective is
max Epθ∗ [mt(v)] = Epθ∗ [(θt − θt−1)
>p(θt−1, v)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1))] (3.55)
≤ Epθ∗ [St(v, pθt)] = St(pθ∗ , pθt) (3.56)
On the other hand, notice that if no trade happens δt = θt − θt−1 = 0, the
profit is zero. It follows that the maximum expected profit given by the opti-
mal trade must be positive. Therefore,
0 < max Epθ∗ [mt(v)] ≤ St(pθ∗ , pθt). (3.57)
Apply Definition 3.4 to complete the proof.
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Finally, we end up this section by introducing a special type of risk-neutral
myopic trades, with respect to which the PoPMM (or in general any weakly
incentive-compatible mechanism) becomes incentive-compatible. We say a
trader is risk-neutral and myopically greedy, if she repeatedly trades with the
market maker until there is no more myopically profitable trade.
Corollary 3.6. A PoPMM is incentive-compatible w.r.t. a risk-neutral myopically
greedy traders.
This incentive-compatibility results from the fact that each trade in a PoPMM
is an optimization step towards maximizing the expected LMSR profit. When
the trader is myopically greedy, she will keep trading until the optimal market
belief that maximizes the expected LMSR profit is reached. By the property
of the LMSR, this optimal market belief reveals the trader’s true belief.
3.7 Experiments
We first complete the PoPMM design for the toy example of the Who-Touched-
the-Ball game (Figure 3.1). We simulate the market using synthetic traders.
In the second example, we present a PoPMM for a more realistic problem of
betting the players’ skills, and simulate it using real data.
The “Who-Touched-the-Ball” game For the “Who-Touched-the-Ball” game
in Figure 3.1, we build a PoPMM which represents a mixture of two Gaussians
(2-GMM) (Section 3.4.1). Each Gaussian is associated with a single player in
the image and describes the possible position of the ball given that the player
it represents last touched the ball. Trades can adjust the mean and covariance
matrix of each Gaussian as well as the mixing weights.
The market will offer securities
φ(x, z) = vect












Note that xx> is a two-by-two matrix, and vect(·) denotes the vectorization of
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Figure 3.5: Traders drawn from the ensemble. Left: plot of first 100 sampled Gaus-
sian components. For each component the mean and the 3σ contour (transparent
thin) are shown. The thick opaque contours in red and green are the components of
the ensemble mean while the transparent ones are samples. Right: plot of first 100
samples of the component mixing weights. The ensemble mean is an even mixture
of two components, while traders deviate from it through a Beta distribution.
the securities. The corresponding share positions are denoted by
θ = vect
θ01, θ02︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ0
, θ11, θ12︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ1





where θ11, θ21 are vectors of length two, and θ12, θ22 are two-by-two matrices.
The potential and the conditional potential are
F(θ) = log ∑
m∈{1,2}
exp(θ0m + log Zm(θm)), (3.60)








with the log partition function








log | − 2θm2|. (3.62)
for each Gaussian component ∀θ ∈ {1, 2}.
To simulate the market, let’s assume that there exists an ensemble of traders,
and each trader’s belief is a noise sample of the ensemble mean. In particular,
we generate each trader’s 2-GMM belief by drawing the mixing weights from
a Beta distribution Beta(3, 2) and drawing each Gaussian component from a
Normal-Inverse-Wishart distribution, NIW(λ = 50, ν = 0.6). The mean belief
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of the generated traders has mixing weights w = (0.6, 0.4), means of Gaus-
sians µ1 = (−9, 4)>, µ2 = (1, 2)> and covariance matrices Σ1 = (3,−2;−2, 3),
Σ2 = (7, 2; 2, 2) (Figure 3.5). We expect that by interacting with these traders
the market will somehow recover the mean belief of the ensemble.
Each trader will interact with the PoPMM once in a sequential order. The
expected profit involves an integration w.r.t. the trader’s belief distribution
pt(x), which is usually expensive to compute. To avoid the integral, we rep-
resent the t-th trader’s marginal belief by Nt sampled points {snt }
Nt
t=1 of the
marginal. Then the trader’s belief is approximated by pt(x) ≈ 1/Nt ∑n 1(x−








δ>p(θt−1, snt )− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)) (3.63)
Now let’s view the trading dynamics as an implementation of the Expectation-
Maximisation (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) for learning the market
belief model pθ(x). Recall that the market belief in the joint space of (x, z) is an
exponential family distribution. The key of the view is to think of each trader
as a dataset Dt, consisting of Nt data points distributed under the trader’s
individual belief pt. Note that this trader dataset can contain infinite data
points depending on how many we want to draw from the distribution. Then
the E-step is to construct Q-objective using the old conditional pθt−1(z | x)




n | sn) log pθt(sn, zn)dzn. (3.64)
and the M-step is to find the θt that maximizes the Q-objective. Since the joint
pθt(x, z) is an exponential family distribution, substituting the canonical form,
we obtain














n)− F(θt) + const. (3.65)
The Q-objective obtained above matches exactly the objective in (3.63) up to a
set of terms independent of θt. Hence the M-step will give the same θt with
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Figure 3.6: Convergence in running averaged prices. Left: The 3σ contours of the
averaged Gaussian components, with transparent dots the Gaussian centres reported
by each trade. Right: the running averaged prices of the security favouring Van Persie
converge to the traders’ mean belief.
the one resulting from the trading dynamics. From this point of view, the
trading process is precisely one EM step performed on the dataset {snt }
Nt
t=1 ∼
pt. If we further assume that each trader may iterate multiple times in her
own mind to determine the final trade, then this corresponds to running the
EM steps a few more steps on the same trader’s dataset. In the experiment we
set this number of virtual iteration to C = 5, that is, each trader will actually
perform five EM iterations to establish her final trade. We set Nt = 500 as an
appropriate balance between the computational efficiency and the accuracy of
representing the trader beliefs. We denote the optimal trade δneutralt and the
resulting post-trade position θneutralt .
If the trader is risk-averse, her trade decision will be a compromise between
her personal belief and the market belief, leading to a post-trade position
sitting in between θneutralt and θt−1:
θaverset = (1− β)θt−1 + βθneutralt = θt−1 + β(θneutralt − θt−1) (3.66)
= θt−1 + βδ
neutral
t = θt−1 + δ
averse
t , (3.67)
where δaverset = βδ
neutral
t , β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the actual transaction made by the
risk-averse trader, and the parameter β measures the degree of risk-aversion.
When β = 1, the trader becomes risk-neutral; when β = 0, the trader is too
risk-averse to make any effective trade. In the experiment, we set β = 0.8.
The market starts from t = 0 and ends at T, during which a single trade occurs
at each time. After time T, we close the market and reveal the true position
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Figure 3.7: Experimental support for boundedness and incentive-compatibility. Left:
comparison of the expected log probability of the market belief before and after each
trade. All points lie above the green line, indicating that the expected LMSR profit
w.r.t. each trader is always positive. Right: the money spent and LMSR profit gained
by the market maker up to the t-th trade, given the observed x. The monetary loss is
bounded from above, but it is not always the same as the LMSR profit.
of the ball x = (−10.1, 6.5)> for this game. Finally, we evaluate securities and
clearing payouts.
During trading, the market instantaneous prices show high volatility due to
the interactions with stochastic natures. However, as the number of trades
increases through time, the running averaged prices converge to the ensem-
ble mean belief (Figure 3.6). Such convergence behaviour has been suggested
by Frongillo et al. (2012). The authors analyse the convergence by approximat-
ing each trade to one step of the stochastic mirror descent. A more accurate
discussion about the market convergence and equilibrium will be presented
later in Chapter 5.
Figure 3.7 shows the results for boundedness and incentive-compatibility of
the PoPMM. The left figure plots the expected log marginal market probabil-
ity w.r.t. the trader’s belief before and after each trade. All trades lie above the
zero LMSR profit line, which means that all trades gain positive LMSR prof-
its, thus implying the weak incentive-compatibility of the PoPMM. The right
figure plots the total money spent and the total LMSR profit gained by the
market maker up to the t-th trade, given the observed x. For the PoPMM, the
monetary loss is still bounded from above, though it does not always match
the LMSR profit.
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A skill betting system In this second example we use the PoPMM to imple-
ment a system that trades to bet on players’ skills. This system can be viewed
as a simple TrueSkill™ rating system with no teams (Herbrich et al., 2007),
but driven by transactions between market and informative traders rather
than performing Bayesian inference directly on historical data. Though based
on TrueSkill™, this skill betting system is of interest on its own. In fact, com-
pared to TrueSkill™, the system prior is enriched by various traders’ beliefs.
In addition, any new information learned by traders can be quickly captured
by the system, such as an injury of a player.
The events we care about are the results of a pairwise comparison game with-
out tie (e.g. go, tennis), repeatedly played by K players K = {1, . . . , K}. The
m-th game is between players im, jm ∈ K. To model the game result, the ac-
tual performance of the two players are first drawn according their skill levels,
yim ∼ N (him , ε2), yjm ∼ N (hjm , ε2), and the winner vm is assigned to the player
with the higher performance.
The belief that PoPMM encodes has the form p(v, h) = p(v | h)p(h). Here
p(h) is a multivariate Gaussian, which is a product of K univariate Gaussians
and captures the skill levels h of players. The mean parameter of p(h) is thus
referred to as the players’ true skills. The conditional p(v | h) is the probability
of v being the winner given players’ skills h. More specifically, given a game
between k1m, k2m, the probability that vm = k1m is
p(vm = im | h) =
∫∫







where Φ the c.d.f. of the standard Normal distribution. Therefore, p(v | h) is
a probit model.
A PoPMM with securities defined only on the latent variables is used to en-
code the above belief (Section 3.4.2). For simplicity, we will pre-set the vari-
ances of the skills, and only let traders bet on the players’ true skills (mean
of skills). In particular, we introduce K securities with φk(h) = hk, and define
potential function F(θ) = θ>Σθ/2 with fixed Σ = diag{σ21 , . . . , σ2K}. Then
each position of the PoPMM is associated with the distribution N (Σθ, Σ).
All tested game results are revealed simultaneously after market closes. The
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exact computation of the conditional market price is intractable, and we ap-
proximate it using (online) moment-matching (Minka, 2001). Given the game
results {im, jm, vm}Mm=1 in a specified order, starting with the market belief
pθt−1(h), moment-matching sequentially approximates the posterior p(h | vm)
to a Gaussian by matching their means and covariance matrices, and uses the
Gaussian as the prior to compute the next posterior p(h | vm+1). As described
by Herbrich (2005), the approximated Gaussian has the form N (µ′, Σ′), with
Σ′ = diag{σ′1
















where gk and Gk are the derivatives of the log partition function of the pos-
terior w.r.t. µk and σ2k , respectively. Denote wm the winner of {im, jm} and lm
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, a = (µwm − µlm)/b, ϕ(a) = Φ′(a)/Φ(a). Note
that Φ′ is simply the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. Finally, the
mean of the final moment-matched Gaussian is then used as the approxima-
tion of the conditional market price.
We collect a total number of 51413 games for the top K = 1049 players from
Go4Go.net, split 10% out (5141 games) for tested game results. The rest 90%
games can be viewed as historical data available to traders to build their be-
liefs. We introduce two types of traders, both of which only care about betting
the game between two specific players: a simple trader builds her belief up by
simply counting the historical games between the two players; while a smart
trader first learns a TrueSkill model on the historical data, and then uses only
the marginal over the game she is interested in.
Two tests are run to evaluate our skill betting PoPMM. In the first test, we
introduce N = 20000 traders, all of whom are smart traders, and let PoPMM
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Figure 3.8: Betting Go players’ skills using PoPMM. Left: prices of 7 sampled skill
securities and the means of corresponding skills given by the TrueSkill model. The
TrueSkill model is the underlying model for the belief construction of smart traders.
The prices prices converge to TrueSkill model, implying that the PoPMM can recover
the aggregated belief from only marginal beliefs over the game by leveraging the bets
on the latent structure it defines. Right: the profit distributions for simple traders
and smart traders when both of them interact with the PoPMM. The histograms are
normalized in corresponding groups such that the heights of all bars in the same
group sum up to one. The PoPMM gives higher profits collectively to smart traders,
who by design have beliefs of higher quality than the simple traders.
interact with them sequentially. The left of Figure 3.8 shows that the market
prices for skill securities all converge to the mean of the TrueSkill model,
the underlying model from which each smart trader sets up her belief. We
emphasize that traders have only marginal distribution on games. It is the
latent structure the PoPMM defines that enables different marginal beliefs to
be aggregated into a single belief via transactions.
In the second test, we again introduce N = 20000 traders, but this time we
set half of the population of the traders to be simple traders and the rest to
be smart traders. The PoPMM interacts with traders sequentially. The right
of Figure 3.8 shows the final profits traders obtain after the results of the test
games are revealed. Since by design the quality of the smart trader’s belief
is higher than that of the simple trader, collectively smart traders should be
rewarded more than simple traders. The result shows that the smart traders’
profit distribution shift positively from zero while the simple traders’ profit
distribution does not, implying a higher quality in smart traders’ beliefs. In
addition, the smart traders also have a smaller variance in their belief quality
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than simple traders.
3.8 Extensions
Our current PoPMM uses penultimate market position to compute condi-
tional market prices. Although we have shown both theoretically and exper-
imentally that the PoPMM inherits desired properties from the PMM, two
important issues still remain.
Weak incentive-compatibility is enough to guarantee that the post-trade mar-
ket belief will always have a higher quality than the pre-trade belief in terms of
describing the traders’ private information. However, under weak incentive-
compatibility the post-trade market beliefs usually do not reflect traders’ true
beliefs, and so we cannot use current version of PoPMM for true belief reve-
lation.
In addition, PoPMM is only weakly incentive-compatible in terms of risk-
neutral, myopic sequential traders, that is, traders are expected profit maxi-
mizers and cares about their profits only in current trading round, and they
interact with the PoPMM sequentially such that each trader will only trade
once. Intuitively, suppose a trader can revisit the market at any time. Then
this trader can manipulate the penultimate market price by following her
trade with another infinitesimal trade that changes the penultimate market
position to the post-trade position. Mathematically, if otherwise traders are
risk-neutral and myopic but now allowed to trade multiple times, then the
objective of trader i who trades at time t is to maximize
mi,t(pi) = Epi [(ϑi + δt)
>p(θt−1, v)]− (F(θt−1 + δt)− F(θt−1)). (3.73)
Here pi is the trader’s true belief, ϑi is her holdings before the trade, θt−1
the market pre-trade position, and δt the shares traded in this round. Denote
θt−1,\i = θt−1 − ϑi and θt = θt−1 + δt. Then mi,t(pi) can be rewritten into
mi,t(pi) = Epi [log pθt(v)− log pθt−1,\i(v)]
−Epi [DF(·,v)(θt, θt−1)] + Epi [DF(·,v)(θt−1,\i, θt−1)] + C, (3.74)
where C = F(θt−1)− F(θt−1,\i). It is a constant w.r.t. the trade δt. The first
term can be thought of as the LMSR profit generated by all holdings of the
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trader, while he second and the third terms are two expected divergences
generated by the conditional potential F(·, v). For traders who trade only
once, ϑi = 0 and θt−1,\i = θt−1. The second divergence is zero, then mi,t(pi)
bounds the LMSR profit from below, recovering weak incentive-compatibility
in (3.55). However, for traders who have obtained non-zero ϑi in previous
trades and would like to trade once more, the second divergence remains
positive, which may destroy the bound. In fact, each trader can always end
her multiple trades with an infinitesimal trade such that θt = θt−1. Under this
circumstance, the first divergence vanishes, and the profit of the trader now
becomes an upper bound of the LMSR profit. This opposite bound is much
less beneficial for the PoPMM, since PoPMM has to pay more money for better
beliefs, and sometime may even end up with paying for worse beliefs.
Fortunately, we can solve both problems by choosing better market positions
for computing conditional market prices. We first discuss how we can make
our PoPMM incentive-compatible in the strict sense. Then the PoPMM is
further improved to maintain (weak) incentive-compatibility under repeated
trading.
3.8.1 Making PoPMM incentive-compatible
The key to recovering strict incentive-compatibility is to match the trading
profit precisely to the corresponding LMSR profit. Given observation v = v,
for the t-th trade, the profits are given by (3.8) and (3.53), that is,
mt(v) = (θt − θt−1)>p(θ′, v)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)), (3.75)
St(v, pθt) = F(θt, v)− F(θt−1, v)− (F(θt)− F(θt−1)). (3.76)
Here θ′ is the market position used for computing the conditional market
prices. In our current design, θ′ is the penultimate position θT−1. Recall that
θ′ = θT−1, the convexity of F(·, v) and p(θ, v) = ∇θF(θ, v) together result in
mt(v) ≤ St(v, pθt) when the t-th trade is the last trade.
Since the second terms on the RHS of both equations are the same, to match
mt(v) and St(v, pθt) we need to find a θ
′ such that
(θt − θt−1)>p(θ′, v) = F(θt, v)− F(θt−1, v). (3.77)
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We must make sure the θ′ we find always exists. In addition, it should be
easily constructed in order to keep the efficiency of potential market making.
It turns out that we can define θ′ = λθt− (1− λ)θt−1, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is such
that (3.77) holds. The existence of θ′ is given by the mean value theorem. More
specifically, define real-valued function
f (λ) := F(λθt + (1− λ)θt−1, v). (3.78)
It is continuous on [0, 1] and differentiable on (0, 1). Then, by the mean value
theorem there exists a λ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that d f (λ′)/dλ = f (1)− f (0), that is
d
dλ
f (λ′) = (θt − θt−1)>∇θF(θ′, v) = F(θt, v)− F(θt−1, v). (3.79)
Finally, the existence of λ′ implies the existence of θ′.
The mean value theorem also implies an optimization based approach for
finding θ′. If we define g(λ) := f (λ)− λ( f (1)− f (0)), then g is convex due
to convexity of f . Taking the derivative of g at λ′ and using d f (λ′)/dλ =






f (λ′)− ( f (1)− f (0)) = 0. (3.80)
That is, λ′ happens to be the minimum of g. Finding λ′ and corresponding
θ′ now becomes a one dimensional minimization problem. If the conditional
potential function F(·, v) is analytical, this minimization can be solved effi-
ciently; otherwise, we can first compute the value of F(·, v) at θt and θt−1 (i.e.
f (1) and f (0)), and then run root-finding algorithm for (3.80) to get λ′. Note
that in the root-finding case, we only need to computing conditional market
prices p(·, v).
3.8.2 Repeated trades
Consider trader i who trades at time t, and assume her holdings ϑi 6= 0.
Denote θt−1,\i := θt−1 − ϑi the total shares the PoPMM sold to all traders
except i. Intuitively, θt−1,\i can be thought of as a market position taking out
the effect of the i-th trader. If we compute the conditional market prices using
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position θt−1,\i, the trader’s profit is
mi,t(v) = (log pθt(v)− log pθt−1,\i(v))− DF(·,v)(θt, θt−1,\i) + C (3.81)
≤ Si,t(v, pθt) + C. (3.82)
where Si,t(v, pθt) := log pθt(v)− log pθt−1,\i(v) is the LMSR profit contributed
by trader i, and C = F(θt−1) − F(θt−1,\i) is the guaranteed/risk-free profit
obtained by selling all holdings. Also, the equality holds when the trader
sells all her holdings (resulting in θt = θt−1,\i). Rearrange the inequality:
mi,t(v)− C ≤ Si,t(v, pθt). (3.83)
That is, the part exceeding the guaranteed profit bounds the LMSR profit from
below. Intuitively, it makes sense since trader i can contribute to the market
belief only when she actually purchases securities.
Therefore, by computing conditional market prices at θt−1,\i, the PoPMM
is weak incentive-compatible for risk-neutral myopic traders, regardless of
whether they trade sequentially or repeatedly. We refer this extended PoPMM
as Re-PoPMM. Re-PopMM includes the original PoPMM as a special case,
since in sequential setting θt−1,\i reduces to the penultimate position. How-
ever, as a price Re-PoPMM has to record all traders’ holdings. The mechanism
is described by Figure 3.9a.
We can further construct a strictly incentive-compatible Re-PoPMM for re-
peated trades by combining these two ideas. Similar to the PoPMM case, the
strict incentive-compatible Re-PoPMM searches for a market position θ′ for
computing the conditional market prices, such that the monetary profit of
each trade mi,t − C matches exactly to the LMSR profit Si,t (i.e. (3.83) holds
with equality). Such θ′ is found by
θ′ = arg min
θλ :λ∈[0,1]
F(θλ, v)− λ(F(θt, v)− F(θt−1,\i, v)). (3.84)
where θλ = λθt + (1− λ)θt−1,\i. The mechanism is given by Figure 3.9b.
3.9 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter we proposed a potential based market maker for handling
partially-observable state spaces (PoPMM). The design of the PoPMM relies
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Input: F, F(·, v), initial market
position θ0, and trader’s id
map γ;
for t = 1 to T do
retrieve trader i = γ(t) and
holdings ϑi;
record θ\i = θt−1 − ϑi;
δt trade costs F(θt)− F(θt−1);
update position θt ← θt−1 + δt;
update and store new holdings ϑi;
end
at T observe v = v, close the market;
evaluate securities r = p(θ\i, v);
a trader holding ϑ gets payout ϑ>r;
(a) Weakly incentive-compatible
Input: F, F(·, v), initial market
position θ0, and trader’s id
map γ;
for t = 1 to T do
retrieve trader i = γ(t) and
holdings ϑi;
record θ\i = θt−1 − ϑi;
δt trade costs F(θt)− F(θt−1);
update position θt ← θt−1 + δt;
update and store new holdings ϑi;
end
at T observe v = v, close the market;
find market position θ′ using (3.84);
evaluate securities r = p(θ′, v);
a trader holding ϑ gets payout ϑ>r;
(b) Incentive-compatible
Figure 3.9: Re-PoPMM: PoPMM allowing repeated trades. The market maker now
has to keep track of the positions of all traders. For the (strictly) incentive-compatible
PoPMM, it is more expensive to find the conditional market price as an optimization
(3.84) is involved.
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heavily on exponential families. In particular, the belief model that a PoPMM
encodes is either an exponential family on the joint space (e.g. the mixture
of Gaussians for Who-Touched-the-Ball game), or has an exponential family
component for the latent variables (e.g. skill betting model for Go players),
and the potential function of the PoPMM is defined to be the log partition
function of the involved exponential family. We analysed theoretically and
demonstrated by experiments how the PoPMM maintains bounded monetary
loss and how it incentivizes traders to improve the quality of the market belief
via transactions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on designing PMM for par-
tially observable events. Prior to our work, Kutty (2014) has suggested using
EM algorithm to model traders’ activities when they temporarily have no ac-
cess to the complete observation of the events. However, her market still falls
into the fully-observable framework, as in the end the events must be com-
pletely observed to ensure the trading incentive. Another interesting work is
given by Dudík et al. (2014). Although the setting is the fully-observable one,
they design a PMM for sequentially observable events whose states will be-
come less uncertain through time and are finally completely determined. The
events can be treated as partially observable any time before the complete
observation.
The first criticism would be the necessity of using exponential families. Ad-
mittedly, the PoPMM can encode flexible joint beliefs p(v, h) by having a
fixed p(v | h) and only requiring p(h) to vary in an exponential family (Sec-
tion 3.4.2). Nevertheless, requiring exponential families in the design is re-
strictive. Do there exist other families of distributions that a PMM/PoPMM
can represent efficiently? In Chapter 4, we complete the existing theory for
the generalized exponential families (GEFs), established by Grünwald and Dawid
(2004); Frongillo and Reid (2013), and show how GEFs can be applied to ex-
tend the design of potential based market maker.
In addition, it remains unclear how PoPMMs and in general potential based
market makers aggregate traders’ beliefs via transactions, despite that some
convergence patterns in market prices have been discovered in the exper-
iments. A thorough discussion is needed to characterize the equilibria of
potential based markets and to understand the dynamics behind the price
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convergences. This will be done in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4
Representing Market Beliefs
A market belief is a distribution, expressed by current market status, over the
uncertain future state upon which the prediction market is built. In a pre-
diction market driven by a potential-based market maker (PMM), the market
belief varies in a family of distributions parametrized by market maker’s po-
sition, such that the expectation of security values w.r.t. the market belief coin-
cides with the instantanous market prices. In previous chapters, we have seen
how a conventional PMM can further defines a belief model that represents its
belief via an exponential family, and how the exponential family belief model
plays a central role in designing a partially-observable PMM (PoPMM). In both
discussions, the exponential family is the only family of distributions used for
modelling the market beliefs, due to its popularity in representing distribu-
tions and analytical simplicity. However, always representing market beliefs
in an exponential family seems restrictive, especially when we consider the
fact that set of all possible probability distributions over the future state is
much larger than a particular exponential family.
In this chapter, we seek for a general parametrized family of distributions
that be used to represent market beliefs beyond the exponential family, and
further to improve the PoPMM design such that it will no longer depend on
the exponential family. Our goal is achieved by allowing a PMM or a PoPMM
to model its belief in a more general family of distributions, which is referred
to as the generalized exponential family (GEF). On the one hand, as is implied by
its name, a GEF maintains the key properties of an exponential family. On the
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other hand, a GEF can contain distributions very different from those in an
exponential family. The former guarantees that such a PMM/PoPMM with
its beliefs efficiently represented in a GEF can be constructed, while the latter
increases flexibility of the representation.
This work is based on the GEF theory, first established by Grünwald and
Dawid (2004) via game theory and later extended by Frongillo and Reid (2013)
via convex analysis. The existing GEF theory can be applied to the design of
the PMM directly, as is shown by Frongillo and Reid (2013). However, not all
GEFs characterized by the existing theory is suitable for the PoPMM as some
of them will suffer from high computational costs. We start by reviewing the
existing theory, especially the key properties that makes a GEF representable
by a PMM. We also contribute to the theory by reintroducing regularity, the
central concept of the theory, more vigorously using convex analysis. Next,
based on the existing theory, we characterize a special class of GEFs that
possess certain desired conditioning structure. Finally, we incorporate GEFs
into a PoPMM, to free it from the usage of the exponential family and make
it efficient for practical application.
4.1 Motivation
Before we start, let’s motivate this work a bit further. More specifically, we
must justify (1) the necessity of including a model for market beliefs in the
PMM design, (2) the non-necessity of representing market beliefs in an expo-
nential family, and (3) the benefit of using GEF.
Necessity of modelling market beliefs At the first glance, it does not seem
necessary to even introduce the concept of market beliefs in a PMM, let alone
an explicit model of it. Indeed, Abernethy et al. (2011) show that the mini-
mum structure of a PMM resulting from several desired axioms is a convex
differential function with effective domain containing the convex hull of all
the possible values of the securities. The concept of market beliefs is not
explicitly defined in this minimum structure. Although market beliefs are
introduced in later designs such as Abernethy et al. (2014), they are treated
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more like an add-on component and not essential to the functioning of the
PMM.
However, despite being implicit, market beliefs are actually included in the
minimum structure as a result of the expressiveness of the PMM. Expressive-
ness is a condition put on the price space of the PMM, such that for any
risk-neutral trader there always exists a market price matched to the trader’s
expectation of the security values. That is, for any p ∈ P , there exists θ ∈ Θ
such that Ep[φ] = ∇F(θ). When designing the minimum structure, Aber-
nethy et al. (2011) introduce the expressiveness condition as one axiom only
for the purpose of characterizing the possible market positions of the PMM
(or equivalently the effective domain of the potential function). But as we will
show below, expressiveness can tell us more than the domain properties.
Expressiveness guarantees the existence of market beliefs, since it maps each
market state to at least one distribution w.r.t. which the expectation of se-
curity values matches the market prices. Furthermore, in a complete market
(i.e. a market where the number of linearly independent securities K is no
smaller than dim(Ω)− 1), expressiveness can determine the model used for
representing the market beliefs. For illustrative purpose, consider a complete
prediction market on a fully-observable binary state space Ω = {−1, 1} of-
fering a single security φ(ω) := ω. For any trader with belief p(ω = 1) =
p, p ∈ [0, 1], her expectation of φ is E[φ] = 2p − 1. Then by definition, a
PMM with potential F and possible market positions Θ is expressive, if for
every p ∈ [0, 1] there always exists a position θ ∈ Θ such that the market
prices dF(θ)/dθ = E[φ] = 2p − 1. Therefore, this PMM models its market
belief by a parametric family PΘ := {(1− p, p) | p = (1 + dF(θ)/dθ)/2}θ∈Θ.
In general, an expressive PMM in a complete market must have a belief model
defined via its prices and parametrized by the market maker’s position. If the
market is incomplete (i.e. K < dim(Ω)− 1), then dF(θ)/dθ = E[φ] together
with ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1 will not be enough to determine a unique distribution
for each θ, hence the map from the market position to the market beliefs is
one-to-many.
The necessity of modelling market beliefs is also supported by the need for
building arbitrage-free markets. According to the fundamental theorem of asset
pricing (see e.g. Schachermayer (2008); Haugh (2010)), a model of financial
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financial/observation time stamp t
t : 0 1
trading time stamp τ
τ : 1 2 3 · · ·
Figure 4.1: Two different types of time stamps in prediction markets. The trading
time stamp labels the trade at each time τ, while the finiancial/observation time
stamp tells whether the future state has been realized. Given fixed θ, the prediciton
market can be viewed as a financial market with (0, 1)-time stamps.
market is free of arbitrage if and only if an equivalent measure p of the orig-
inal measure P (i.e. the true probability measure of the future state) exists
such that the prices for securities are martingales under p. A PMM with
small enough trades (such that the market prices keep fixed at p(θ)) can be
thought of as a special financial market model with only two financial time
stamps: t = 0 for trading, and t = 1 for realizing state and clearing payouts
of securities. Notice that the time stamp defined here is not for distinguishing
different transactions. The financial market prices S0 for securities φ at t = 0
is equal to the market maker’s prices p(θ), and the prices S1 at t = 1 is equal
to the security values at the realized state φ(ω). Then, to build arbitrage-free
market we must find a probability measure p under which the price {S0, S1}
is a martingale, that is,
p(θ) = S0 = Ep[S1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
p-martingale
= Ep[φ]. (4.1)
Based on this equality, we can then model the market belief at θ by the martin-
gale measure. Finally, to ensure the PMM is free of arbitrage at any position
in Θ, we must associate with every position a market belief which is modelled
by a martingale measure.
In summary, it is necessary to model the market belief to guarantee the ex-
pressiveness of the prediction market and the absence of arbitrage.
Non-necessity of using exponential family Representing market beliefs in
an exponential family is restrictive. In particular, in a complete market built
on a finite discrete state space, we can easily find a PMM representing beliefs
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Figure 4.2: A binary complete market driven by two PMMs. Left: the potential
functions of the PMMs. Right: the market prices for φ(ω) = ω ∈ {−1, 1}. In
this complete market, the market belief is represented in p(ω = 1) = p with
p ∈ {(1 + dF(θ)/dθ)/2}θ∈R. The PMM with potential F1 models its belief by an
exponential family p(ω) ∝ exp(θφ(ω)), while the one with F2 does not.
beyond exponential families. For example, again consider a binary state space
Ω = {−1, 1}, and two PMMs offering the same single security φ(ω) = ω
and having the same possible positions Θ = R, but running under different
potentials
F1(θ) = log(cosh(θ)), F2(θ) =

−θ − 1/2 θ ∈ [−∞,−1]
θ2/2 θ ∈ (−1, 1)
θ − 1/2 θ ∈ [1,+∞]
(4.2)








−1 θ ∈ [−∞,−1]
θ θ ∈ (−1, 1)
1 θ ∈ [1,+∞]
. (4.3)
Figure 4.2 presents the plots of the potentials as well as the prices. By ex-
pressiveness, The market belief is computed by p(ω = 1) = p where p =






0 θ ∈ [−∞,−1]
(1 + θ)/2 θ ∈ (−1, 1)
1 θ ∈ [1,+∞]
. (4.4)
The first PMM models its belief by an exponential family, while the second
one does not. This is an example for a complete market with binary state
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space. For general incomplete markets, it is also possible to design a PMM
with a belief model that is not an exponential family.
Benefit of using the GEF The exponential family provides an efficient way
of encoding market beliefs into market prices and positions. The GEF pro-
vides a reasonable balance between generalizing the exponential family for
flexible market design, and inheriting the key properties of the exponential
family for efficient market belief representation. In fact, one important goal of
the GEF theory is to characterize GEFs by directly using those key properties
found in the exponential family.
4.2 Key properties of the exponential family
The market belief serves the PMM in two aspects. It makes the market ex-
pressive, by encoding each trader’s true belief to the closest exponential family
distribution under the KL-divergence. It also ensures the absence of arbitrage,
by decoding the market prices as martingales. The exponential family can rep-
resent market beliefs in an efficient way due to the following two properties:
1. the gradient of the cumulant function F := log Z at θ is matched to the
mean statistics w.r.t. the exponential family distribution with parameter
θ, that is, Epθ[φ] = ∇F(θ); and
2. each exponential family distribution pθ maximizes the Shannon entropy
among all distributions that give the same mean statistics as pθ, that
is, pθ = arg inf p∈Γµ −H(p), where Γµ := {p ∈ P | Ep[φ] = µ} and
µ = Epθ[φ].
The first property directly implements the price decoding, while the second
property implements the belief encoding by matching the expected profit of
a trade to the KL-divergence through a loss function defined below
L(p, pθ) :=F(θ)− θ>Ep[φ] = −Ep[log pθ], (4.5)
=KL(p, pθ) + H(p). (4.6)
It is worth noting that if p is in the same exponential family as pθ, then L(p, pθ)
is the negated expected score of the log scoring rule S(ω, pθ) := θ>φ(ω)−
Chapter 4. Representing Market Beliefs 59
F(θ) = log pθ(ω).
Then for a risk-neutral myopic trader, the highest profit she expects by trading
δt = θt − θt−1 is
max Ep[mt(ω)] = L(p, pθt−1)−minθt∈Θ
L(p, pθt) (4.7)
= L(p, pθt−1)− H(p)− minpθt∈PΘ
KL(p, pθt). (4.8)
Therefore, her true belief p will be encoded into pθt , which minimizes the KL-
divergence in the exponential family. The optimal pθt is such that its mean
statistics are matched to that of p, Ep[φ] = Epθt [φ],
However, these properties are not exclusive to the exponential family. The first
property simply requires that a cumulant function exists for the whole family
of distributions. The second property in essence only asks each distribution
in the family maximizes a certain objective, which only needs to be convex for
defining a Bregman divergence, and does not have to be the Shannon entropy.
In principle, any family with these two properties can potentially be used in
the PMM design, serving the same role as the exponential family, and more
importantly, generalizing the processes of belief encoding and price decoding.
4.3 Generalized exponential family (GEF)
A generalized exponential family (GEF) is a family of distributions derived
from the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) principle with a generalized entropy
function instead of the Shannon entropy. A GEF maintains both key proper-
ties of the exponential family.
In this section, we review the existing theory for the GEF. The content of
the review will mainly follow the work of Frongillo and Reid (2013) based on
convex analysis, but will differ in some details. The concepts and results are
organized in a way to parallel the formulation of Frongillo and Reid (2013)
to the original formulation of Grünwald and Dawid (2004) based on game
theory. We also make our own contribution by reintroducing regularity, and
then unifying it with similar concepts that have been previously defined in
both formulations.
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4.3.1 Convex analysis in the space of measures
To define generalized entropies and GEFs we need to analyse convex func-
tions defined on the space of (probability) measures. In general, the space of
measures is no longer Rn, the domain space for deriving classic results of con-
vex analysis (Rockafellar, 1970). Fortunately, the space of measures has a rich
enough structure that maintains most of the results in Rn. In mathematical
jargon, the space that probability measures sit in carries a Hausdorff locally
convex topology, a structure that introduces the sense of closeness between
points in the space as well as the continuity of functions defined on the space,
and is dually paired with another Hausdorff locally convex topological vector
space through a bilinear functional.
In the rest of this section, the details of the convex structure of the space of
measures are explained without mathematical rigour. For readers who are
less interested in the details, please jump to the next section, and keep in
mind that most the results in the space of measures coincide with the classic
ones due to the convex structure. For a thorough introduction to the convex
analysis on general topological spaces we refer to e.g. Cheridito (2013); Barbu
and Precupanu (2012); Zalinescu (2002).
Consider a measurable space (Ω,F ), where Ω is the sample space of the un-
certain events equipped with some σ-algebra F . LetM be the set of all finite
signed measures (i.e. measures that allow using negative values) on (Ω,F ).
The space M is a vector space. Meanwhile, the set of all real-valued mea-
surable functions on (Ω,F ) forms another vector space, denoted by X . The




x(ω)dm(ω), ∀m ∈ M, ∀x ∈ X , (4.9)
then forms a bilinear functional on these two spaces 〈·, ·〉 : M×X → R. In
addition, this bilinear functional separates points in both M and X , i.e. for
every m ∈ M, there exists a x ∈ X such that 〈m, x〉 6= 0 and similar for every
x ∈ X . Through the bilinear functional, a family of linear functionals on M
with index set X , { fx := 〈·, x〉}x∈X , is also introduced, which then induces
a Hausdorff locally convex topology on M such that every linear functional
fx is continuous onM1. Symmetrically, a Hausdorff locally convex topology
1In topological sense, a real-valued function is continuous if the pre-image of every open
Chapter 4. Representing Market Beliefs 61
is also added to X . The two spaces together with the bilinear functional
(M,X , 〈·, ·〉) define a dual system, which carries a rich enough structure to
support convex analysis.
The set of all probability measuresM+1 is then characterized by the intersec-
tion of the convex cone of positive measures M+ := {m ∈ M | m ≥ 0} and
the affine subspace containing all measures that assign a measure of one to the
whole sample spaceM1 := {m ∈ M | m(Ω) = 1}, that is,M+1 =M+ ∩M1.
Let P be a convex subset ofM+1 with a non-empty interior2 and contains all
probability measures that we are interested in. Denote int(P) the interior of
P , then it follows that int(P) 6= ∅. For example, in the prediction market
setting P will contain all possible beliefs a trader can have. Our discussions
will be conducted on P .
4.3.2 Generalized negated entropy and GEF
Entropies are (strictly) concave functions of the probability distribution. To
directly apply convex analysis, in the following discussion we will always
refer to the negation of the entropy. Also for simplicity, the negated entropy
will be just called “entropy” when the context is clear. For readers who prefer
the original concave definition of entropies, an extra negation sign should
always be attached to the entropy functions.
First we extend the concept of entropy beyond Shannon. This generalized
negated entropy is mainly characterized by convexity.
Definition 4.1. A generalized (negated) entropy on P is a function G : M →
R∪ {+∞} that is lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) and strictly convex with effective
domain dom(G) = P .
The properties of a generalized entropy G include that: (1) G = G∗∗ which
results directly from the Fenchel-Moreau theorem (the convex conjugate G∗
of G will be introduced shortly); (2) since G is strictly convex, (∂G)−1 = ∂G∗
is single-valued on int(P) and contains the gradient as its unique element,
interval in R through the function is an open set (and so falls into the topology).
2Here the interior of P is w.r.t. the affine subspaceM1 with the subspace topology induced
fromM. When w.r.t.M, it then becomes the relative interior of P .
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∂G∗ = {∇G∗}; and (3) G is continuous on int(P), by Theorem 3.4.1 of Cherid-
ito (2013). According to the definition, the Shannon entropy is a generalized
entropy.
Lemma 4.2. The convex conjugate of a generalized entropy G,
G∗(x) := sup
p∈P
〈p, x〉 − G(p), x ∈ X (4.10)
is a l.s.c. and proper convex function on X , and is continuous on int(dom(G∗)).
Proof. The lower semi-continuity and proper convexity follows directly from
the Fenchel-Moreau theorem.
Given a p0 ∈ int(P), the image of the sub-differential map at p0 is character-
ized by (Barbu and Precupanu, 2012, Proposition 2.33)
∂G(p0) = {x ∈ X | G(p0) + G∗(x) ≤ 〈p0, x〉}. (4.11)
Convexity and lower semi-continuity of G∗(x)− 〈p0, x〉 implies that ∂G(p0) is
a closed convex subset of X . Since int(P) 6= ∅, there exists a neighbourhood
U of p0 such that the sub-differential exists for all points in U. Let ∂G(U) :=⋃
p∈U ∂G(p) be the image of U through the sub-differential map. Since the
reverse sub-differential map is single-valued, different points in U will map
to different subsets of ∂G(U), which implies that int(∂G(U)) 6= ∅. Therefore,
G∗ is finite on some neighbourhood int(∂G(U)) of x0 ∈ ∂G(p0). By Theorem
3.4.1 of Cheridito (2013), G∗ is continuous on int(dom(G∗)).
Definition 4.3. A statistic φ is a function in X .
Thus a statistic is a real-valued measurable function on (Ω,F ). It evaluates
each state by a real number. Usually a set of K statistics will be considered.
We collect them into a vector, φ = (φ1, . . . , φK)
> with φk indexing the k-th
statistic.
Based on a generalized entropy and statistics we can introduce two functions.
Both of them will play key roles in characterizing the GEF.
Definition 4.4. Given a generalized entropy G and statistics φ, the MaxEnt
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function and the dual MaxEnt function are defined to be
g(µ) := inf
p∈Γµ
G(p) where Γµ := {p ∈ P | Ep[φ] = µ}, (4.12)
F(θ) := sup
p∈P
θ>Ep[φ]− G(p) = G∗(θ>φ), (4.13)
The effective domains of these two functions are given by dom(g) := {µ ∈
RK | g(µ) < +∞} and dom(F) := {θ ∈ RK | F(θ) < +∞}.
Again remind that our generalized entropy is negated, thus the MaxEnt for-
mula here involves infimum instead of supremum. We name g the MaxEnt
function as it directly results from the generalized MaxEnt principle with the
Shannon entropy replaced by the generalized entropy G. We name F the dual
MaxEnt function since it is precisely the convex conjugate of g.
Lemma 4.5 (Lemma 2 of Frongillo and Reid (2013)). Let g and F be the MaxEnt
and dual MaxEnt functions generated by the generalized entropy G and statistics φ.
Then g is convex and F = g∗.
Now we are ready to define the GEF.
Definition 4.6 (Condition 7.3 of Grünwald and Dawid (2004)). Given a gener-
alized entropy G and statistics φ, define the dual MaxEnt function F in (4.13).
Then the generalized exponential family (GEF) generated by G and φ is a set
of distributions PΘ := {pθ}θ∈Θ with parameter set Θ ⊆ dom(F), such that
the supremum in F is attained at pθ ∈ P for each θ ∈ Θ. The dual MaxEnt
function F is also called the cumulant function of the GEF.
By definition a GEF PΘ is a subset of P . PΘ might trivially be an empty set,
which means that no GEF exists for current configurations of (G, φ). Without
loss of generality we assume PΘ 6= ∅.
Now we show that Definition 4.6 of the GEF is almost identical to the one
given by Frongillo and Reid (2013), and so will be the properties.
Theorem 4.7. Given a generalized entropy G and statistics φ, let g, F and PΘ be
the MaxEnt, dual MaxEnt and the GEF generated by G and φ. Then
1. the GEF PΘ is characterized by the sub-differential of G∗ at each θ>φ, that is,
PΘ = {pθ = ∇G∗(θ>φ)}θ∈Θ;
2. Θ ⊆ dom(∂F) and Epθ[φ] = ∇F(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ;
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3. infp∈Γµ G(p) = G(pθ) = g(µ) with µ = Epθ[φ], ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. For every θ ∈ Θ the supremum in F is attained at pθ ∈ P , implying that
θ>φ ∈ ∂G(pθ). Since G is l.s.c. and proper convex, we have G = G∗∗. Then
for any dual pair p ∈ P and x ∈ X , x ∈ ∂G(p) if and only if p ∈ ∂G∗(x). This
implies pθ ∈ ∂G∗(θ>φ). The strict convexity of G gives that ∂G∗ = {∇G∗}
and so pθ = ∇G∗(θ>φ).
For every θ0 ∈ Θ, it holds that G∗(x) ≥ G∗(θ>0 φ) + 〈pθ0 , x − θ>0 φ〉, ∀x ∈
X . In particular, ∀θ ∈ RK, θ>φ ∈ span(φ) ⊆ X and we have G∗(θ>φ) ≥
G∗(θ>0 φ) + 〈pθ0 , θ>φ− θ>0 φ〉 = G∗(θ>0 φ) + (θ− θ0)
>
Epθ[φ]. It together with
the single-valued property of ∂G∗ gives Epθ[φ] = ∇F(θ) and Θ ⊆ dom(∂F).
Finally, for every pθ ∈ PΘ, choose µ := Epθ[φ]. Then µ ∈ RK since θ ∈ RK
and θ>µ = 〈pθ, θ>φ〉 ∈ RK. Thus Γµ is well defined and we have
pθ = arg sup
p∈Γµ
θ>Ep[φ]− G(p) = arg inf
p∈Γµ
G(p). (4.14)
It follows that g(µ) = G(pθ).
However, there exists some differences between Theorem 4.7 and the corre-
sponding results in Frongillo and Reid (2013). First, in the original definition
of Frongillo and Reid (2013) the GEF has domain Θ = dom(F), which may
cause trouble as the sub-differential may not exist for some θ ∈ dom(F),
leaving the GEF distribution undefined at this point. Comparatively, in our
definition, the domain of a GEF is Θ ⊆ dom(∂F) ⊆ dom(F) which guarantees
the existence of sub-differential and thus the existence of a GEF distribution
for every θ in Θ. Second, the strict convexity we require for a generalized
entropy leads to a single-valued map (through gradient) at each θ, resulting
in a unique GEF distribution for each θ. This eliminates the potential ambi-
guity in the original definition, in which each GEF distribution is only said to
belong to the sub-differential. Finally, we refine our proof of Property 2 such
that it no longer requires the GEF to be regular in the sense of Definition 3
of Frongillo and Reid (2013). Hence now Property 2 should hold for all GEFs.
Property 2 of Theorem 4.7 enables the GEF to maintain the first key property
of the exponential family. It shows that the expectation of φ w.r.t. every GEF
distribution has been encoded into the gradient of the cumulant F (and this
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is the reason why F is called the cumulant function). However, by having just
the cumulant F we cannot completely characterize a GEF since its parameter
set Θ is only known to be a subset of dom(∂F). If further the parameter set Θ
coincides with dom(∂F), then Θ will become an intrinsic feature of F, and the
GEF will be characterized by the cumulant. Such a GEF can then be applied
to the market design efficiently through its cumulant.
It turns out that there exists a simple sufficient condition to make Θ deter-
minable by dom(∂F).
Theorem 4.8. Given a GEF PΘ with its cumulant function F, if the effective domain
of ∂F is non-empty and open, then Θ = dom(∂F).
Proof. Since int(dom(F)) ⊆ dom(∂F) ⊆ dom(F), dom(∂F) being non-empty
and open implies that dom(∂F) = int(dom(F)) and int(dom(F)) 6= ∅. Hence
{θ>φ | θ ∈ dom(∂F)} ⊆ int(dom(G∗)). By Lemma 4.2 G∗ is continuous
on int(dom(G∗)), then in particular G∗ is continuous at θ>φ for every θ ∈
dom(F). It follows that, given a fixed θ>0 φ, the directional derivative
(G∗)′(θ>0 φ, x) := lim
λ→0+
G∗(θ>0 φ + λx)− G∗(θ>0 φ)
λ
(4.15)
is a real-valued continuous sub-linear function of x ∈ X . In addition, when
being restricted to the linear subspace span(φ) of X , (G∗)′(θ>0 φ, x) dominates
the linear functional f (θ) := θ>µ0 where µ0 = ∇F(θ0), since by convexity
F(θ0 + λθ)− F(θ0) ≥ λθ>∇F(θ0) and thus we have
(G∗)′(θ>0 φ, x) = lim
λ→0+
F(θ0 + λθ)− F(θ0)
λ
≥ θ>µ0. (4.16)
By the Hahn-Banach theorem (Rudin, 1991, Theorem 3.3) there exists a contin-
uous linear functional 〈p0, ·〉 with p0 ∈ P , such that 〈p0, θ>φ〉 = θ>µ0 on the
subspace span(φ) and that 〈p0, x〉 ≤ (G∗)′(θ>0 φ; x) for all x ∈ X . Therefore,
for every µ0 ∈ ∂F(θ0) there exists a sub-gradient p0 ∈ ∂G∗(θ>0 φ), implying
dom(∂F) ⊆ Θ. Combine it with Property 2 of Theorem 4.7 to complete the
proof.
4.3.3 Regular GEF
Motivated by Theorem 4.8, we can introduce a special GEFs by adding the
sufficient condition as regularity.
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Definition 4.9. A GEF PΘ with its cumulant function F is regular if dom(∂F)
is non-empty and open.
According to Theorem 4.8, a regular GEF has its parameter set determined by
∂F, that is, Θ = dom(∂F).
It is worth mentioning that our definition of the regular GEF directly general-
izes the regular exponential family, which is characterized by having an open
parameter set (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978). In fact, every exponential family is
by definition also a GEF derived from the generalized entropy G = −H.
The regular GEF has been introduced in different ways by Frongillo and Reid
(2013) and Grünwald and Dawid (2004). In Frongillo and Reid (2013) a GEF
is regular if its cumulant is l.s.c. and proper convex, while in Grünwald and
Dawid (2004) a regular GEF is the set of all GEF distributions whose mean
statistics are regular points (Definition 7.3). Now Definition 4.9 gives a new
definition of the regular GEF that differs from the previous two. This leaves
us a question that how the three different concepts of regularity are connected
and whether it is even necessary to introduce a new definition of regularity
as it seems only makes the theory more complicated. Fortunately, with our
new definition we are now able to unify these concepts of regularity in dif-
ferent contexts. In particular, it can be shown that the regular GEF defined
in our way is also regular in the other two senses. Note that, to the best of
our knowledge, no work has been done to explicitly link the regular GEF
of Frongillo and Reid (2013) and that of Grünwald and Dawid (2004).
We first show that the regular GEF given by Definition 4.9 also interprets
regularity in the sense of Frongillo and Reid (2013). We also refine the impor-
tant property of the regular GEF: there exists a bijection between the regular
GEFs and certain class of Bregman divergences. Then we match the regular
GEF to the one defined by Grünwald and Dawid (2004) via a game-theoretic
approach. Unless otherwise stated, in the following discussion when men-
tioning the term regularity alone we mean regularity given by our Definition.
Regularity of Frongillo and Reid (2013) Under their definition, a GEF is
regular if its cumulant is l.s.c. and proper convex. Therefore, the following
theorem shows that every regular GEF is also regular in the sense of Frongillo
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and Reid (2013).
Theorem 4.10. The cumulant function F of a regular GEF PΘ is proper convex, and
is l.s.c. on dom(∂F).
Proof. By Definition 4.9 the sub-differential exists on dom(∂F). It then follows
directly from Lemma 3.5.7 of Cheridito (2013).
Notice that a regular GEF in the sense of Frongillo and Reid (2013) may have a
parameter set dom(F) that is not open, hence not regular in our sense of Def-
inition 4.9. However, the distributions on the boundary of the parameter set,
dom(F) \ int(dom(F)) are very few compared to those in int(dom(F)), and
the properties of the GEF will still be mainly contributed by the distribtuions
in int(dom(F)).
Bijection between regular GEFs and Bregman divergences Let (U, V, 〈·, ·〉)
be a dual pair of topological vector spaces, and f : U → R ∪ {+∞} be a l.s.c.
and proper convex function on U, the Bregman divergence generated by f is
defined by D f ,d f : U ×U → R∪ {+∞}
D f ,d f (u, u0) : = f (u)− f (u0)− 〈u− u0, v0〉 (4.17)
= f (u) + f ∗(v0)− 〈u, v0〉, (4.18)
where d f is a sub-gradient map (not the sub-differential map) which is single-
valued and it maps each u0 ∈ dom(∂ f ) to a sub-gradient v0 ∈ ∂ f (u0), and
v0 = d f (u0). If either f (u) = +∞ or ∂ f (u0) = ∅, D(u, u0) = +∞. Geomet-
rically, the Bregman divergence D f ,d f (·, u0) is the vertical distance between f
and the hyperplane h0 := 〈·, v0〉 − f ∗(v0) that supports f at u0. The lower
semi-continuity and proper convexity of f guarantee the existence of such
supporting hyperplanes (Barbu and Precupanu, 2012, Proposition 2.20).
The bijection is established between regular GEFs and Bregman divergences
generated by a special class of MaxEnt functions. The original statement of
the bijection is given by Theorem 2 of Frongillo and Reid (2013). Here we
improve it a bit to fit our new definition of regularity.
Theorem 4.11. Given the generalized entropy G, the set of all regular GEFs is in
bijection with the set of Bregman divergences generated by the MaxEnt functions
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whose sub-differential map has an open image.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, g is convex and F = g∗. Furthermore, if there exists x0
such that ∂g(x0) 6= ∅, then g is proper convex on its effective domain and is
l.s.c. at x0 (Cheridito, 2013, Lemma 3.5.7). This property of g will be used for
the proof.
Proof of sufficiency. For every configuration of statistics φ such that the GEF
PΘ generated by G and φ is regular, Θ = dom(∂F) and it is open. By Property
3 of Theorem 4.7, ∂g is non-empty at every µ = Epθ[φ] with θ ∈ Θ, since
θ ∈ ∂g(µ). Therefore, g is proper convex and l.s.c. on dom(∂g). In addition,
by Corollary 23.5.1 of Rockafellar (1970) ran(∂g) = Θ is open.
Proof of necessity. For every MaxEnt function whose sub-differential map has
an open image, it is proper convex and l.s.c. on dom(∂g). Then dom(∂F) =
ran(∂g) is open. The proof is completed by the definition of regularity.
Regularity of Grünwald and Dawid (2004) This regularity is based on a
loss function L : Ω × P → R defined based on the generalized entropy as
follows (see Section 3.5.4)
L(ω, p0) := −G(p0)− (x(ω)− 〈p0, x〉) = G∗(x)− x(ω), (4.19)
where x ∈ ∂G(p0) is a sub-gradient at p0 (thus being the dual of p0). Given
belief p ∈ P , the minimum expected loss
inf
p0∈Q
L(p, p0) := inf
p0∈Q
Ep[L(ω, p0)] = inf
p0∈Q
DG,dG(p, p0)− G(p) (4.20)
If Q = P , then the minimum is attained at p0 = p and has a minimum value
equal to −G(p), the (negated) generalized entropy of p.
Given the generalized entropy G and statistics φ, define the MaxEnt function
g, loss function L and GEF PΘ. Then µ0 ∈ dom(g) is a regular point, if there
exists a p0 ∈ PΘ such that L(·, p0) can hold the following linear form p0-
almost surely
L(ω, p0) = β0 + β>φ(ω), (4.21)
where β = (β1 . . . βK)
> and β0, . . . , βK ∈ R. GEF is regular in the sense
of Grünwald and Dawid (2004) if µ = Epθ[φ] is a regular point for every
θ ∈ Θ.
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Theorem 4.12. For every distribution in a regular GEF PΘ, its mean statistics are
a regular point.
Proof. For every pθ ∈ PΘ, we set p0 = pθ and choose the sub-gradient map
such that dG : pθ 7→ θ>φ. Then the loss function L in (4.19) becomes
L(ω, pθ) = F(θ)− θ>φ(ω). (4.22)
Therefore, the loss function has a linear form, with β0 = F(θ), β = −θ.
We end this section by computing the minimum expected loss when the report
distribution p0 is constrained in the regular GEF. Given belief p ∈ P , we have
inf
p0∈PΘ
L(p, p0) = inf
p0∈PΘ
DG,dG(p, p0)− G(p) = (G(p)− g(Ep[φ]))− G(p)
= −g(Ep[φ]). (4.23)
Namely, the minimum loss is the (negated) entropy of the GEF distribution
which sits in the set ΓEp[φ] the belief p belongs to.
4.3.4 Examples of (regular) GEFs
Here we present two examples of GEFs. The first one defines distributions on
finite discrete space while the second one defines distributions on an interval
in R.
A discrete GEF Recall that, in the motivation section we present a very sim-
ple non-exponential family on a binary state ω ∈ {−1, 1}. It has one sufficient
statistic φ(ω) = ω and its potential F and probability p = p(ω = 1) are
F(θ) =

−θ − 1/2 θ ∈ [−∞,−1]
θ2/2 θ ∈ (−1, 1)
θ − 1/2 θ ∈ [1,+∞]
, p =

0 θ ∈ [−∞,−1]
(1 + θ)/2 θ ∈ (−1, 1)
1 θ ∈ [1,+∞]
. (4.24)
It turns out that this family of distributions is a GEF generated by a quadratic
generalized entropy G and statistic φ, where this quadratic generalized entropy
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To obtain the potential and the probability, we need to solve the optimiza-
tion problem contained in the convex conjugate G∗(x) (4.10). Assuming that
p(ω) > 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, using calculus of variations with constraint Ep[1] = 1,
we have p(ω) = (x(ω) + λ)/2 where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the
constraint. Applying the constraint, λ = 1− ∑ω∈Ω x(ω)/2, and the convex












By Theorem 4.7, set x = θφ = θω to obtain the potential of the GEF. Since
∑ω∈Ω ω = 0 and ∑ω∈Ω ω2 = 2, we have λ = 1, F(θ) = G∗(θφ) = θ2/2 and
pθ(ω) = (1 + θω)/2.
We can check if the derivative of F gives the desired expectation of φ w.r.t. the
corresponding GEF distribution pθ








Finally, since Θ = R, this GEF is by definition a regular GEF.
Calculus of variations adds an arbitrary perturbation δp(ω) around p(ω) for
any ω ∈ Ω. When the support of p changes such that p(ω) = 0 for some ω,
the permutation δp(ω) will cause negative probability masses and thus lead
to invalid result. In fact, this is the reason we assume p(ω) > 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω
in the above derivation. To keep using this method, every time the support
changes we need to re-apply calculus of variations only on the support of
the distribution. In current example, this means we need to consider two
more cases, with support {ω = −1} and support {ω = 1}, respectively.
However, both cases will uniquely determine one distribution p(ω = 1) = 0
and p(ω = 1) = 1. It is then straightforward to work out the potential
functions for these cases, which is precisely the potential function in (4.24).
For a bit more complicated case, let’s consider the space Ω = {−1, 0, 1}. Then
the GEF generated by the quadratic entropy G and statistic φ(ω) = ω has the
form: for θ ∈ (∞,−2],
F(θ) = −θ, pθ(ω) =
1 ω = −10 ω ∈ {0, 1} ; (4.28)
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Figure 4.3: The potential/cumulant function of the GEF generated by the quadratic
entropy G and statistic φ(ω) = ω with ω ∈ {−1, 0, 1} (left), and its gradient (right).
The gradient of the potential matches the expectation of φ w.r.t. the GEF.














ω ∈ {−1, 0}
0 ω = 1
; (4.29)


















(θ + 2)2, pθ(ω) =









ω ∈ {0, 1}
; (4.31)
for θ ∈ [2,+∞),
F(θ) = θ, pθ(ω) =
0 ω ∈ {−1, 0}1 ω = 1 . (4.32)
Note that the potential function F, though written in parts, is a smooth func-
tion in R. In addition, the support of the GEF varies as θ changes, and the
change points are θ = −2,−2/3, 2/3 and 2. With the probability and the po-
tential functions, it can be verified that dF(θ)/dθ = Epθ [φ] = µ always holds,
and that the resulting µ ∈ [−1, 1]. The change points of support in terms of µ
are µ = −1,−2/3, 2/3 and 1 (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.4 provides a geometric view of this GEF (left) and compares it to
the exponential family (EF) generated by the Shannon entropy −H and φ
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Figure 4.4: The GEF and EF on Ω = {−1, 0, 1}. Left: the GEF generated by the
quadratic entropy G and statistic φ(ω) = ω. Right: the EF generated by the Shan-
non entropy −H and the same φ. All distributions on Ω form a ∆2-simplex, and
each point is the distribution (p(−1), p(0), p(1)). Contours on the simplex show the
entropy levels. The set of distributions Γµ happens to be a vertical line (solid grey)
under this equilateral view. GEF/EF are plotted in red curves. Each GEF/EF distri-
bution reaches the lowest entropy level along Γµ. Different from the EF, the support
of GEF is dependent on θ. Figures are recreated from (Grünwald and Dawid, 2004).
(right). All distributions on Ω form a ∆2-simplex, which is shown under the
equilateral angle. Each point on this simplex represents a distribution p with
probabilities matching the coordinate (p(−1), p(0), p(1)). The contour plot
on the simplex shows the level of G (−H for EF). Under this equilateral view,
each Γµ, i.e. the set of distributions sharing the same mean statistic, happens
to be a vertical line (solid grey). The corresponding value of µ is ticked on
the bottom. The GEF and EF are represented by red curves on the simplex.
Each of them is a one-dimensional sub-manifold as it is parametrized by a
single parameter θ. Each point on the red curve also reaches the lowest level
of the contour along Γµ, which demonstrates Property 3 of Theorem 4.7, that
for each GEF/EF pθ, G(pθ) = arg inf p∈Γµ G(p). The GEF changes its support
as θ varies, while the EF has a support independent of θ.
A continuous GEF Given an interval Ω = (−a, a) ∈ R, the GEF PΘ gen-
erated by the quadratic generalized entropy and statistic φ(ω) = ω has the
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with a+ = −a + 2/
√
−θ ≤ a, and (−a, a+) the support of pθ; similarly, for
















with a− = a− 2/
√
θ ≥ −a, and (a−, a) the support of the distribution.
4.3.5 Discussion
One main characteristics of the GEF is that its support depends on the param-
eters. The varying support divides GEF derivations into many sub-cases, and
deduction has to be done for each of these cases. Therefore, it is generally
computationally expensive to derive a GEF with varying support for large
spaces.
One way to mitigate this issue is to only consider the subset of the full GEF
that contains only distributions with full support. More specifically, given a
GEF PΘ, we consider its subset PΘs := {pθ | θ ∈ Θ, supp(pθ) = Ω}. We
name this GEF the fully-supported GEF. The potential of this fully-supported
GEF is related to the potential of the full set by
Fs(θ) =
F(θ) supp(pθ) = Ω+∞ otherwise . (4.36)
Regularity can also be reintroduced for PΘs , which again requires dom(∂Fs)
is non-empty and open. We do not need PΘ in the first place to derive PΘs .
In stead, we can derive Pθs directly via calculus of variations, which now will
only be applied once to distributions with full support on Ω.
We again consider previous examples. For the discrete case with binary space
Ω = {−1, 1}, the fully-supported GEF is the branch Θs = (−1, 1); for the
discreate case with Ω = {−1, 0, 1}, the fully-support GEF is the branch Θs =
(−2/3, 2/3); for the continuous case, the fully-supported GEF is the branch
Θs = (−1/a2, 1/a2). All of them are regular.
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4.4 GEF with conditioning structure
In this section we will add an additional conditioning structure to the GEF.
It allows us to efficiently express its conditional distributions, as we could do
for the exponential family. The GEF with the conditioning structure will play
a central role in making our PoPMM more general while keeping its market
making efficiency. However, this important structure has not been discussed
by either version of the existing GEF theory.
Consider a measurable space (Ω,F ) and an exponential family distribution
pθ ∝ exp(θ>φ(ω))ν(ω) defined on it. The cumulant function of pθ has the









When being conditioned on a random variable v(ω), each conditional of pθ
given v = v, which we denote by pθ,|v, remains in an exponential family, and
therefore it will inherit the properties of the exponential family and in partic-
ular those in Section 4.2. More specifically, first, the conditional distribution
has a cumulant








which gives the conditional expectation of φ efficiently via it gradient w.r.t. θ,
Epθ[φ | v = v] = ∇θF(θ, v). (4.39)
In addition, each conditional pθ,|v maximizes the Shannon entropy among all
conditional distributions on v = v sharing the same mean statistics with pθ,|v,
that is, Epθ,|v [φ] = Epθ[φ | v]. Note that if v has not been realized, then both
F(θ, v) and the MaxEnt objective (which takes a conditional distribution as
the input) mentioned above are functions of v and are also random variables.
For the GEF, it does not hold universally that the conditional distribution of
a GEF distribution is still in some GEF. As a consequence, there will be no
more efficient way of expressing the conditional expectation of the GEF. To
obtain the conditional expectation we have compute integral explicitly w.r.t.
the conditional distribution, but it is usually too expensive or even intractable
and cannot be applied to the PoPMM design.
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4.4.1 Conditional and nested GEF
To characterize the GEF with desired conditionals, we should first charac-
terize those distributions which themselves may not be in any GEF but have
conditionals to be GEF distributions. This characterization will be more com-
plicated than that in the conditional exponential family: the latter can be
directly defined by its density function, while the former is defined indirectly
by the generalized entropy and the cumulant function via convex analysis.
Definition 4.13. Given a generalized entropy G and a random variable v, the
conditional generalized entropy (induced by G) is a function G(·, ·) : P ×V → R,
such that ∀p ∈ P , G(·, v) = G(p|v) almost surely.
A conditional generalized entropy is a random variable due to its dependency
on v. On the other hand, given v = v, the conditional generalized entropy
is simply the generalized entropy of the conditional p|v. For Shannon en-
tropy, the induced conditional entropy has the form −H(p, v) = −H(p|v) =
Ep|v [log p|v].
Both of the conditional MaxEnt and conditional dual MaxEnt functions are
defined in the similar way as before, expect that the generalized entropy is
now replaced by the conditional generalized entropy.
Definition 4.14. Given a generalized entropy G, statistics φ, and a random
variable v, define the conditional generalized entropy G(·, ·). Then the condi-
tional MaxEnt function and the conditional dual MaxEnt function are defined to
be
g(µ) := ess inf
p∈Γµ
G(p, v) where Γµ := {p ∈ P | Ep[φ | v] = µ} (4.40)
F(θ, v) := ess sup
p∈P
θ>Ep[φ | v]− G(p, v) = G∗(θ>φ, v). (4.41)
Here the convex conjugate G∗(x, v) of G(p, v) is w.r.t. the first argument p.
Since g and F are random variables, they in general give infimum and supre-
mum almost surely instead of point-wisely. Therefore, the definition uses
essential infimum/supremum instead of infimum/supremum.
Definition 4.15 (Conditional GEF). Given a generalized entropy G, statis-
tics φ, and a random variable v, define the conditional generalized entropy
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G(·, ·) and the dual MaxEnt function F(·, ·) in (4.41). Let Θ be the set of all
θ ∈ dom(F) such that for each θ ∈ Θ the essential supremum of (4.41) is
achievable at p′θ. Then the conditional GEF generated by G, φ and v = v is a
set of distributions Pθ,|v with parameter set Θ, such that pθ,|v ∈ Pθ,|v is the
conditional of p′θ.
Here the generalized entropy G is introduced not for defining a GEF as be-
fore, but instead for defining the conditional entropy based on which the con-
ditional GEF is introduced. As a result, the distribution p0, which generates a
conditional GEF distribution pθ,|v, itself is not necessarily a GEF distribution.
To characterize the GEF distributions whose conditionals also belong to some
GEF, we need to introduce the generalized entropy that can effectively gen-
erate the GEF with the desired conditioning structure. Recall that for the
Shannon entropy, the entropy H(p) and the conditional entropy H(p, v) are
related in the following way
H(p) := H(pv) + Epv [H(p, v)]. (4.42)
Here pv is the marginal distribution of p and H(pv) is the Shannon entropy
defined on the marginal. If similar relation can be found for generalized en-
tropies, the generated GEF should have GEF distributions as conditionals as
the exponential family. The problem is that (4.42) is usually too strong to
be held for a generalized entropy since it requires both the marginal entropy
G(pv) and the conditional entropy G(p, v) to be induced from the same en-
tropy G. Fortunately, to achieve our goal we only need to maintain a much
weaker relation than (4.42), by simply ensuring the term on the left to be some
generalized entropy, which is allowed to be different from the generalized en-
tropies that induce the marginal or the conditional entropies.
Definition 4.16. A generalized entropy G0 is a nested generalized entropy w.r.t.
the random variable v if there exists two generalized entropies Ḡ and G1 such
that for any p ∈ P
G0(p) = Ḡ(pv) + Epv [G1(p, v)] (4.43)
where pv is the marginal of p and G1(·, ·) the conditional generalized entropy
induced by G1.
Remark. This definition considers only the existence of the decomposition of
a nested generalized entropy, and does not require such decomposition to be
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unique. In practice, a nested generalized entropy is usually found by a direct
construction from two given entropies via (4.43). The uniqueness will be a
fundamental and also valuable problem, but discussion of it is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Definition 4.17 (Nested GEF). Given generalized entropy G0, statistics φ and
random variable v, then the resulting GEF PΘ is a nested GEF generated by
G0, φ and v if G0 is a nested generalized entropy w.r.t. v.
A nested GEF inherits all the properties of a GEF (recall Theorem 4.7). Ad-
ditional properties also emerges because of the richer conditioning structure.
The following theorem summarizes the properties of a nested GEF.
Theorem 4.18. Let PΘ be a nested GEF generated by nested generalized entropies
G0, statistics φ and a random variable v. Then
1. the cumulant function of PΘ is
F0(θ) = G∗0 (θ
>φ) = Ḡ∗(G∗1 (θ
>φ, v)) = Ḡ∗(F1(θ, v)); (4.44)
2. for each θ ∈ Θ, pθ = pθ,v · pθ,|v where
pθ = ∇G∗0 (θ>φ), pθ,|v = ∇G∗1 (θ>φ, v), pθ,v = ∇Ḡ(x) |x=F1(θ,v); (4.45)
3. for each θ ∈ Θ
Epθ[φ] = ∇F0(θ), Epθ[φ | v] = ∇θF1(θ, v); (4.46)
and
4. for each θ ∈ Θ,
inf
p∈Γµ
G0(p) = G0(pθ) = g0(µ) with µ = Epθ[φ] (4.47)
ess inf
p∈Γµ
G1(p, v) = G1(pθ, v) = g1(µ) with µ = Epθ[φ | v]. (4.48)
Property 1 gives the exact form of the cumulant function for the nested GEF.
It is derived from the convex duality between MaxEnt and dual MaxEnt func-
tions F = g∗. The cumulant of the nested GEF wraps the cumulant of a
conditional GEF, implying the name “nested GEF”. Property 2, 3, 4 extend
the Property 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 4.7 respectively. These results are based on















F0(θ) = Ḡ∗(F1(θ, v))
Figure 4.5: The structure of the potential of a nested GEF. Given each v = v, F1(θ, v)
is a potential of a GEF distribution. F1(θ, v) characterizes a family of conditional
distributions, which we name the conditional GEF. F1(θ, v) is then feeded to Ḡ∗, the
convex conjugate of the marginal entropy Ḡ. Such nesting reflects precisely how the
joint probability is constructed from the marginal and conditional: we first obtain the
coarse probability p(v), and then obtain the finer one by further working out p(h | v).
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Property 1 and can be derived by using the fact that both the distribution and
its conditionals are GEF distributions. More specifically, Property 2 charac-
terizes each nest GEF distribution together with its conditional and marginal
by the sub-differential of G0, G1 and Ḡ. Property 3 shows that the expectation
and conditional expectation of φ can be represented by the gradients of the
cumulants. Property 4 states the MaxEnt argument for the nested GEF and
its conditional.
Proof. We will mainly prove Property 1. Denote Pv the marginals of the dis-















〈pv, F1(θ, v)〉 − Ḡ(pv). (4.51)
= Ḡ∗(F1(θ, v)). (4.52)
The second is equality is obtained by substituting (4.43) in and regrouping,
the third equality uses (4.41) and the last equality uses (4.10).
4.4.2 Regular nested GEF, Bregman divergences and losses
Similar to the regular GEF, a regular nested GEF is determinable by the sub-
differential domain of its cumulant functions. When only the mean statistics is
involved in the application, we can avoid explicitly writing down the regular
nested GEF but simply represent it by its cumulant functions.
Definition 4.19. A nested GEF with its cumulant function F0(·) = Ḡ∗(F1(·, v))
is regular if dom(∂F1) is non-empty and open, and ran(F1) ⊆ dom(∂Ḡ∗).
The second condition ran(F1) ⊆ dom(∂Ḡ∗) ensures that the conditional GEF
is fully wrapped into the nested GEF, such that each conditional GEF distri-
bution is always associated with a nested GEF.
Bregman divergences A nested GEF is involved with three generalized en-
tropies G0, G1 and Ḡ. Each of them can generate a Bregman divergence (recall
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(4.17)). Similar to a regular GEF, the Bregman divergences between two reg-
ular nested GEF distributions or two conditional GEF distributions will be
transformed to the Bregman divergences between their parameters. To be
more specific, let’s consider a nested GEF PΘ. For θ, θ0 ∈ Θ, using G0 and
choosing sub-gradient maps dG0 : pθ 7→ θ>φ, dg0 : µ 7→ θ we have
DG0,dG0(pθ, pθ0) = G0(pθ)− G0(pθ0)− 〈pθ− pθ0 , dG0(pθ0)〉 (4.53)
= g0(µ) + F0(θ0)− 〈µ, θ0〉 (4.54)
= Dg0,dg0(µ, µ0) = DF0,∇F0(θ0, θ) (4.55)
where µ := Epθ[φ] represents the mean statistics of the distribution pθ; for
the conditionals, using G1(·, ·) and the sub-gradient maps dG1(·, v) : pθ,|v 7→
θ>φ, dg1 : µ = Epθ[φ | v] 7→ θ we have
DG1(·,v),dG1(·,v)(pθ,v, pθ0,v) = Dg1,dg1(µ, µ0) = DF1(·,v),∇F1(·,v)(θ0, θ). (4.56)
Comparatively, the Bregman divergence between the marginals of two regu-
lar nested GEF distributions DḠ,dḠ(·, ·) cannot be represented in divergences
between the parameters of the distribution. This is due to the fact that the
marginals may not belong to any GEF.
Losses For a regular nest GEF and its conditionals, the loss functions intro-
duced based on the generalized entropy (4.19) have a linar form in (4.22)
L0(ω, pθ) = F0(θ)− θ>φ(ω) (4.57)
L1(ω, pθ,|v) = F1(θ, v(ω))− θ>φ(ω). (4.58)
L0 defines some measure of the loss of pθ w.r.t. the true state ω, while L1 mea-
sures the loss of pθ,|v w.r.t. ω, given that v has been realized. The difference of
L0 and L1 defines the loss of the marginal pθ,v naturally
L̄(ω, pθ,v) = L0(ω, pθ)− L1(ω, pθ,|v) = F0(θ)− F1(θ, v(ω)). (4.59)
Although L̄ is written as a function of ω, its value is determined on the level
of the random variable v and does not need the full observation of the state.
Given a belief p ∈ P , the expected losses for L0 and L1 are
L0(p, pθ) = Dg0,dg0(Ep[φ], µ)− g0(pθ) (4.60)
L1(p, pθ,|v) = Epv [Dg1,dg1(Ep[φ | v], µ)− g1(pθ, v)]. (4.61)
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Therefore, L0 is minimized at the nested GEF distribution that shares the same
mean statistics with p, and L1 is minimized at the nested GEF distribution
that shares the same conditional mean statistics with p. If p is a distribution
picked from the same regular nested GEF, then the losses are minimized when
pθ = p.
More interestingly, the expected loss for L̄ also has a divergence form. Recall
that for a nested GEF, F0(θ) = 〈pθ,v, F1(θ, v)〉 − Ḡ(pθ,v)
L̄(p, pθ,v) = F0(θ)−Epv [F1(θ, v)] = 〈pθ,v, F1(θ, v)〉 − Ḡ(pθ,v)−Epv [F1(θ, v)]
= DḠ,dḠ(pv, pθ,v)− Ḡ(pv). (4.62)
Similar to the previous losses, L̄ is minimized by the pθ ∈ PΘ whose marginal
is closest to the marginal of p under divergence DḠ,dḠ(·, ·). Since the marginal
may not belong to any GEF, the minimum divergence will in general not be
characterized by matching the mean statistics as in L0 and L1. If p is in the
same GEF as pθ, then the minimum loss is obtained at pθ = p.
4.4.3 Examples
By definition an exponential family is a nested GEF, with entropies G1(·, v) =
−H(p|v), Ḡ = −H(pv), and G0 = Ḡ(pv) + Epv [G1(·, v)] = −H(p). The convex
conjugates of G1 and G0 are (c.f. Frongillo and Reid (2013))










exp(G∗1 (x))dvi = Ḡ
∗(G∗1 (x)),
(4.64)
which verifies Property 1 of Theorem 4.18. The density functions of the GEF
distribution and the conditional GEF distribution are
pθ(ω) = eθ
>φ(ω)−F(θ)ν(ω), pθ,|v(ω) = e
θ>φ(ω)−F(θ,v)ν(ω) (4.65)
where F(θ), and F(θ, v) are the log partition functions in (4.37) and (4.38). It
follows that pθ = G∗0 (θ
>φ), pθ,|v = G∗1 (θ
>φ), Epθ[φ] = ∇F0(θ), Epθ,|v [φ] =
∇θF1(θ, v), which verify Property 2 and 3 of Theorem 4.18.
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Therefore, pθ,v = ∇Ḡ∗(F1(θ, v)).
In the second example, we construct a nested GEF on partially-observable
state space (v, h) with v ∈ (−a, a) where a ≤ 6 and h ∈ {−1, 1}, using the
quadratic generalized entropy. It can be understood as a mixture model in
which the latent variable h is the component indicator.
First, we induce both the conditional entropy G1(·, v) and the marginal en-
tropy Ḡ from the quadratic generalized entropy
G1(p, v) = ∑
h∈{−1,1}




Define a single statistic φ(v, h) = vh. Then by applying the first example in


































The marginal distribution is p(v) = ∇G∗(x) = (x(v) + λ)/2. The potential of
the nested GEF is obtained by feeding x(v) = F1(θ, v) to Ḡ∗






















For a ≤ 6, pθ ≥ 0 thus it is a valid distribution. Finally, the joint distribution
over (v, h) is obtained by pθ(v, h) = pθ(v)p(h | v).
We can check if the mean statistics match the gradient of the corresponding
potentials. For the conditional expectation, ∀v ∈ (−a, a)





















3For simplicity, here we will consider the fully-support GEF.
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Since θ ∈ (−1/a, 1/a), this nested GEF is regular, which allows Bregman
divergences and losses to be defined.
4.5 Generalizing PMM and PoPMM design
In previous two sections, we reviewed the existing theory for GEF, and also
established an extended theory for characterizing the special GEF with certain
desired conditioning structure. With these results, we are ready to tackle our
main task: designing potential-based mechanisms that can represent more
general market beliefs.
4.5.1 Summary of the inherited properties
The two properties of the exponential family in Section 4.2 are inherited by
the regular GEF. In particular, given a regular GEF,
1. the gradient of its cumulant F at θ matches the mean statistics w.r.t.
pθ for every θ ∈ Θ = dom(∂F), which is guaranteed by Property 2 of
Theorem 4.7; and
2. each pθ minimizes the generalized entropy G among the distributions
Γµ := {p ∈ P | Ep[φ] = Epθ[φ]}, which is guaranteed by Property 3 of
Theorem 4.7.
For a regular nested GEF, an additional property of the exponential family is
inherited
3. given random variable v, the conditional distributions also form a GEF
with cumulant F(·, v).
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4.5.2 Design with regular GEF
In this section we will extend the design of both the PMM and the PoPMM
using only regular GEFs. The design of the PMM was first given by Frongillo
and Reid (2013). Here, we make more analysis to show how the GEF fits
into the design, encoding traders’ beliefs and decoding prices naturally. It is
possible to design the PoPMM using just the regular GEF, but the mechanism
may suffer from some deficiency.
Designing PMM To represent market beliefs in a regular GEF, we simply
set up the PMM as follows:
• the PMM will offer securities that coincide with the statistics φ used for
defining the GEF;
• the PMM will use the cumulant function F of the GEF as its potential
function; and
• the PMM will have possible market positions in Θ = dom(∂F).
Based on this setup, each instantaneous market price at market position θ is
decoded as a martingale under the corresponding GEF distribution pθ, since
p(θ) := ∇F(θ) = Ep[φ]. The resulting PMM also effectively encodes each
trader’s true belief to the closest GEF distribution under the Bregman diver-
gence generated by the generalized entropy. In fact, this encoding process is
implemented through the loss function L(ω, p0) defined in (4.19). Recall that,
when p0 is in a regular GEF, the loss becomes a linear with the form in (4.22),
which we rewrite here for reference
L(ω, p0) = F(θ)− θ>φ(ω). (4.74)
Then, given a risk-neutral myopic trader, the highest profit she expects for a
trade δt = θt − θt−1 is
max Ep[mt(ω)] = max
θt∈Θ
(θt − θt−1)>Ep[φ]− (F(θt)− F(θt)) (4.75)
= L(p, pθt−1)− minpθt∈PΘ
L(p, pθt). (4.76)
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Thus the optimal trade will minimize the loss. By further using the relation
between the loss function and the Bregman divergence (4.20),we obtain
max Ep[mt(ω)] = L(p, pθt−1) + G(p)− minpθt∈PΘ
DG,dG(p, pθt). (4.77)
With the optimal trade, the p is encoded to pθt that minimizes the Bregman
divergence. For the GEF, the optimal pθt is such that its mean statistics are
matched to that of p, Ep[φ] = Epθt [φ].
Note that the PMM involves only the cumulant function of the regular GEF.
Once the cumulant function is given, there is no need to ask for the explicit
p.d.f. or the c.d.f. of the family, which is usually expensive to obtain.
This benefit will go even further in practical PMM design. In practice, we will
assume that every potential function we encounter in the design is matched
to the cumulant of certain regular GEF. Using this assumption and the fact
that the PMM requires no explicit form of the family, all we need to do is
to construct a convex function and set it as the potential, without worrying
about exactly which GEF is behind the potential function, just like Abernethy
et al. (2011).
Designing PoPMM Let (v, h) be the partially-observable state space upon
which the PoPMM is built. Setting up the PoPMM that represent a GEF over
this space is the same as setting up a PMM by assuming that (v, h) is fully-
observable. The conditional market prices at market position θ, given v = v,
are defined by the conditional expectation w.r.t. the GEF distribution pθ
p(θ, v) = Epθ[φ | v = v] =
∫
h∈H
φ(v, h)pθ(h | v)dh. (4.78)
Since the regular GEF lacks a conditioning structure, there are no alternative
ways but only to compute the conditional expectation via its definition, that
is, explicitly working out the density, deriving the conditional p(h | v) and
computing the integral. Therefore, computing the conditional prices could
be expensive or even intractable, making this generalized PoPMM design less
interesting for practical application.
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4.5.3 Efficient PoPMM design with regular nested GEF
When the regular GEF used for the PoPMM design is a regular nested GEF
with cumulant F0 = Ḡ∗(F1(·, v)), the conditional market prices at θ is given
by the gradient of F1(·, v) at θ. Once F1 is given, it will be cheaper than
computing the conditional prices via explicit integrals.
With the regular GEF as the underlying belief model, the incentive property
of the PoPMM is also well maintained and can be illustrated in a similar way
as before (Section 3.6). Recall that a mechanism is weakly incentive-compatible if
there exists a Market Scoring Rule (MSR) St such that given trader with belief
pθ∗ ∈ PΘ, St(pθ∗ , ·) is always positive w.r.t. the post-trade market belief re-
sulting from an optimal trade of this trader (Definition 3.4). In particular, the
expected profit of each trade under this PoPMM are related to the following
MSR
St(v(ω), pθt) := L̄(ω, pθt−1,v)− L̄(ω, pθt,v). (4.79)
It is a MSR since St(p, ·) for any p ∈ PΘ.
St(p, pθt) := L̄(pv, pθt−1,v)− L̄(pv, pθt,v) = DḠ,dḠ(pv, pθt−1,v)− DḠ,dḠ(pv, pθt,v)
(4.80)
and is maximized at pθt = p. Then for a risk-neutral myopic trader with belief
pθ∗ ∈ PΘ, applying convexity of F1 we have
St(v, pθ) = (F1(θt, v)− F1(θt−1, v))− (F0(θt)− F0(θt−1)) (4.81)
≥ (θt − θt−1)>∇θF1(θt−1, v)− (F0(θt)− F0(θt−1)). (4.82)
That is, the trade profit bounds the MSR profit from below exactly the same
way as in the exponential family case. Therefore, all the following results will
hold.
Since the explicit form of the GEF is not required in price computation, it
is also simpler to design a PoPMM in practice with a regular nested GEF
as the underlying belief model. By assuming that every conditional poten-
tial function F1 we encounter in the design is matched to the cumulant of
certain conditional GEF, then all we need to do is to (1) design a poten-
tial function F1(·, v), (2) design a generalized entropy Ḡ, and (3) compute
F0 = Ḡ∗(F1(·, v)), without worrying about which regular nested GEF is en-
coded into the PoPMM.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed a general method for interpreting market be-
liefs in prediction markets, which was achieved by decoding market prices
in generalized exponential families (GEFs). GEFs are not only more flexible
than exponential families in terms of representing beliefs, but also the same
efficient as the exponential families in terms of market making (price calcu-
lation). For partially-observable PoPMMs (Chapter 3), GEFs free the design
and make exponential family unnecessary to define the market maker.
For PMMs, the generalization is supported by the existing GEF theory. We
complete the theory (mainly the concept of regularity) to trigger a more natu-
ral design in PMM potentials. The existing theory can also be used to gener-
alize PoPMMs, but it cannot guarantee the efficiency of computing the condi-
tional market prices. We introduced a special class of GEFs, which we named
nested GEFs, and showed that nested GEFs have all desired properties that
will make the resulting PoPMMs efficient.
Chapter 5
Convergence and Equilibrium
Up to now our discussion of prediction market has focused on the market
mechanism design. To be specific, we propose the partially-observable poten-
tial based market maker (PoPMM), which generalizes the standard PMM and
can build prediction markets on events containing latent variables. As a mar-
ket maker, the PMM/PoPMM guarantees bounded loss and (weak) incentive-
compatibility. As a probabilistic model, the PMM/PoPMM is able to encode
market beliefs in a variety of distribution families.
Another important topic on markets is the equilibria of markets as well as
the dynamics of achieving them. It is a classic problem, and a vast amount
of work can be found in both the economics and the game theory literature,
among which famous work includes Walras (1877); Nash (1950); Shapley and
Shubik (1969). However, these results on market convergence and equilib-
rium do not fit the prediction market setting very well, since a prediction
market is not only a market in the standard economic sense, but also inter-
preted as a probabilistic model, especially an information aggregation model.
Therefore, when analysing a prediction market, we need to characterize its
equilibrium and convergence dynamics further in the machine learning con-
text, by considering the extra modelling role it plays. In particular, we are not
only interested in what the equilibrium and convergence dynamics are, but
more importantly, how these concepts are linked to the learning objective and
learning process of the underlying model. This gives the main motivation of
this work.
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5.1 Overview
In contrast to the market mechanism design which focuses on the market
maker while involving almost no traders (expect that risk-neutral myopic
traders are called to help show incentive-compatibility), the convergence and
equilibrium analysis is based on the whole market. We present convergence
results in two different settings: trader driven convergence and market maker
driven convergence.
We start our discussion by presenting the convergence and equilibrium results
driven by risk-averse traders. A risk-averse trader will not only consider how
to reach high expected profits, but also how to avoid the risks of possibly
obtaining low or even negative profits. As a result, the post-trade market
prices will no longer encode the true belief of the trader, but instead her
effective belief, which is a compromise between the trader’s true belief and the
market belief before the trade. Intuitively speaking, the more trades have
been accomplished, the better the market prices will reflect the market-wise
consensus, and the more risky for a risk-averse trader to move the market
prices/belief away from the current position via transactions. Eventually, the
risk-averse traders will agree on certain market prices, which none of them is
willing to unilaterally change.
An alternative way of modelling the behaviour of a trader is to think that the
trader is always risk-neutral but adjusts her true belief depending on the mar-
ket positions. In fact, this alternative approach transforms each risk-averse
trader to an equivalent risk-neutral trader, such that the risk-neutral trader’s
true belief matches the original risk-averse trader’s effective belief, the latter
of which depends on the market and varies through time. Under this model,
the equilibrium is established simply when all trader’s believed prices (i.e.
expected security values) coincide with each other and also with the market
ones. We refer to traders modelled by this alternative approached as risk-
neutral niche traders. The model and convergence results for niche traders are
discussed in Section 5.3.
The challenge of the trader driven convergence setting is that, distinct from
most machine learning models that explicitly define and optimize a global
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learning objective, a prediction market is a distributed environment, where
individual traders behave independently under their own local objectives. To
interpret a market as a machine learning model, we must find, if there is any,
the global objective the market aims to optimize, and also how each trader’s
selfish behaviour contributes to the optimization.
Trader driven convergence relies on the model of traders that is assumed to
be able to capture the traders’ trading behaviours. However, in situations
where no good models for traders are available, such as due to the lack of
the knowledge about traders or due to information privacy issues, the trader
driven convergence may not be well established. To aggregate belief infor-
mation from trades, an alternative approach is developed. Unlike the trader
driven convergence, this approach avoids building the convergence results
on particular trader models. Instead, the convergence is purely driven by
the market maker. More specifically, we make the assumption that traders are
i.i.d. sampled from an ensemble with fixed ensemble mean price (also referred
to the true mean price in this context), and the goal of the market dynamics is
to discover this mean price from trades. To discover the true mean price, the
PMM is augmented by another prior belief over the mean price. This prior
belief helps the PMM set the price for each trade, and is updated via the ac-
complished trades. As more trades occur, the posterior becomes more certain
about the true mean price, and will gradually stabilize the market price at or
around the true mean price. The details of market maker driven convergence
is presented in Section 5.4.
5.2 Risk-averse traders
The quantitative analysis for the convergence and equilibrium of prediction
markets will depend on the models of the risk-averse traders. A preference
model is a function that assigns values to each possible position a trader
can take, so as to reflect the trader’s preference orders on these positions.
The assigned values are only required to be ordinal, and may or may not
reflect a real quantity such as a risk-free asset like money, although having an
additional relation to the real quantity will make the preference model more
quantitative and expressive.
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Before this work, the dominant model for the analysis of the trader behaviour
in prediction markets is the expected utility theory (EUT) introduced firstly by
Daniel Bernoulli in the eighteenth century. EUT is well supported by ax-
iomatic approaches and has become the most popular theory for modelling
preferences in various areas including economics and game theory (Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 2007). In prediction market literature, analyses and
discussions have been made by work such as Barbu and Lay (2012); Frongillo
et al. (2012); Premachandra and Reid (2013); Storkey (2011); Storkey et al.
(2012, 2015); Chakraborty and Das (2015); Sethi and Vaughan (2013).
This work will model the behaviours of risk-averse traders differently, by us-
ing a new approach based on risk measures. Risk measures were developed
in the finance literature and have been widely applied to risk management
tasks (Artzner et al., 1999; Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000; Föllmer and Schied,
2004). Since a prediction market can be thought of as a special financial mar-
ket (which has only two financial time stamps t = 0, 1) risk measures fit natu-
rally into the prediction market setting. In addition, there are more important
reasons to choose risk measures instead of EUT: with risk measures we will
provide a simple market model in which analysis will become tractable, and
the link between the prediction markets and machine learning will be drawn
more explicitly.
5.2.1 Modelling preferences in share space
We first build a preference model in the space of shares Θ, or equivalently
span(φ), by using risk measures. Remember that span(φ) is a subspace of
X , the dual space in the dual system (P ,X , 〈·, ·〉) (Section 4.3.1). Consider a
prediction market that is built on the state space Ω and offers K securities φ.
Then the position of a trader is characterized by a vector of K + 1 dimensions
θ̂ referred to as the portfolio, which records the amount of money w and the
shares of securities θ she holds
θ̂ := (w, θ>)
>
= (w, θ1, . . . , θK)
>. (5.1)
The payout of the portfolio is computed by
x̂(ω) = θ̂>φ̂(ω) = w + x(ω) = w + θ>φ(ω), (5.2)
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where φ̂ := (1, φ>)
>
denotes the unit payout vector of the portfolio, and
x := θ>φ denotes the payout of the securities. The payout consists of two
parts: the risk-free part w which always guarantees a deterministic payout,
and the risky part x with an uncertain payout dependent on the realization of
the true state. Thus, we name x the risky asset of the trader, w the risk-free asset,
and x̂ the gross asset or simply asset.
In this setting, the preference model is a function of the portfolio, f : Θ̂→ R,
such that the trader prefers one portfolio θ̂1 than the other asset θ̂2 if and only
if f (θ̂1) > f (θ̂2), and that the agent is indifferent between asset θ̂1 and asset
θ̂2 if and only if f (θ̂1) = f (θ̂2).
There are plenty of theories on selecting and analysing a specific form of f ,
such as EUT of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007), dual utility theory
of Yaari (1987) and risk measures of Artzner et al. (1999); Föllmer and Schied
(2002). Unlike other work, this work uses risk measures to model traders’ be-
haviours. We first introduce risk measures, then make a detailed justification
of using risk measures and its relation to EUT.
Risk measures Risk measures assign higher scores to assets that are more
risky. They can also be understood as measures of the potential loss of choos-
ing a certain asset. A (monetary) risk measure is defined as a function ρ : X → R
such that ρ(0) is finite and ρ satisfies the following conditions (Artzner et al.,
1999):
Translation invariance If x ∈ X and m ∈ R, then
ρ(x+ m) = ρ(x)−m. (5.3)
Monotonicity If x, y ∈ X and x ≤ y, then
ρ(x) ≥ ρ(y). (5.4)
Here x ≤ y should be understood as p(x ≤ y) = 1, that is, with the probability
of one that x will generate a lower return than Y. Thus monotonicity indicates
that an asset with a better return deserves a lower risk. Due to translation
invariance, a risk measure maps any risk-free asset to itself, and is additive
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w.r.t. any risk-free asset. Therefore, the output of a risk measure has the same
unit as a risk-free asset, and can be effectively treated as an asset.
Risk measures are very generic. In our discussion we will use both risk mea-
sures and a specific class of them, the convex risk measures. Föllmer and
Schied (2002) defines a risk measure to be convex if ∀x1, x2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1]
ρ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ λρ(x1) + (1− λ)ρ(x2). (5.5)
It says that the risk of a combination of two assets should not be higher than
holding them separately. In other words, convex risk measures encourage
diversification, which is a natural condition for managing risky-assets. A
convex risk measure can always be written as a convex conjugate of a function
f defined on the dual space:
ρ(x) = sup
p∈P
〈p, x〉 − f (p). (5.6)
Examples of risk measures A famous non-convex risk measure is the Value
at Risk (V@R) (Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000), which outputs a threshold loss l
such that the probability of −x exceeding l is smaller than a predefined level
VaRα(x) ≡ inf{l ∈ R | P(−x > l) ≤ 1− α}. (5.7)













Here p0 is the trader’s belief distribution, Mx,p0(t) := Ep0 [e
tx] is the moment-
generating function, KL(·, ·) is the KL-divergence (and this is the reason the
term entropic is used), and η > 0 controls the degree of risk aversion. The
larger η is, the more risk averse the trader will be. In general, we can intro-
duce the degree of risk aversion for any risk measures ρ(x) by considering
another risk measure ρη(x) := η−1ρ(ηx). From the second equality, we see
the entropic risk measure is represented as a convex conjugate of the function
f := KL(·, p0).
As the final example, the convex conjugate of a generalized entropy is in
essence a convex risk measure. Let G be a generalized entropy, and define
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ρ(x) := G∗(−x). Then according to Theorem 4.2, ρ(x) meets all conditions of
being a convex risk measure.
It immediately follows that the potential function of a PMM/PoPMM defined
using a GEF (cf. Section 4.5.2 and 4.5.3) is a convex risk measure. More specifi-
cally, let θ be the market maker’s inventory or holdings, which is the negation
of the total number of sold shares, and define ρ(θ>φ) := F(−θ) = G∗(−θ>θ).
Then ρ is a convex risk measure on span(φ).
Risk measures v.s. EUT To justify using risk measures for modelling pref-
erences, several reasons why risk measures are preferred to EUT are given.
First, the output value of a risk measure can be treated as a risk-free asset and
standard linear operations are well defined for it. In comparison, an expected
utility outputs a number that only has abstract meaning, that is, to measure
the degree of agent’s satisfaction. In addition, risk measures force translation
invariance by definition, while expected utilities do not have this property in
general. With the help of translation invariance, the wealth w can always be
separated from the risky asset x, which implies that the optimal portfolio does
not depend on w. This saves us from the trouble of associating w with the
aggregation weights, as the relationship between them is highly inconsistent
and varies dramatically under different utilities (Storkey et al., 2012). Finally,
according to Föllmer and Schied (2004), we could always derive a convex risk
measure ρu from any expected utility
ρu(x, p0) ≡ inf{m ∈ R | Ep0 [u(x+ m)] ≥ u0}, (5.9)
where p0 is the true belief of the trader. In fact, the output of this risk measure
is the risk premium, the least amount of money that one would like to borrow
in order to accept this risky asset. Then a sensible decision rule should be to
find an asset that minimizes the premium, which leads to risk minimization.





xη x ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(5.10)
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where 1/η + 1/γ = 1. The risk measure itself can be computed from (5.6).
Another example is the entropic risk measure in (5.8). It can be derived from
the exponential utility uE(x) = − exp(−ax), with η = a. In fact, the entropic
risk measure coincides with the log expected exponential utility.
Deriving preference models from risk measures A risk measure ranks as-
sets naturally by their risks, which enables us to define a preference function
f based on it. More specifically, let x̂ be the asset resulting from the portfolio
θ̂ = (w, θ>)> through (5.2). Then our preference model is defined by
f (θ̂) := −ρ(x̂) = −ρ(w + x) = w− ρ(θ>φ) = w− $(θ). (5.12)
where for simplicity we define $ := ρ ◦φ>, which is a function of θ. The third
equality is obtained by applying translation invariance in (5.3). This model is
going to be our model for describing the behaviours of risk-averse traders.
We say a trader is myopic-rational or myopic if she always chooses the portfo-
lio that maximizes her preference values by only considering current round
of trading and neglecting the influence of the future trades. Consider a my-
opic trader whose preference is modelled by our preference function in eq.
(5.12). Then when she interacts with a PMM at time t, her behaviour will be
described by the following optimization problem
max
ϑ̂t∈Θ̂
f (ϑ̂t) = max
ϑ̂t∈Θ̂
(wt−1 − (F(θt)− F(θt−1)))︸ ︷︷ ︸




(F(θt)− F(θt−1)) + $(ϑt) (5.14)
= f (ϑ̂t−1)−min
ϑt∈Θ
(F(θt)− F(θt−1)) + ($(ϑt)− $(ϑt−1)). (5.15)
where θt−1, θt, ϑt−1, ϑt are positions of the PMM and the trader before and
after the trade, respectively. f (ϑt−1) = −ρ(ϑt−1) is added and subtracted in
the last equality, and (5.12) is applied. The four positions are linked via the
trade δt = θt − θt−1 = ϑt − ϑt−1, that is, the amount of shares the PMM sells
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matches to the amount of shares the trader buys. Note that wt−1 is a constant
w.r.t. time t and hence can be moved out of the maximization. (5.15) interprets
the trader’s behaviour as searching for the minimum risk of updating her
holdings from θt−1 to a new position θt.
Since the potential function of a PMM/PoPMM is a convex risk measure w.r.t.
its inventory, a PMM can be treated simply as a risk-averse trader. Under this
view, (5.13) becomes symmetric, thus there is no actual difference in the trad-
ing behaviour between a market maker and a normal trader. To identify the
market maker from traders, we need an extra model such as a trade network
(Frongillo and Reid, 2014), which characterizes a market maker as a trader
who is linked to (is able to trade with) all the other traders.
5.2.2 Modelling preferences in price space
Dually, a preference model can also be established in the space of possible
prices, which is derived from the primal space P in the dual system. If we
review the behaviours of traders in the price space, then at each trade a risk-
neutral myopic trader will always adjust the market prices to her expected se-
curities values, regardless of the market status. A risk-averse instead myopic
trader will adjust the market prices to a position that compromises between
her expectations and the market prices before trading.
Building a model in the price space is less straightforward than in the share
space. We will begin with the model established in the previous section, dis-
cussing its counterpart in the price space, and then proposing the modelling
framework based on what we have learned from this specific example. To
model risk-averse traders in the price space, let’s write down the equivalent
dual problem of the minimization problem in (5.15), which is
min
pt∈p(Θ)
DF∗(pt, pt−1) + D$∗(pt, p′), (5.16)
where pt−1, pt are the market prices before and after the trade; p′ is the mar-
ket prices the trader beliefs before this trade happens; DF∗(·, ·) and D$∗(·, ·)
are Bregman divergences generated by the convex conjugates of F and $, re-
spectively. In addition, p(Θ) is the image of the set of all possible positions Θ
under the price (duality) map p(·). It contains all possible prices the market
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can have. This dual form relies heavily on the fact, that for a potential func-
tion F (and similarly for a convex risk measure) the convex conjugate of its
difference C(δt) := η−1t (F(ηtθt)− F(ηtθt−1)) is a Bregman divergence
C∗(pt) := sup
θt∈Θ
δ>t pt − C(δt) = sup
θt∈Θ











Here ηt > 0 is an augmented parameter for F that controls the liquidity of
the market (Chen and Wortman Vaughan, 2010). As we will see shortly, the
liquidity parameter controls the step-size of the market optimization towards
the market equilibrium.
In convex analysis, such augmentation of f (x) → η−1 f (ηx) is called the per-
spective transform. The perspective transform will maintain the convexity of
the original function f . However, the gradient will be scaled in the sense
that the gradient map is maintained, but the input of gradient map is scaled
multiplicatively by η, ∇ f (x)→ ∇ f (ηx).
The liquidity parameter η is fixed during each trade, and may only be updated
by the market maker after each trade. Therefore, with the liquidity augmented
potential function, the trading dynamics will almost be the same as before
except for an extra update of η at the end of each trade t and before the next
trade t + 1. However, if the market maker only changes ηt → ηt+1 but keeps
θt fixed, an inconsistency in price pt will occur as the gradient ∇F(ηtθt) 6=
∇F(ηt+1θt). To maintain the same price, the market maker will also update
θ′t ← ηtθt/ηt+1, such that ηtθt = ηt+1θ′t with this updated θ′t. Then under this
update, the market price pt is maintained while varying the liquidity.
Notice that by updating θt in accordance with liquidity ηt, The conventional
meaning of θt, that it represents the market inventory which records the total
amount of shares sold to traders, is no longer valid. Instead, θt now simply
describes an abstract market position of the market maker. If the liquidity is
fixed throughout the market lifetime, then θt can again represent the market
inventory.
The convex conjugate relation (5.17) enables us to write the cost of purchasing
securities as well as the full objective into the Bregman divergences as in (5.16).
The term DF∗(pt, pt−1) reflects the price change under the PMM, while the
Chapter 5. Convergence and Equilibrium 98
term D$∗(pt, p′) describes the trader’s behaviour. In fact, when not interacting
with the PMM, then pt = p′ minimizes the divergence, implying that the
trader will prefer market prices that match her belief. When trading with a
PMM, the final prices shift to a position between her belief p′ and the pre-
trade market prices pt−1 to minimize the risks.
In general, we can model a risk-averse myopic trader by a convex risk function
defined on the price space ft : p(Θ)→ R, such that when not interacting with
the market maker the trader’s minimum risk is achieved at her expectations.
Then similar to (5.16) a trade with the market maker will be characterized by






whose dual problem in the share space is
δ∗t = arg max
δt :δt+θt−1∈Θ
− f ∗t (−δt)−
1
ηt
(F(ηt(θt−1 + δt))− F(ηtθt−1)). (5.19)
Here the second term inside the maximization is just the cost of trading δt
shares, while the first term − f ∗t (−δt) is understood as the corresponding
preference model in the dual space, which estimates the values of δt shares of
securities that takes the trader’s risk preference into consideration. When ft
is set to a characteristic function such that f (vt) = 0 and f (pt) = +∞ for all
pt 6= vt, then − f ∗t (−δt) = δTt vt which reduces to the risk-neutral case.
5.2.3 Convergence w.r.t. sequential traders
The first market setting for convergence analysis is a prediction market involv-
ing a set of sequential traders, such that each trader interacts with the PMM
only once. From the PMM point of view, each time it will always trade with
a new trader. In this setting, the total number of traders will increase through
time. Hence the cash flow and the total amount of information carried by the
traders also increase. Typically, the increasing number of traders will prevent
the market prices from converging to a fixed point, and will not result in any
equilibrium in the conventional fixed point sense. Instead, we show that an
alternative concept of market equilibrium does exist in the stochastic sense,
and this equilibrium is reached by having the PMM sequentially trade with
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risk-averse trader, who are assumed to be drawn an ensemble of agents with
its mean preference invariant through time.
5.2.3.1 Trading for no regret
Recall that the interaction between a PMM and our risk-averse trader is rep-
resented by an optimization problem in (5.18), which we rewrite here for
reference






For simplicity, here and later we reload pt for the optimal solution, and we
shorten DF∗(·, ·) to D(·, ·) when context is clear. (5.20) is referred to as proximal
iteration in optimization literature (Parikh and Boyd, 2013, Section 4.1).
On the other hand, from the machine learning point of view, a prediction
market with sequential traders is an online learning system, with the sequence
of traders being the streaming data, and the trader’s (primal) risk function ft
being the loss function associated with the data point. The performance of an
online learning system is usually measured by the (averaged) regret (Shalev-














with p∗ = arg min p∈p(Θ) 1/T ∑
T
t=1 ft(p) the optimal hindsight model obtained
given all data points and the losses associated with them. Note that pt−1 is
used instead of pt in order to capture the predictability of the market prices for
the next trade. In other words, regret measures the performance of the system
not by the absolute (averaged) loss, but by its difference to that of the optimal
hindsight model. Compared to the absolute loss, regret provides a consistent
measure of performance in the online setting, as the data stream is assumed
to be arbitrary or even adversarial, w.r.t. which the absolute performance of
the system cannot be guaranteed.
Since each trade is equivalent to a proximal iteration, the convergence of the
market can be analysed by using standard techniques. In particular, our re-
sults is obtained with the help of Chen and Teboulle (1993), who analyse the
convergence for this type of algorithm without sequential setting, and Duchi
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et al. (2010), who analyse the convergence for online mirror descent, a close
neighbour of the proximal iteration algorithm.
We assume from now on that the potential function of a PMM is always aug-
mented by the liquidity parameter, whose value ηt at time t is adjusted by the
market maker right before the t-th trade. In addition, we assume
1. that all preference functions are L-Lipschitz continuous, and
2. that the PMM’s potential function F is α-strongly smooth, which implies
the α-strong convexity of its convex conjugate F∗ (Kakade et al., 2009).
The key to the analysis The proximal iteration (5.20) tells us that at each
time t, the following inequality holds for any p′ ∈ p(Θ)
〈p′ − pt, ∂D(p, pt−1)|p=pt + ηt∂ ft(pt)〉 ≥ 0, (5.22)
and in particular for p′ = p∗ = arg min p∈p(Θ) 1/T ∑
T
t=1 ft(p). From (5.22) an
important lemma could be obtained.
Lemma 5.1. Given a PMM with potential function F and a set of sequential risk-
averse traders with preference models { ft(p)}Tt=1, the market regret in (5.21), after




















ηt〈pt − p∗, ∂ ft(pt)〉 ≤ 〈p∗ − pt, ∂D(p, pt−1)|p=pt〉. (5.24)
The LHS bounds ηt( ft(pt)− ft(p∗)) from above by convexity of ft. By defini-
tion of Bregmain divergences, D(p, p0) = F∗(p)− F∗(p0)− 〈∂F∗(p0), p− p0〉,
the RHS can be rewritten into
〈p∗ − pt, ∂D(p, pt−1)|p=pt〉
=− 〈p∗ − pt−1, ∂F∗(pt−1)〉+ 〈p∗ − pt, ∂F∗(pt)〉+ 〈pt − pt−1, ∂F∗(pt−1)〉
=D(p∗, pt−1)− D(p∗, pt)− D(pt, pt−1). (5.25)
These together lead to
ηt( ft(pt)− ft(p∗)) ≤ D(p∗, pt−1)− D(p∗, pt)− D(pt, pt−1). (5.26)
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The LHS gives ft(pt) while what we want is ft(pt−1). Adding ηt ft(pt−1) to
both sides and moving ηt ft(pt) to the RHS in the we obtain
ηt( ft(pt−1)− ft(p∗)) ≤ D(p∗, pt−1)− D(p∗, pt)
− D(pt, pt−1) + ηt( ft(pt−1)− ft(pt)). (5.27)
First by convexity we have ft(pt−1)− ft(pt) ≤ 〈pt−1 − pt, ∂ ft(pt−1)〉. Second,
by Fenchel-Young inequality we obtain
〈pt−1 − pt, ∂ ft(pt−1)〉 ≤
α
2ηt




where ‖ · ‖ is the norm w.r.t. which the α-strong smoothness of F is defined,
and ‖ · ‖∗ is the corresponding dual norm. Then, by the α-strong convexity of




‖pt−1 − pt‖2∗. (5.29)
Finally by the L-Lipschitz continuity of ft, ‖∂ ft(·)‖ ≤ L. These three relations
simplify the last three terms on the RHS of (5.27) to



















Summing over t gives the target bound.
Minimum regret bound with fixed liquidity Assume a fixed ηt = η. Then

















Recall that the bounded loss property of the market maker gives D(p, p0) ≤
M2 for any p ∈ p(Θ) and thus in particular for p∗ (Theorem 3.2). Then the








which is obtained at η = M/L
√
2α/T.
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Minimum regret bound with adaptive liquidity Assume that ηt is adaptive



























Choosing ηt = M/L
√


























Similar to the fixed liquidity case, the regret bounded is O(1/
√
T).
In both cases the regret objective is bounded byO(1/
√
T) that shrinks through
time. Thus the sequential trading scheme in a prediction market implements a
no regret algorithm, such that with a sufficiently large time scale T, the market
prices pT−1 will finally coincide with the prices p∗ that achieves the mini-
mum averaged loss. It is also worth noting that the liquidity ηt, in either fixed
or adaptive setting, plays a role as the step-size parameter in the underlying
optimization.
5.2.3.2 Stochastic traders
Now we further assume that the sequence of traders are in fact i.i.d. samples
from the same distribution p(z). More specifically, for each trader t, her risk
function ft is sampled from a collection { f (·, z)}z∈Z , such that ft := f (·, zt)
with zt ∼ p(z). We also denote f := E[ f (·, z)] the mean risk function of the
collection.
We refer to the sequence of traders under this extra assumption as the stochas-
tic traders, as used by Frongillo et al. (2012). Stochastic traders are special
cases of sequential traders, and so they will maintain the boundedness on the
market regret. In addition to that, it will be shown that the market prices can
be directly linked to the mean risk function f .
Lemma 5.2. Consider a PMM with potential function F and a set of stochastic
traders with preference models { ft = f (·, zt) | zt ∼ p(z)}. Denote f := E[ f (·, z)]
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the mean risk function and p̄T = 1/T ∑Tt=0 pt the running averaged prices. Then
after time T

























with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. First rewrite eq. (5.31) to involve f instead of ft in each single trade










+ ( f (pt−1)− ft(pt−1))− ( f (p∗)− ft(p∗)), (5.37)
Denote the last two terms by Yt := ( f (pt−1) − ft(pt−1)) − ( f (p∗) − ft(p∗)).
Then by definition of Yt and f , E[Yt | z1, . . . , zt−1] = 0. On the other hand, ap-
plying convexity of f , the lower and higher bounds on D(p∗, pt−1): α/2‖p∗−
pt−1‖2∗ ≤ D(p∗, pt−1) ≤ M2, and Cauchy-Schwarz, we obtain




Thus {Yt}Tt=1 is a bounded martingale difference sequence, to which the Azuma’s
inequality can apply. Denote γT := ∑Tt=1 Yt, then Azuma’s inequality tells us
that






Summing (5.37) over t and applying the Jensen’s inequality ∑Tt=1 f (pt−1) ≥
T f (p̄T−1), we obtain

















Since LHS is no larger than γT, it implies that the probability the LHS being







and so we have ε = 4LM
√
T/α log(1/δ). Replacing ε by δ leads to (5.36).
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As T → ∞, f (pT−1) will finally convergence to f (p∗). Given a finite time, the
variance of f (pT−1) can be calulated using the fact that
var[ f (pT−1)] = E[( f (p̄T−1)− f (p∗))2]− (E[ f (p̄T−1)]− f (p∗))2
≤ E[( f (p̄T−1)− f (p∗))2]. (5.42)
and then by applying (5.36). Since f (p̄T−1) − f (p∗) vanishes as T → ∞, so
does the variance of f (pT−1).
Minimum regret bound with fixed liquidity Similar to the regret analysis,























The upper bound is tight when η = M/L
√
2α/T. Therefore, in this case with
probability at least 1− δ












That is, the running averaged market prices p̄T−1 converges to the optimum
p∗ in rate O(1/
√
T).
Minimum regret bound with adaptive liquidity If ηt is adaptive, the min-
imum bound in probability is given by ηt = M/L
√
α/t. A similar result will
be obtained, that with probability at least 1− δ












Without loss of generality, consider a prediction market on a binary future
state ω ∈ {0, 1}. Each trader is assumed to have a beta prior π = Beta(α, β)
about the true distribution p(ω) of ω, and she builds her belief over ω after
observing several private i.i.d. samples s ∼ p(ω) using Bayesian update:
pt(ω = 0) =
∫
p′(ω = 0)π(p′ | s)dp′ = nt,0 + α
nt + (α + β)
. (5.46)
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price with η= 1. 0
running avg.
ensemble belief













price with η= 0. 1
running avg.
ensemble belief













price with η= 0. 01
running avg.
ensemble belief
Figure 5.1: Sequential trading between market maker and traders under different
liquidity parameters η = 1, 0.1, 0.01. In sequential trading, each trader acts only once
and leaves the market immediately after the transaction. Given a fixed trading period
T = 1000, the minimum market regret (5.21) as well as the convergence of the market
price depend on η. Reducing η will decrease the price volatility, but will also slow
down the convergence. According to the analysis, the optimal η is at the scale of
1/
√
T ≈ 0.03, which is supported by the result.
Here nt is the number of private signals the t-th trader observes, and nt,0 is
the count of ω = 0. Each trader models her preference through an entropic
risk measure (5.8). The primal preference function for the t-th trader is thus
ft(·) = KL(·, pt). Note that the private signal is not necessary the historical
observations of the same event we want to predict. In fact, many interesting
events we want to predict are unique, such as each US presidential election.
Instead, the private signal should be understood as the virtual result gener-
ated by each trader using her own prediction method. Here, we assume that
each trader’s prediction method is powerful enough to (almost) catch the true
process of generating the future outcome, but is too expensive to run. Hence
each trader can only get very few sample points.
We use a market maker with standard log-sum-exp potential, augmented by
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the liquidity parameter: 1/ηF(ηθ) = 1/η log ∑1i=0 exp(ηθi). Trading period is
T = 1000, and each trader observes nt = 5 private signals for belief construc-
tion. The simulation result is shown in Figure 5.1.
Given a fixed trading period (in this case T = 1000), the minimum market
regret (5.21) as well as the convergence of the market price to the ensemble
mean depend on the choice of the liquidity parameters η. Recall that the
liquidity of the market η also plays a role as the step-size parameter in the
corresponding optimization process. Under a smaller η, the price is more
stable but will converge more slowly. According to the previous analysis, the
optimal η should be at the scale of 1/
√
T ≈ 0.03. This is supported by the
simulations.
5.2.4 Convergence under repeated trading
In the second setting we consider a finite number of traders repeatedly trading
in the market. Since the number of traders is finite, both the traders’ budgets
and the total amount of the information carried by the traders are bounded
through time. We can thus show that a real convergence in the market prices
rather than in the running averages will be established. To get the convergence
result, we will first work in the share space, giving the condition (in the dual
form) under which the market reaches its equilibrium and showing how the
trades drive the market to this equilibrium; then we transform the result to
its primal form described in the space of market prices. The significance of
the convergence result in the primal form is beyond the pure market sense.
In fact, in addition to giving the price condition for the market equilibrium,
it will also link explicitly the prediction markets to a generic class of machine
learning problems.
5.2.4.1 Market global objective
In the repeated trading market, despite that each trade is made to achieve the
trader’s personal goal, it will effectively act as an optimization step towards
the minimum of a market-wise objective. In particular, let A = {1, 2, . . . , A}
be the index set of involved traders, ϑa be the trader a’s holdings and ϑa,0 be
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the trader’s initial holdings. We will show that the market’s global objective









where θ− θ0 = ∑a∈A ϑa− ϑa,0, η the liquidity parameter, and ηa the degree of
risk-aversion for trader a. The constraint on the shares interprets the conser-
vation in shares: the total amount of shares sold by the market maker should
match to the total amount of shares purchased by traders.
To derive the global objective, we recall from (5.15) that each trade at time









where δt = θt − θt−1 = ϑa,t − ϑa,t−1. Since one trade happens each time, for
each trader a′ 6= a her holdings keep invariant ϑa′,t = ϑa′,t−1 during the t-th





































Here δ = ∑Tt=1 δt = θT − θ0 = ∑a∈A ϑa,T − ϑa,0. (5.50) is a sequential mini-
mization scheme for minimizing the market objective L in (5.47). Finally, if
the market has converged at time T, then for t ≥ T, θt = θT and ϑa,t = ϑa,T.
We denote θ = θT and ϑa = ϑa,T. Then {θ, {ϑa}a∈A} gives a (potentially local)
minimum of L.
Convergence The convergence analysis of our repeated trading market (and
its generalization) is done by Frongillo and Reid (2014, 2015). They prove that
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the market prices converge to the minimum of L in O(1/T). We also mention
that the repeated trading market effectively implements a generalized version
of stochastic dual coordinate accent (SDCA) of Shalev-Shwartz and Zhang (2013),
in which the PMM potential F instead of a standard quadratic function is used
as the proximal function. For SDCA, the authors also show a convergence rate
O(1/T).
5.2.4.2 Market objective in primal form
The minimization of the above market global objective in eq. (5.47) is known
as the sharing problem in convex optimization (Boyd et al., 2011, Chapter 7). It










where each fi is convex. For our problem, the primal form of the market objec-
tive is obtained by directly applying the generalized Fenchel’s duality of Shalev-









D$∗a (p, pa,0), (5.52)
with p0 = ∇F(θ0) the market maker’s initial price, and pa,0 = ∇$a(θa,0). If









$∗a(p) + constant. (5.53)
The trading dynamics also has an interesting primal representation, which
is illustrated by Figure 5.2. Under this representation, the trading dynamics
can be understood as a magnetic ball algorithm: the market maker as well as
the traders are treated as balls located at their prices; at each time t, the trade
magnetizes the market maker (with prices pt−1) and the corresponding trader
(with belief pa,t−1); the market maker and the trader are attracted towards
each other until they collide at a new position (i.e. pt), after which they are
demagnetized. The new position is characterized by





















Figure 5.2: The repeated trading dynamics in the price space. The black dot repre-
sents the market prices p while the coloured circles represent traders’ beliefs {pa}.
The dashed line indicates the trade that happens at current time. Each trade could be
understood as follows: at each time t, the black dot is linked with one of the circles,
and the dot and the linked circle are attracted towards each other until they collide
at a new position, marked by a small grey dot.
It is also interesting to note that, while each trader a’s belief about the future
state upon which the market is built is fixed through time, the prices pa that the
trader believes in, however, keeps varying after each trade. Due to risk aversion,
the trader will prefer prices not only based on her belief about the future state,
but also based on the amount of shares she has held (inventory). Thus the
prices pa can be thought of as the trader’s effective belief which considers the
impact of risk aversion. As a comparison, for a risk-neutral trader, the prices
she believes in will always match her expected values of the securities and are
thus invariant.
Finally, using the primal form we can compare the convergence results be-
tween the repeated trading setting and the sequential trading setting, espe-
cially the setting with stochastic traders. The sequential trading has an ob-
jective that excludes the market maker and scales with trading times t, while
the repeated trading has an objective that consists of the market maker and a
fixed number of repeated traders. In terms of the convergence rate, we proved
that the sequential trading converges in O(1/
√
T), while Shalev-Shwartz and
Zhang (2013); Frongillo and Reid (2014, 2015) show that the repeated trading
converges in O(1/T).
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5.2.4.3 Link to machine learning
Many machine learning tasks can be interpreted under the following generic
framework: given a set of data sampled from a space Ω, and a hypothesis
space PΘ parametrized by Θ which contains a class of accessible probabilistic
models on Ω, we would like to find a probability distribution/model in PΘ
that can best describe the data. Usually we use a function f : PΘ → R to
measure the performance, such that the best model is the one that minimize
f , that is,
p∗θ = arg min
pθ∈PΘ
f (pθ). (5.55)
For specific problems in which the information comes from different parts of
the data or the models, f can often be written as the sum of a set of functions
which share the same domain PΘ, that is, the form in (5.51). Notice that
the data is necessary for constructing the learning objective f , although it
is not explicitly presented in the above learning objective. For example, if
fn(pθ) is the negative log likelihood of the model pθ on the n-th data point,
then f (pθ) = ∑n fn(pθ) is the negative log likelihood of the model on the
full dataset, and the minimization problem will simply implement maximum
likelihood estimation. Here we do not explicitly write the data as we would
like to emphasize the argument we are trying to optimize, and also to draw
the link to prediction market more straightforwardly.
A market global objective (5.52) can match exactly to the machine learning
objective. In fact, if we assume that F and {$a} are cumulant functions of
GEFs PΘ and {Pa} respectively (see the previous chapter), then the Breg-
man divergences in (5.52) can all be rewritten into the Bregman divergences
between the corresponding GEF distributions. More specifically, note that
PΘ and Pa may be different families. Then for any pθ ∈ PΘ, we denote
proja(pθ) := minpa∈Pa D(pθ, pa) its projection onto Pa. With the projection









Dρ∗a (proja(pθ), pa,0). (5.56)
Here pa,0 is the true belief of the trader a, and p0 is the initial market belief.
When F and $a coincides, we have PΘ = Pa and thus proja(pθ) = pθ.
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We use two examples to illustrate how a repeated trading market can imple-
ment certain machine learning algorithms.
Opinion Pooling The opinion pooling problem is a common setting for pre-
diction market models (Barbu and Lay, 2012; Storkey et al., 2012). Garg et al.
(2004) show that the objective of an opinion pool is to minimise a weighted
sum of a set of divergences. Particularly, for logarithmic opinion pooling (Lo-




where {wn} are weight parameters.
A repeated trading prediction market implements LogOP. Consider a LogOP
of the ∆K−1-simplex of probabilities on a finite discrete state space Ω with K
future states. Define a market on the same space Ω and introduce K indicator
securities. We introduce a set A of traders, and assign a unique probabil-
ity pa ∈ ∆K−1 to trader a ∈ A as its personal belief. Model each trader’s









where we let ηa match the weight wa by wa = 1/ηa. Let the traders interact









Two typical simulation results are shown in Figure 5.3 and 5.4. As the number
of trades increases, the market objective gradually reaches the optimum, and
the market prices converge to a fixed level. When the market scales up, the
converge process slows down but the convergence is guaranteed to happen.
In this case, we can analytically work out the primal objective of this mar-
ket using (5.56). Since all distributions lie in the ∆K−1-simplex, we have
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Figure 5.3: A market with indicator securities defined on a binary future state ω (i.e.
K = 2). N = 10 traders are involved. All traders start with a uniform prior on ω and
each one builds its own posterior belief after observing 5 private samples of ω. The
market price (for one of the securities) converges to a position which is close to the
unbiased agent aggregation but with a bias towards 0.5. This bias is introduced by
the market maker (cf. (5.61)).
where p0 = uniform(K) is the discrete uniform distribution in ∆K−1. In this




pwa/(1/η0+∑a∈A wa)a . (5.61)
The aggregated belief p is not a pure weighted product of trader beliefs but
has a bias towards p0, due to the presence of the PMM. However, when
the population is sufficiently large such that the market maker’s weight is
negligible compared to the traders’ collective weight, ∑a 1/ηa  1/η, then
the market maker’s bias could be ignored and we will end up with a pure
LogOP of traders’ beliefs.
Logistic Regression Consider a logistic regression model with l2 regulariza-

















where ‖ · ‖ denotes the l2 norm.
We build a repeated trading market that has a dual objective equal to (5.62).
Let the sample space be the space that generates the data Ω := RK ∪{+1,−1}
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Figure 5.4: A similar setting to Figure 5.3 but this time the market has indicator
securities defined on a space of K = 10 possible future states. N = 500 traders are
involved. After increasing the population, the convergence of price slows down. The
impact of the market maker is also negligible compared to the population of traders,
and thus the biased aggregated belief matches the LogOP of traders.
and each future state is associated with a data in Ω, ω = {x, y}. Define K
securities, each of which is φk(x, y) = yxk. We introduce a set A of K traders,
such that the trader a = k is only interested in trading the k-th security φk.
Thus the shares of the k-th security held by trader a is ϑa,k = 1(n = k)wk, and
the asset is xa = ϑ>a φ = waφa. The market inventory is θ = ∑a ϑa = w. Let
F(w) be the first term on the RHS of (5.62) and define the risk measure of













which matches the market global objective in (5.47). Therefore, by running
this market we will effectively solve a logistic regression problem.
In order to show a slightly deeper connection to a specific learning method,
notice that the objective of trader a at each round is min∆wk,t F(wt−1 +∆wk,t)+
(wk,t−1 + ∆wk,t)
2/2. The minimum is not analytic, and it is costly to solve for
the exactly minimum of this objective at each time. To get rid of this problem,
we relax the condition on the trader’s behaviour, such that instead of being
strictly profit maximizer, a trader will accept a portfolio as long as it is better
than her current position, $(ϑ̂a,t) < $a(ϑ̂a,t−1). To find a better position, a
trader can simply update her portfolio along the (reversed) gradient direction,
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where α > 0 is a step size adjusted such that $(ϑ̂a,t) < $(ŝa,t−1). In practice α
could be chosen by backtracking line search (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
This updating rule implements a coordinate descent algorithm.
Instead of introducing K agents, we can match the logistic regression problem
by using only one agent and allowing it to trade all securities. This will result
in a standard gradient descent method.
5.3 Risk-neutral niche traders
A niche trader is a trader who believes that the true distribution of the future
state differs from the current market belief in some limited way, by learning
and representing her belief relative to the market. When a niche trader inter-
act with a PMM, she exploits this belief difference for possible profits, and at
the same time, updates her belief according to current market position.
Storkey (2011) proposes a model for niche traders and uses it for equilibrium
analysis. In this model, a niche trader represents her belief as a factor on
the equilibrium belief. The author shows that when all niche traders behave
risk-aversely under the same entropic risk measure (or equivalently the expo-
nential utility), the equilibrium belief is the product of all traders’ factors.
5.3.1 Modelling niche traders
Our model for niche traders is similar to the original model of Storkey (2011).
We improve the design of the original model in order to better capture the
trading dynamics, which is not addressed in the equilibrium analysis. In
particular, consider a market with fixed set A of repeated traders. Denote
θt, ϑa,t the total shares of securities sold by the market maker and the trader
a’s holdings after the t-th trade, respectively, and fa(·) the belief factor of the
trader. Then the niche trader’s true belief at time t is
pa,t := fa · f\a = fa · pθt−1−ϑa,t−1 , (5.65)
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where f\a := pθt−1−ϑa,t−1 is the corresponding market belief for the market
position θt−1 − ϑa,t−1. It can be understood as the pre-trade market collective
belief excluding trader a, and it encodes the information that is not repre-
sented by fa. In fact, if trader a sells all her current holdings, which is θt−1
before the t-th trade happens, and leaves the market, the market belief will
just be pθt−1−ϑa,t−1 .
Assuming that the belief model behind the PMM is a GEF PΘ, and that the
trader is risk-neutral and myopic, then the optimal trade at time t between





(θt − θt−1)>Epa,t [φt]− F(θt)− F(θt−1), (5.66)
whose optimal is obtained at Epa,t [φ] = ∇F(θt). Since the market belief is
a GEF distribution, the optimal post-trade market position θ∗t is obtained by
matching the moments of the market belief pθ∗t to that of the trader’s belief
pa,t, that is, pθ∗t [φ] = Epa,t [φ].
Implementing expectation propagation (EP) Similar to the risk-averse set-
ting, the prediction market with risk-neutral niche traders can also be linked
to specific machine learning algorithms. In fact, this market in essence im-
plements expectation propagation (EP) of Minka (2001). In particular, the target
factor model we aim to approximate here is the product of trader’s factors
{ fa} and the PMM’s initial belief pθ0
p ∝ pθ0 · ∏
a∈A
fa, (5.67)
While the approximate model p̃ is given by the market belief at the equilib-
rium pθ. When the market beliefs are represented by an exponential family,
the approximate distribution can be rewritten as a product of trader’s approx-
imate factors f̃a and the PMM’s initial belief
pθ ∝ pθ0 · ∏
a∈A
f̃a, (5.68)
where f̃a is proportional to the exponential family distribution parametrized
by the trader a’s final holdings pθa . The EP algorithm starts with an initial
guess of pθ, and in each step it replaces one approximate factor f̃a by the true
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factor fa, and updates the approximate distribution p̃ via moment-matching:
p̃← argpθ∈PΘ
(
Epθ[φ] = Ep̃ fa/ f̃a [φ]
)
. (5.69)
Since p̃ fa/ f̃a = fa pθ−ϑa , each trade is exactly one EP step.
When the market beliefs are GEF distributions, the market equilibrium belief
pθ will still serve as the EP approximate distribution p̃, although it may no
longer have a factorized form as (5.68). The algorithm also remains the same.
Now the true factor model will be approximated to a GEF distribution rather
than an exponential family distribution.
By using risk-neutral niche traders, we can avoid the issue of choosing specific
preference functions for traders, at the cost of a more complicated model
for their beliefs. The complete match between this market model and EP
has both advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, it makes the market
more machine learning oriented, and one can understand and analyse the
market though EP; on the other hand, the convergence result of the market
is weaker than the risk-averse setting, since it will rely on the convergence of
the corresponding EP algorithm, which is case-dependent.
5.3.2 Example
Consider a market betting players’ skills. As distinct from the setting in Chap-
ter 3, here we assume that the players’ true skills are observable, and define
a fully-observable PMM to offer traders directly on the players’ skills. More
specifically, given a set K of K players, denote the skill of player k by xk. We
define securities {φk1 = xk, φk2 = x2k}
K
k=1, and a fully-observable PMM with











That is, the PMM expresses a multivariate Gaussian with diagonal covariance
matrix: N (µ, Σ) = ∏Kk=1N (µk, σ2k ), where µk = −θk1/2θk2, σ2k = −1/2θk2, Σ =
diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
K).
Each trader observes one game result between two players and keeps it as her
private information. The trader has a niche belief, that is, she only has a belief
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about a player’s actual game performance y ∼ N (xk, ε2), but does not have
the belief over the skills {xk}. Then the trader’s niche belief about the game
result between two player k1, k2 ∈ K, conditioned on the players’ skills, is


















The niche trader combines her niche factor with the market belief over skills
to form her complete belief pa(x) ∝ fa(x)pθ\a(x), where pθ\a(x) is the market
belief at expressed at position θ\a which excludes the trader a’s traded shares.
Since trader is risk-neutral and myopic, the post-trade market position is de-
termined by ∇F(θ) = Epa [φ], or by moment-matching between pa and the
market belief pθ. The trader a’s holding ϑa determines the approximate factor
f̃ , which is a Gaussian with natural parameter ϑa.
Since each trade reflects a moment-matching step, the repeated trading among
traders implements the EP algorithm for inference in the true skill system.
5.4 Market maker driven convergence
Trader driven convergence relies on the model of traders that is assumed to
be able to capture the traders’ trading behaviours. Thus the trader driven
convergence analysis asks traders to actually behave, at least approximately,
in the way as the model describes. However, in situations where no good
models for traders are available, such as due to the lack of the knowledge
about traders or due to information privacy issues, the trader driven conver-
gence may not be well established. In this section, we discuss an alternative
convergence result that is directly driven by the market maker.
This alternative approach does not build any specific risk-aversion models
for traders. Instead, it treats traders as i.i.d. samples from a trader ensemble
which has a fixed ensemble mean belief about the future state, or equivalently,
fixed ensemble mean prices for the securities. The ensemble mean prices are
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also referred to as the true mean prices in this context, and the goal of the
market maker is to discover the true mean prices from the trades with traders.
This convergence solution is heavily inspired by the Bayesian market maker
of Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009). Viewed from the high level, the PMM is
augmented by a probabilistic model representing the market maker’s belief
about the ensemble mean prices. This model is updated via accomplished
trades using Bayes rule. As more trades occur, the belief will gradually con-
verge to the ensemble mean prices.
For simplicity, convergence discussion in this section will be restricted to a
PMM that encodes her belief in an exponential family and offers just one
security. Settings that involve multiple securities and GEFs can be discussed
in similar ways.
5.4.1 Potential function revisited
In a PMM, an equivalence between the market maker’s inventory and maker
maker’s belief could be found. The key idea is that, the market maker can be
treated as a special trader who always has an inventory fixed to zero but keeps
updating her belief after every trade.
Consider a PMM with initial belief p0. If we treat the market maker as a
trader, that is, we record how many shares the market maker holds instead of
how many shares she sells, then the potential function is defined to be
Fp0(θ) := log Ep0 [e
−θφ(ω)], (5.73)
where an extra negation appears due to this change of view. The inventory of
the market maker θ will decrease when the market maker sells and increases
when she buys. The instantaneous price is also redefined to be the negation of
the gradient of Fp0
p(θ) = − d
dθ
Fp0(θ) (5.74)
and when θ = 0, the price matches the expectation of φ w.r.t. p0, as expected.
At time t, a trade δt := θt − θt−1, with δt > 0 indicating that the market
maker buys securities from the trader, is priced by the difference in potential
Fp0(θt)− Fp0(θt−1).
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We assume that the market maker’s belief p0 also belongs to the encoded




e(θ0−θ)φ(ω)ν(ω)dω = log Z(θ0 − θ)− log Z(θ0), (5.75)
and so the cost of the trade δt can be rewritten as
Fp0(θt)− Fp0(θt−1) = log Z(θ0 − θt−1 − δt)− log Z(θ0 − θt−1) (5.76)
= Fpt−1(δt)− Fpt−1(0), (5.77)
where pt−1 is the market belief before the t-th trade, and has natural param-
eter θ0 − θt−1. Now, we end up with two equivalent ways of interpreting the
market maker’s behaviour.
1. The market maker has a fixed initial belief throughout the market life-
time, and maintains a record of the inventory. To determine prices she
needs to compute the change of potential using the pre-trade and post-
trade inventories.
2. The market maker varies her initial belief between trades. After each
trade she updates her initial belief to the post-trade market belief, and
resets the inventory to zero. As a consequence, the market maker’s pre-
trade inventory will always be zero. Using Fpt−1(δt) is enough to com-
pute the price of a trade δt, as the pre-trade state is implicitly adjusted
through pt−1.
The second view is of special importance to building the belief augmented
PMM. Since the PMM under the second view always has an empty inven-
tory, then each price update is caused by a pure update in the market belief.
Therefore, if the market belief could be updated in a better way such that it
can finally converge to ensemble mean, a market convergence result will also
be obtained based on this belief update.
To simplify our notation, the later discussion will denote the market maker’s
potential function Fpt by Ft.
5.4.2 Belief augmented PMM
Under the basic potential based mechanism, the market prices are updated
to match the most recent trader’s expectation of the security values. Hence if
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the traders are stochastically drawn i.i.d. from a trader ensemble, the market
prices will also form i.i.d. samples of ensemble. In other words, the basic
potential based mechanism can be thought of as a model-free sampler of the
trader ensemble. Since market prices are samples, their running averages will
converge to the ensemble mean price v, but the market prices themselves will
not converge to any fixed price.
To obtain converged market prices, more trades than just the most recent one
must be used for setting up the market instantaneous prices. This goal is
achieved by adding an extra belief model on the top of the existing PMM.
This belief model treats the ensemble mean price v as a random variable
and maintains a distribution pt(v) over it. Note that the price belief pt(v) is
different from pt(ω) or its abbreviation pt, which is market belief over the
future state represented by the PMM (recall Chapter 4). To distinguish them
we will always write the belief over the price in pt(v) with random variable
shown explicitly, while pt (without the argument) always refers to the market
belief at time t.
The mean of v under pt(v), denoted by µt, is used for setting up the initial
market price for the (t + 1)-th trade. On the other hand, after the (t + 1)-th
trade occurs, the belief pt(v) is updated to pt+1(v) based on the trade. More
specifically, the belief model assumes that the (t + 1)-th trader’s true price
qt+1 is a noise around v: qt+1 = v + εt+1, εt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2n). Since traders
are risk-neutral and myopic, qt+1 can be recovered from the traded shares δt
through qt+1 = ∇Ft(δt+1). Then by Bayes rule, the belief about the ensemble
mean price is updated to
pt+1(v) := p(v | qt+1) ∝ p(qt+1 | v)pt(v). (5.78)
Assume that pt(v) is a Normal distributionN (µt, σ2t ). Then the updated belief




















After the (t + 1)-th trade, the market maker will reset her inventory to zero
and sets a new initial price for the next trade. However, distinct from the
standard PMM who matches the new initial price −dFt+1(0)/dδ to qt+1, the
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Figure 5.5: The price dynamics of the standard PMM (left) and the belief augmented
PMM (right). While the standard PMM follows precisely the most recent trader’s
belief, the belief augmented PMM discovers the true price using trades and drive the
market price to converge.
belief augmented PMM uses the updated belief in (5.79) and matches the new
initial price to µt+1. In other words, the market maker is adjusted to the new
position such that the market price is equal to the posterior mean µt+1, rather
than the post-trade price qt+1 in the standard PMM case.
Evaluation A simulated environment is used to test the performance of the
belief augmented PMM in comparison with a standard PMM. For each sim-
ulation, we generate a true ensemble mean price from a Normal distribution
v∗ ∼ N (0, 2.52), and generate a set of risk-neutral myopic traders with true
beliefs {qt+1}T−1t=0 , T = 100, qt+1 ∼ N (v∗, 12). Traders interact with the market
maker sequentially. The simulation is repeated for N = 10, 000 times.
Figure 5.5 shows the price dynamics in a simulation. The standard PMM’s
price follows precisely the traders’ true beliefs, showing completely a stochas-
tic pattern, while the prices of the belief augmented PMM do not follow the
traders but converge to the ensemble mean. On the right figure the belief
interval (µt − σt, µt + σt) of pt(v) is also plotted. As more trades occur, the
belief becomes more and more certain around the true ensemble mean.
The averaged reward per trade of the both market makers are given by Fig-
ure 5.6. The left figure plots the profit of each trade given the true observa-
tion of the event being the ensemble mean. The right figure treats the market
maker as a risk-averse trader whose risk/preference function is given by its
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Figure 5.6: The profits (left) and risk gains (right) of standard PMM and belief aug-
mented PMM in each trade. Results are averaged over N = 10, 000 simulations. The
belief augmented PMM outperforms the standard PMM under both measures.
potential (recall Section 5.2.1), and plots the maker maker’s risk gain in each
trade. Under both measures the belief augmented PMM outperforms the
standard PMM. At the beginning of the trades, both mechanisms lose some
money in order to move their positions close to v∗. The standard PMM fol-
lows precisely the stochastic traders, such on average gains zero profit in each
round as traders are i.i.d. sampled around v∗. It also obtains negative risks
per trade since the price does not converge and has a constant volatility. The
belief augmented PMM gradually discovers the true price v∗, and sets the
true belief as the initial price for each trade. Then each trader who drives the
price away from v∗ will lose money to the market maker, and the converged
price also reduces the risks to zero.
One drawback of the belief augmented PMM is that it does not provide a
theoretical bound on its monetary loss. Intuitively, if the price that the market
price converged to turns out to be incorrect, then those traders with the true
mean price v∗ can trade to earn money from the market maker before the
price is readjusted to v∗. In a Bayesian update, the more uncertain that pt(v)
is, the slower for pt(v) to readjust the market price to the true one. Thus the
belief augmented PMM may end up with losing arbitrary amount of money.
Fortunately, this issue can be avoided by a mild condition on the traders:
if the mean of stochastic traders’ beliefs forms a consistent estimator of the
ensemble mean v∗, then the belief augmented PMM will finally discover the




























Another drawback of the belief augmented PMM is that it inevitably loses
money at the beginning of the trade and can never obtain positive risk gains.
Can we exploit the belief augmented mechanism more efficiently, to avoid the
money loss in the early market and to earn positive risk gains? It turns out
that a belief augmented PMM with bid-ask spread can kill two birds with one
stone.






traders buy δ1 > 0
traders sell δ2 > 0
Figure 5.7: Market maker’s
limit order book (Fbt , F
a
t ).
To further leverage the belief augmented PMM for
ensemble price discovery while reducing the costs
and risks of running such market makers, a bid-ask
spread is introduced. A bid-ask spread is defined
by a bid price bt and a ask price at. They bound
the uni-price µt of the belief augmented PMM from
below and above, respectively: bt ≤ µt ≤ at. The
bid price bt is the price at which the market maker
would like to pay for buying securities, while the
ask price at is the price at which the market maker
would like to sell. Both bid-ask prices are derived
from the potentials, hence the prices will change
during a trade. More specifically, at the end of each time t (also the beginning
of time t + 1), the bid-ask potentials (Fbt , F
a
t ) are published by the PMM, with
bid (ask) price initialized at bt = −dFbt (0)/dθ and at = −dFat (0)/dθ. At time
t + 1, one trade will occur. If the trader wants to buy δ1 > 0 shares, then the
ask potential Fat will be used for pricing and the purchase costs F
a
t (−δ1) −
Fat (0). Otherwise if a trader wants to sell δ2 > 0, the other potential F
b
t will be
used and the trader’s gain is computed by Fbt (0)− Fbt (δ2). Notice that each
trade will always increase the bid-ask spread. A market maker with such bid-
ask spread in essence implicitly maintains a limit order book (Fbt , F
a
t ), waiting
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for a trader to neutralize some limit orders via transactions (Figure 5.7).
Intuitively, the bid-ask spread is a better way to encode and express the mar-
ket belief than the uni-price. The uni-price gives a point estimate of the mean
value of the security w.r.t. current market belief, while the bid-ask prices give
an interval that the mean value falls in. In other words, the bid-ask prices can
capture the uncertainly of the security value under the market belief. Another
benefit of using the bid-ask spread is that, with a bid-ask spread the market
maker can avoid trading with less informative traders, thus achieving more
efficient market making with less monetary loss and risks.
Since each trade always increases the bid-ask spread, a maintenance for the
spread (or equivalently, the limit order book) is needed after the trade in order
to correctly reflect the market belief and also to encourage future trading. Sim-
ilar to the uni-priced belief augmented PMM, the bid-ask prices/potentials
should somehow update based on the latest belief model for the ensemble
mean price. That is, after the (t + 1)-th trade, the market maker first updates
her belief over the ensemble mean price pt(v) → pt+1(v), and then sets the
new potentials (Fbt+1, F
b
t+1) for the next trade. However, unlike the uni-priced
PMM who simply matches the new price to the latest mean of pt(v), there is
no trivial way to set the bid-ask prices. In fact, the following two issues are
the key to designing a belief augmented PMM with a bid-ask spread.
1. How to update the belief pt(v)→ pt+1(v) from the latest trade; and
2. How to set new potentials (Fbt+1, F
b
t+1) using the new market belief.
The belief update is addressed by Section 5.4.3.1 using a standard Bayesian
approach. Section 5.4.3.2 then builds the new potentials as the solution to an
optimal control problem defined on the updated belief. Finally, in the last
section this bid-ask system is evaluated and the results are discussed.
5.4.3.1 Belief update in bid-ask systems
Now the market maker controls two prices: bid for buying (from the trader),
and ask for selling (to the trader). The price discovery process remains almost
the same except that there will be an explicit “null-trade” interval (bt, at).
Given a trader with expected security values qt+1, if qt+1 ∈ (bt, at), then the
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trader will not see any profitable offer from the market maker. Outside the
null-trade interval the model is as previous but with a modified partition
function to ensure the probabilities sum up to one. Recall that v is the ensem-
ble mean price; µt is the market price at end of time t (and also the beginning
of time t + 1). The market maker’s noise model for the trader is changed to












































which by definition is equal to one minus the probability of a null trade (with
the corresponding trader’s belief in (bt, at)) in (5.81).
The true ensemble mean price v could be integrated out by pt(v). The exact
marginal distribution over the trader’s belief qt+1 is
p(qt+1 | at, bt) =
∫




























The price update after trade δt, which adjusts the market price from µt to qt+1,



























Here µt+1 and σ2t+1 are computed from (5.79). It is worth pointing out that a
trader who does not make a trade still provides information. However, the
update rule for null trade is different.
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After a null-trade update, pt+1(v) is no longer a Normal but it can be well ap-
proximated by a Normal via moment-matching. The approximated posterior
is what is actually used as the prior for the next trade. The moment-matched
Normal is with











log Zt+1 = −






log Zt+1 = −
u+t φ(u
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By applying this approximation, we will always have a Normal distribution
N (µt+1, σ2t+1) no matter whether the trade is a null trader or not. This Normal
distribution is then used as the new belief over the ensemble mean price for
the next round pricing.
To sum up



































5.4.3.2 Bid-ask potentials for the next trade
Previous sections discussed how the belief updates, given the bid-ask prices
and the trade. The problem remains is that how this updated belief can help
set the bid and ask prices for the next trade. In the uni-price system, the price
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is simply set to match the mean µt+1. However, there is no trivial way to set
the bid-ask prices.
As pointed out by Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009), the price update process
can be modelled as an optimal control problem. Intuitively, with the latest
belief over the ensemble mean price, the belief augmented PMM can estimate
the behaviours of the following traders and also the accumulated reward gen-
erated from the later trades. Maximizing the accumulated reward involves
the interactive process between the trading and the bid-ask pricing. On the
one hand, the bid-ask prices will affect the behaviour of each trade; on the
other hand, each trade will bring in new information that helps update the
PMM’s belief over the ensemble mean price, which in turn affects the bid-ask
pricing. An optimal control problem thus emerges from this trading-pricing
interaction.
In the rest of this section, the model for the price update process will be in-
troduced. The model is mainly based on the Glosten-Milgrom model (O’hara,
1995, Chap. 3.3), which is originally used by Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009).
The model will cover several settings that result from the different choices
on the reward function and on the decision-making preference of the market
maker. For each setting, the optimal pricing strategy will be solved.
Deriving the model Denote r(qt+1, v, at, bt) the gain that the market maker
obtains in the (t + 1)-th trade, given that the ensemble mean v is revealed.
Then the expected gain for the (t + 1)-th trade is
r̄t+1(at, bt) =
∫ ∫
r(qt+1, v, at, bt)p(qt+1 | v, at, bt)pt(v)dvdqt+1. (5.93)
If no trade happens, r(qt+1, v, at, bt) = 0. Thus the expected gain decomposes








r(qt+1, v, at, bt)p(qt+1 | v, at, bt)pt(v)dvtdqt+1 (5.95)
and no gain is generated for qt+1 ∈ (bt, at).
The vanilla Glosten-Milgrom model assumes that the market maker stays in
a competitive environment. That is, there exists many other market makers
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who provide the same services, and in order to survive the market maker has
to set her bid-ask returns to zero, r̄bidt (at, bt) = r̄
ask
t (at, bt) = 0. If we drop the
competitive market assumption and let the market maker be a monopoly, then
the price update will be characterized by a Markov Decision Process (MDP),





t ) + γE[V
π(pt+1(v)) | aπt , bπt ]. (5.96)
Here each state of the MDP is a belief over the ensemble mean price pt(v),
and the value function V is defined as the discounted total expected reward
through time V(pt(v)) := ∑∞t=0 γ
trt+1(at, bt). Map π : pt(v) 7→ (at, bt) is the
policy that tells how the market maker will set her bid-ask prices when she
has belief pt(v). The bid-ask prices as well as the value function resulting
from π are denoted by aπt , b
π
t , V
π, respectively. Note that at the beginning of
time t right before the (t + 1)-th trade Vπ(pt+1(v)) is random as qt+1 is not
observed, and the expectation of Vπ(pt+1(v)) is taken w.r.t. p(qt+1 | v, at, bt).
Measuring the gain Intuitively, the gain r(qt+1, v, at, bt) can be measured by
the market maker’s profit obtained for the (t + 1)-th trade. Consider a trader
with belief qt+1 < bt. She will sell securities to the market maker until the bid
price matches qt+1. According to potential based mechanism, this trader will
keep trading until
qt+1 = −∂Fbt (δt+1), (5.97)
which costs her Fbt (δt+1)− Fbt (0) = Fbt (δt+1). Similarly, for a trader with belief
qt > at the trade stops at qt+1 = −∂Fat (δt+1) and the agent pays Fat (δt+1) to
(gets −Fat (δt+1) from) the market maker. If the market market know the true
ensemble mean price for the security v, the profit is
r(qt+1, v, at, bt) = vδt+1 − ct+1, (5.98)





t (δt+1) qt+1 < bt






(qt+1) qt+1 < bt
(−∂Fat )
−1(qt+1) qt+1 > at
. (5.99)
Note that δt+1 > 0 when qt+1 < bt and δt+1 < 0 when qt+1 > at.
Chapter 5. Convergence and Equilibrium 129
In general, we can think the market maker, as a trader, is risk-averse and
include the risks when measuring its gain. Let ρ be the market maker’s risk
measure and $ := ρ ◦ φ, then the gain for the trade δt+1 is
r(qt+1, v, at, bt) = −ρ(δt+1φ− ct+1) = −$(δt+1)− ct+1. (5.100)
Solving optimal pricing strategies For simplicity we will use the quadratic
potential for Fat and F
b
t










and choose the risk measure





Note that when σr = 0, the market maker becomes risk neutral and measures
its gain via profit. We say the risk measure is consistent with the potential if
σr = σp, and inconsistent otherwise.
After the trade δt, the price is adjusted to the trader’s belief qt. From (5.99),
we obtain the amount of traded shares δt+1 = (bt − qt+1)/σ2 if qt+1 < bt (i.e.
market maker buys), and δt+1 = (at− qt+1)/σ2 if qt+1 > at (i.e. market maker
sells).
The gain is




(v− bt)(bt − qt+1)−
σ2r − σ2p
2σ4p
(bt − qt+1)2 qt+1 < bt
1
σ2p
(v− at)(at − qt+1)−
σ2r − σ2p
2σ4p
(at − qt+1)2 qt+1 > at
.
(5.104)
Denote constants α+ = (σ2r + σ2p)/2σ2p, α− = (σ2r − σ2p)/2σ2p, and their quotient
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ρ2t = 0. 0
ρ2t = 0. 5
ρ2t = 1. 0
ρ2t = 2. 0
(a) α = 0 (α+ = 1, α− = 0)











ρ2t = 0. 0
ρ2t = 0. 5
ρ2t = 1. 0
ρ2t = 2. 0
(b) α = −1 (α+ = 1/2, α− = −1/2)
Figure 5.8: The reward function r̄t+1 under different circumstances. For α = −1, r̄t+1
is positive everywhere when ρ2 < 1. In general, the reward r̄t+1(u) will always be
positive if ρ2 + α < 0.
Here we use the dimensionless quantities introduced in (5.89).
A symmetric pattern emerges in between r̄bidt (bt) and r̄
ask
t (at). In particular, if
b∗t is a solution to r̄
bid
t (bt) = r0, then the solution to r̄
ask
t (at) = r0 is such that
µt − b∗t = a∗t − µt. Due to this symmetric pattern, the optimal solution to the
Bellman equation (at, bt) will meet the condition u+t = u
−
t = ut. Therefore,
the r̄t+1 = r̄bidt+1 + t̄
ask











When ρ2t + α < 0, the reward r̄t+1(ut) will always be greater than zero.
Also, under the symmetric condition the belief update in (5.90–5.92) is sim-
plified to























There are three solution concepts (1) a market maker in a competitive environ-
ment; (2) a myopic monopoly; and (3) a Bellman optimal monopoly. A market
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maker in a competitive environment maintains zero expected gain r̄t+1 = 0,
while a myopic monopoly maximizes r̄t+1 at each time t. The optimal solution
for these two cases can be easily obtained by using Newton’s method. When
the market maker is a Bellman optimal monopoly, the Bellman equation (5.96)
will have the following specific form, which is derived by applying (5.83) and
(5.110), and the symmetry of the bid-ask prices












2Φ(−ut)V(ρ2t /η2t ) + (1− 2Φ(−ut))V(Atρ2t )
)
. (5.111)
Notice that for both coefficient of ρ2t we have 0 < At, ηt < 1. Thus the state ρ
2
is bounded in the interval [0, ρ20]. To solve the Bellman equation, we first find
the boundary solution at ρ2t = 0, and then build up V(ρ
2) for other ρ2 > 0 by
sweeping from ρ2 = 0 to the initial state ρ2 = ρ20.







utφ(ut)− (u2t + α)Φ(−ut)
)
+ γV(0). (5.112)
Hence the optimal u∗ is the root of (1 + α)φ(u)− 2uΦ(−u) = 0. In particular,
when α = 0, that is, the market maker is risk-averse about the gain and the
risk measure is consistent with the bid-ask potentials






when α = −1, that is, the market maker uses profit to measure the gain






To compute the value function at other states, we build a discrete grid on the
state space 0 = ρ̂20 < ρ̂
2
1 < · · · < ρ̂2N+1 = ρ20, and approximate V(ρ2t ) using a
piecewise linear function V̂ defined on this grid. Specifically
V̂(ρ2) = V̂n +
ρ2 − ρ̂2n
ρ̂2n+1 − ρ̂2n
(V̂n+1 − V̂n), ρ̂2n ≤ ρ2 ≤ ρ̂2n+1. (5.115)
Figure 5.9 and 5.10 shows the optimal pricing strategy under different solu-
tion concepts. Notice that the belief augmented PMM with single price (Sec-
tion 5.4.2) is a special bid-ask market maker who always has a zero bid-ask
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Figure 5.9: The value function (left) and the half bid-ask spread (right) for α = 0.
The Bellman optimal market maker has the highest value function, as expected. The
minimum spread of the competitive market maker is zero, while the myopic and the
Bellman optimal market makers have the same non-zero minimum spread. The belief
augmented PMM with single price can be treated as a special bid-ask market maker
with bid-ask spread always being zero.
spread. The optimal strategy depends on how the market maker measures her
gain of each trade. When the market maker is risk-averse and her risk mea-
sure is consistent with the potential function she uses for pricing, both the
myopic and the Bellman optimal solutions have the same non-zero bid-ask
spread when her belief N (µt, σ2t ) converges (i.e. ρ2t → 0), while the compet-
itive market maker shrinks the spread to zero. However, when the market
maker is aiming to maximize the expected profits, all optimal strategies will
finally lead to zero bid-ask spread. Another interesting observation is that,
when the expected profit is used to measure the gain, the value function of
the competitive market maker is actually not zero. The reason is that for
α < 0, if ρ2t is small enough such that ρ
2
t + α < 0, then the expected profit
r̄t+1(ut) is positive for any ut ≥ 0. In this situation, the market maker still
gains a positive reward even if she sets a zero bid-ask spread.
5.4.3.3 Evaluation
This section evaluates the optimal pricing strategies in a simulated market
environment. More specifically, we draw the true ensemble mean v∗ from a
Normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation σ = 5. Traders
are risk-neutral and myopic, with beliefs i.i.d. drawn qt+1 ∼ N (v∗, 1). They
visit the market in a sequential manner, such that each trader interacts with
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Figure 5.10: The value function (left) and the half bid-ask spread (right) for α = −1.
The minimum spread is zero for all three types of market makers. When ρ2 + α < 0,
r̄t+1 > 0 and so the market maker in the competitive environment actually receives a
positive reward when ρ < 1.
the market maker only once, and then leaves the market. All market mak-
ers have the same initial prior belief over v, which is a Normal distribution
N (0, σ20 ). The optimal strategies of the Bellman optimal maker maker are
derived under the discount factor γ = 0.9 (i.e. same as the results plotted in
Figure 5.9 and 5.10). At the end of the market lifetime, we reveal v∗ to evalu-
ate the market makers’ actual profits and risk gains. Finally, the simulation is
repeated for N = 10, 000 and we report the averaged result.
Figure 5.11 shows the pricing processes of market makers in one of the N
simulations. The optimal strategies of the market makers are derived from the
risk consistent measure of gains (α = 0). The Bellman optimal market maker
has a much smaller initial bid-ask spread than the myopic and the competitive
ones, allowing her to accept more non-zero transactions (red cross outside of
the bid-ask interval) in the early stage. Since the coefficients of the variance
update in (5.110) has the relation At ≥ 1/η2t , these early non-zero transactions
will lead to a faster convergence of the market maker’s belief. The large bid-
ask spread is the main drawback of the competitive and the myopic optimal
maker makers, which can even make them impractical: if the market maker
has a broad initial belief over v, p0(v), the bid-ask spread will be too large
to allow any non-zero trade to happen in the early market, and the belief
convergence will be very slow (Figure 5.12).
All market makers’ beliefs converge to the true ensemble mean (black dashed
line) as time increases. The pricing process is consistent with the optimal
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Figure 5.11: The pricing process of the market makers with σ0 = 2.5 and strategies
derived from the risk consistent measure of gains (α = 0). A non-zero trade happens
when the trader’ belief (red cross) is outside of the bid-ask spread. All market mak-
ers’ beliefs converge to the ensemble mean price v∗. The Bellman optimal and the
myopic optimal market makers maintain a non-zero bid-ask spread.
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Figure 5.12: The pricing process of the market makers with σ0 = 3 and strategies
derived from the risk consistent measure of gains (α = 0). For the competitive and
the myopic market makers, a broader initial belief p0(v) leads to a much larger bid-
ask spread, and a much slower convergence. Note that the σ0 only increases by 0.5.
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Figure 5.13: The pricing process of the market makers with σ0 = 3.5 and strategies
derived form the profit measure of gains (α = −1). A non-zero trade happens when
the trader’ belief (red cross) is outside of the bid-ask spread. All market makers’
beliefs and bid-ask spread converge to the ensemble mean price v∗.
strategies in Figure 5.9: the zero spread market maker has a zero bid-ask
spread by definition; the competitive market maker starts with a non-zero
but ends up with a zero bid-ask spread; the Bellman optimal market maker
and the myopic optimal market maker maintains a non-zero bid-ask spread
through out the market lifetime. The pricing processes of the market mak-
ers derived from α = 0 is also consistent with their optimal strategies (Fig-
ure 5.13).
Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 show the actual profits, or the actual risk gains of
the market makers, averaged over simulations. Note that when α = −1, the
variance of the market maker’s risk measure σ2r = 0, and so the risk gains
coincide with the profits. For the market makers derived from α = 0, we see
a trade-off between profits and risk gains (Figure 5.14 and 5.15). In particu-
lar, the Bellman optimal market maker has the highest risk gains among all
market makers. However, to guarantee low risks the market maker has to
give up those strategies that are more profitable but more risky, which in av-
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Figure 5.14: The actual profits of the market makers with σ0 = 2.5 and pricing strate-
gies derived from the risk consistent measure of gains (α = 0). Results are averaged
over N = 10, 000 simulations.









































Figure 5.15: The actual risk gains of the market makers with σ0 = 2.5 and pricing
strategies derived from the risk consistent measure of gains (α = 0). Results are
averaged over N = 10, 000 simulations.









































Figure 5.16: The actual profits/risk gains of the market makers with σ0 = 3.5 and
pricing strategies derived from the profit measure of gains (α = −1). Here the actual
profits and the risk gains coincide since σ2r = 0. Results are averaged over N = 10, 000
simulations.
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erage sense will lead to worse actual profits than the competitive and the zero
spread market makers. When α = −1, the Bellman optimal market maker
aims to maximize the monetary profit, and it does achieve the highest actual
profits among all market makers (Figure 5.16). With a smaller initial bid-ask
spread the Bellman optimal market maker may lose some money and risk-
averse gain in the early stage. However, the smaller bid-ask spread speeds
up the price discovery and, with a better belief, the Bellman optimal market
maker gains more in the long run. Therefore, by using bid-ask market maker
we can avoid investing money for price discovery, and usually we even end
up with earning profits.
5.4.4 Discussion
The market maker driven convergence is heavily inspired by the Bayesian mar-
ket maker (BMM) of Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009), but differs in fundamental
design. While the original BMM was proposed as a mechanism distinct from
the standard PMM, here we actually construct a similar mechanism by di-
rectly augmenting the standard PMM, thus providing a unified view for both
mechanisms. In addition, our mechanism can naturally model an arbitrary
amount of shares in each transaction using the embedded PMM, while the
BMM relies on the assumption that either a unit share or nothing is traded
in each round, and can only model up to integer shares by trading multiple
times (Brahma et al., 2012).
Alternatively, we can view our bid-ask mechanism as a BMM but with a finite
limit order book. The original BMM has infinite many limit orders at bid
and ask prices, which makes the bid-ask prices unmovable by during a trade.
Comparatively, our bid-ask model has finite limit orders at each price. When
the orders at the initial bid (ask) price is not enough to meet the demand of the
trade, orders at lower (higher) prices will start to supply, implying a decrease
(increase) in the bid (ask) price. The finite limit order book is a more realistic
model for limit order books, and also works better with risk-neutral myopic
traders who, with sufficient budgets, will keep trading until the market prices
are moved to their true beliefs.
One underlying assumption of the market maker driven convergence is that
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all traders are drawn consistently from an invariant trader ensemble. This
assumption enables the price belief pt(v) to be updated under Bayes rule,
which guarantees the shrinkage of pt(v) conditioned on new trades (recall
(5.79) and (5.110)). However, if the trader ensemble is dynamically chang-
ing though time, the convergence result will not apply. For example, when
the market price has almost converged but the true ensemble mean suddenly
jumps to a different value, it will take a considerably long time for the market
price to adapt to this jump, due to the small variance that pt(v) has already
acquired. One solution to this problem is to model the traders with a lin-
ear dynamical system, such that we can use the Markov chain on the latent
state to capture the dynamics of the ensemble mean belief while still view-
ing traders as noises around the ensemble mean. Another solution is to drop
the assumption of stochastic traders completely, and search for a convergence
result based on online learning. We will study these ideas in our future work.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed in details the convergence and equilibrium of
potential based prediction markets in various settings. These settings and re-
sults were classified into two categories: (1) the convergence driven by traders,
and (2) the convergence driven by the market maker.
In the trader driven convergence, we considered more realistic models for
trader behaviours, then analysed based on them how a market-wise objective
emerges from the trading preference of each individual, and how this global
objective is optimized via each selfish trade. Our analysis showed that the
trader driven convergence is closely linked, or even equivalent to popular
convex optimization techniques (e.g. Chen and Teboulle (1993); Duchi et al.
(2010)) and machine learning methods (e.g. Minka (2001); Garg et al. (2004)).
The trader driven convergence result is suitable for situations where traders
are controllable, or are designed artificially.
In the market maker driven convergence, we simply left traders being risk-
neutral myopic, instead augmented PMM with an extra belief model that
allows the market maker to learn the equilibrium price from the past trades,
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and with an extra bid-ask spread that allows the market maker to set better
initial prices for the upcoming trades. We modelled this convergence process
as an optimal control problem, governed by a Bellman equation which we
derive by combining the potential based mechanism and the classic Glosten-
Milgrom model. In addition to achieving price convergence, the belief aug-
mented PMMs can usually avoid subsidizing the market and even make prof-
its. However, the market maker driven convergence requires that the traders
are stochastic and consistently drawn from an invariant ensemble.
The results in this chapter can help us understand and even solve the instabil-
ity that has been observed in practical prediction markets. By comparing the
real-world settings to that of the ideal convergence models, one could know
how a prediction market violates the necessary assumptions and hence de-
viates from the expected equilibria. Furthermore, one can also increase the
stability of a prediction market by adding appropriate risk-aversion regulari-
ties to traders, or by augmenting the PMM with a proper price belief.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
After having spread our discussion of potential prediction markets over three
chapters, let’s now review the research problem and contributions of the work
in this thesis, point out some future directions, and draw the conclusion.
6.1 Review of research problems and
achievements
The goal of our research is to improve the potential based prediction mar-
ket designs which currently suffer from limited belief modelling powers and
inadequate understandings of market dynamics. Improvement in both as-
pects will help pave the way for using potential based prediction markets as
distributed, scalable and self-incentivized machine learning systems, which
models beliefs over the target problems using the probabilistic models en-
coded in the market maker, and learns the beliefs by aggregating local in-
formation from potentially large population of traders via transactions. The
main results and contributions are summarized below.
• In Chapter 3, we introduce the partially-observable state space as a new
target space for running prediction markets, and argue how this space
could potentially improve the flexibility and effectiveness of the market
design and the belief modelling. Then, based on the latent variable mod-
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els involving exponential families, we propose the partially-observable
potential based market maker (PoPMM) that allows prediction markets
to be run on partially-observable spaces, and expressing beliefs on both
observable and latent variables. We prove that the PoPMM maintains
the key properties of the standard PMM including bounded monetary
loss and weak incentive-compatibility. We show in details with two
practical examples how the PoPMM is designed from the latent variable
models involving exponential families, and demonstrate the PoPMM
properties by running experiments on them. Finally, we discuss how
we can further improve the PoPMM design, such that it can be strictly
incentive-compatible and can provide correct incentives for traders who
may revisit markets.
• To represent the market belief models beyond exponential families, in
Chapter 4, we focus on the development of the theory of generalized
exponential families (GEFs). We first complete the existing GEF the-
ory, and then develop the theory to characterize GEFs with conditioning
structures. For the first part, our key contribution is Theorem 4.8, which
gives the condition for when the whole GEF can be precisely captured
by the internal domain of its cumulant function. Based on this theorem
we redefine the concept of regularity and generalized Bregman diver-
gences, and further unify the existing concepts of regularity in different
formulations of GEF theory. We also give the first example of GEF on
the continuous sample space. For the second part, our key contribution
is Theorem 4.18, which characterizes those GEFs with additional con-
ditioning structures by a cumulant function with a simple nested form.
We then show all concepts and properties of the nested GEFs parallel
the GEFs.
We then replace exponential families with GEFs in the PMM design, and
replace exponential family involved latent variable models with nested
GEFs in the PoPMM design. We show both design generalization will
result in a much broader range of distributions for representing market
beliefs, while maintaining the market making efficiency.
• Chapter 5 covers market convergence and equilibrium analyses under
various circumstances, which are classified in two categories: conver-
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gence driven by the traders, and the convergence that are led by the
market maker itself.
In the trader driven convergence analysis, we first introduce a realistic
model for risk-averse traders using risk measures, providing two equiv-
alent formulations in share (dual) and price (primal) spaces. Then we
consider settings in which traders are trading sequentially or repeatedly,
and for each setting we derive the market-wise objective from each indi-
vidual trading goal, and match precisely the trading rule (without any
approximation) to the single optimization step towards the global objec-
tive. We also present an alternative niche model for risk-averse traders.
Along with our analysis, the connections between the market dynam-
ics and several optimization as well as machine learning problems are
drawn explicitly.
Then we discuss the convergence driven by the market maker, aiming
to obtain the convergence result when trader models are inaccurate or
traders are less controllable. Instead of modelling traders, we augment
market makers with an extra belief model for the equilibrium prices
and bid-ask spreads, allowing the market maker to learn the equilib-
rium prices from the trades and to set market prices efficiently. We con-
vert the market dynamics to an optimal control problem and solve its
Bellman equation. We demonstrate the convergence result using simu-
lations. The convergence result is suitable for understanding the market
involving stochastic traders from a fixed trader ensemble.
6.2 Future directions
This section points out several potential directions that are worth investigating
in the future research. For some topics, preliminary ideas are also presented.
Efficient computation of trading costs The cost of a trade is defined as the
difference between the values of the potential function at the pre-trade and
post-trade market positions. In this thesis the potential function is assumed
to be tractable. Hence the trading costs are cheap to obtain from the potential
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function. However, for PMMs with intractable potential functions, we have to
seek for another way of computing the trading costs. It is worth noting that
even for PMMs derived from exponential families, their potential functions
could be expensive or intractable to evaluate. For example, for a PMM en-
coding a d-dimensional multivariate Gaussian, its potential function involves
the log determinant and the inverse of the covariance matrix, both of which
has a time complexity of O(d3). As d increases, the computation quickly be-
comes expensive. Another example is a PMM which encodes a Restricted
Boltzmann Machine (RBM), which belongs to the exponential family but has
an intractable log partition function.
For a PMM that encodes its market belief in the exponential family, the cost
of a trade δt = θt − θt−1 is bounded from above
F(θt)− F(θt−1) ≤ δ>t ∇F(θt) = δ>t Epθt [φ]. (6.1)
We can redefine the cost of a trade as the upper bound, which is simply
the unit prices of securities multiplied by the amount of shares. Since the
new cost bounds the original from above, one can interpret the excess part
as the commission. Notice the subtle difference between the redefined cost
and the one used by Premachandra and Reid (2013): here the unit price is
computed at the post-trade position instead of the pre-trade position. For
intractable potentials, computing the exact unit price is also expensive and
we will estimate it using the samples {snt } drawn from pθt . However, if we
estimate each new price by drawing a new set of samples, the estimation
will suffer from high variances, making the mechanism unstable. One way
of mitigating the problem is to run a persistent Markov chain for sampling pθ,
which is similar to the idea of Tieleman (2008). To make persistent chain
work, each trade has to be restricted to a small amount of shares, such that
the post-trade market position is close enough to the pre-trade position to
ensure fast mixing of the samples.
Further work needs to be done to exploit the above ideas. Topics include
but not limited to: (1) how the new cost and its estimation will affect the
existing market results; (2) to what extent the persistent chain can reduce the
estimation variance; (3) how many shares can be traded without breaking the
persistent chain. It will be also interesting to explore other ways of efficient
computing the trading costs.
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PoPMM with sequentially observed information In our discussion all ob-
servable variables are revealed simultaneously, after which the market will
close. If the variables are sequentially observed, the market will keep run-
ning before all variables are revealed but its potential function will somehow
change in order to adapt the new revealed information. In the fully-observed
setting, Dudík et al. (2014) design a PMM for sequentially observable infor-
mation whose states will become less uncertain through time and are finally
completely determined.
From the probabilistic modelling point of view, the market running on se-
quentially observed variables effectively represents its belief as a state-space
model (e.g. hidden Markov model, linear dynamical system), and compu-
tation of the conditional market prices becomes the filtering problem. The
simplest implementation for the sequential setting is to concatenate multiple
independent PoPMMs, with the initial state of each PoPMM being the final
state of the previous one conditioned on the observed information.
Advanced analysis of potential based prediction markets A link between
the prediction markets and the financial markets has been revealed in Chap-
ter 4. This link may enable us to apply numerous tools developed in the
financial literature to prediction markets. On the other hand, since the po-
tential based prediction markets have close dependencies on the exponential
family which is the central object in information geometry (Amari and Na-
gaoka, 2007), advanced analysis can also be done from the geometry point of
view.
In fact, consider a PoPMM encoding an exponential family PΘ. The potential
of the PoPMM matches to the log partition of PΘ, F(θ) = log Z(θ). Then Θ
is a Riemannian manifold with metric given by ∇2F(θ). The tangent space
Tθ at each θ is a vector space spanned by the market instantaneous prices
at θ since p(θ) = ∇F(θ). Tθ can thus be understood as a market with fixed
prices, and each vector a in Tθ is a trade which costs a>p(θ). When new
information (i.e. the value of the observable variable v) is observed, the prices
in the fixed-price market will be adjusted to the gradient of the conditional
potential F(·, v). It can be verified that the prices of the fixed-price market at
the same θ across different information sets form a pθ-martingale, implying














t(θ) | F t−1] = pt−1(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ
Figure 6.1: Geometric view of potential based prediction markets. A potential based
prediction market could be viewed as a Riemannian manifold with metric ∇2F(θ).
The tangent space at each θ, Tθ, can be viewed as a market with fixed market prices
p(θ) = ∇F(θ). When new information is observed (here a filtration of σ-algebras
{F t} is used to denote the information available at each time t), the potential is
adjusted to its conditional potential, and the market prices are recalculated. In the
same fixed-price market Tθ, its prices across different information sets form a pθ-
martingale, where pθ is the exponential family distribution encoded by the market
position θ. Therefore, each Tθ is a financial market model.
that each fixed-price market, or each tangent space Tθ, is a financial market
model (Figure 6.1).
The above view sheds light on the intimate connections between prediction
markets, financial markets, and information/differential geometry. It would
be of interest to work further along this direction. It is also worth noting that
researchers have started to use the geometry for solving economics problems
in recent years (Marriott and Salmon, 2000).
Generalized exponential families in practice Generalized exponential fam-
ilies (GEFs) greatly expand the range of the probabilistic models that a po-
tential based prediction market can encode. However, computation of the
cumulants of the nested GEFs may not be efficient, if the underlying gener-
alized entropy is complex. In practice, one would like to further characterize
a special class of generalized entropy which can generate GEFs with cheap
cumulants.
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Robust market maker driven convergence As is pointed out, the conver-
gence result is efficient if the true price the market aims to discover is varying
through time. To obtain a robust result that can quickly adapt to the change
of the underlying true price, we can improve the price belief model (i.e. the
model used to augment the PMM) such that it now considers the dynamics
of the true belief. Switching linear dynamical system (Shumway and Stoffer,
1991) and Bayesian change-point model (Western and Kleykamp, 2004) are
promising candidates. Alternatively, similar to part of the trader driven con-
vergence results, we can also seek for a model-free result by applying methods
in online learning, which will hold for those true prices that change arbitrarily
or even adversarially.
6.3 Concluding remarks
This work studied the potential based prediction markets from the machine
learning perspective. Leveraging the links between the potential based pre-
diction markets and machine learning, this work enriched the probabilistic
models that a prediction market can encode, and matched the market dy-
namics to a variety of important optimization methods and machine learning
algorithms. It is anticipated that this work will help inspire further devel-
opments of prediction markets, and will also trigger more applications of
prediction markets in machine learning.
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